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Abstract
The effects of the recent financial crisis have been devastating. Its causes are not well understood, but
most people agree that incentive structures led to behaviors which are not captured by the standard
theoretical paradigms of finance and economics. In this thesis, I analyze two models in which incentive
structures cause deviations from such standard paradigms; one model focuses on the investment allocation
process at the portfolio level and the other focuses on the investment allocation process at the financial
system level. These two models are unified by the theme that incentive structures affect investment
and risk in ways which are not captured by prevailing theoretical paradigms; my goal is to analyze
these models so as to propose tools for identifying and/or mitigating their effects on risk and investment
allocation. In analyzing the results of the asymmetric compensation incentive structure at the portfolio
level, I propose a statistical inference tool which is able to decouple the information components of a
portfolio allocation due to an equilibrium asset pricing model from the components due to the portfolio
manager's proprietary views. Such information is useful for risk management purposes as it allows one
to examine whether the portfolio manager has implemented "outrageous" views in his portfolio. To
explore the effects of incentive structure at the financial system level, I analyze an agent based model of
the financial system inspired by recent empirical evidence of levered financial intermediary procyclical
balance sheet management practices and propose an optimal rate setting rule for the Federal Reserve
which mitigates some of the undesired effects on investment allocation and risk which arises from the
endogenous financial system agent interactions.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis started as a financial crisis; as is typical with such crises, it
quickly spread to the real economy. While its causes are not well understood, most people
agree that incentive structures led to behaviors which are not captured by the standard
theoretical paradigms of finance and economics. One popular incentive structure problem
involves financial decision makers, such as portfolio managers, who have adverse incentives:
they have a high payoff when they make money yet have limited downside when they lose
money; thus, they are incentivized to take large risks. Another popular incentive structure
problem involves levered financial intermediaries, who play an active role in channeling cap-
ital from ultimate lenders to ultimate borrowers instead of their traditionally passive role;
these intermediaries are governed by their desire to maximize returns but are regulated by
a VaR constraint. Both cases described above have the common denominator of incentive
structures resulting in agents taking actions that cause deviations from the prevailing stan-
dard academic paradigms. In the former case, a portolio manager's compensation scheme
incentivizes him to try to "beat the market"; he thus adjusts his allocations away from the
standard Markowitz efficient frontier in order to accomodate his personal views. In the lat-
ter case, a bankruptcy constraint imposed on levered financial intermediaries causes a series
of unintended dynamics because it incentivizes them to act in a procyclical manner; this
results in a behavior which can be summarized as "invest more following good investment
returns and divest more following bad investment returns"; such behavior may have broader
effects on the economy and it deviates from the paradigm set by existing standard macroeco-
nomic models. In this thesis, my goal is to explore both of the paradigm deviating incentive
structure cases described above in an analytic manner so as to understand their causes and
propose tools for identifying and/or mitigating their effects.
In analyzing the results of the asymmetric compensation incentive structure at the port-
folio level, I propose a statistical inference tool which is able to decouple the information
components of a portfolio allocation due to an equilibrium asset pricing model from the
components due to the PM's proprietary views. PM's are paid handsomely because of their
investment ideas and input. Such PM's have to combine publicly available information with
their own ideas/information in order to make optimal investment decisions consistent with
both information sources. Typically, PM's bring to the table their expertise on certain
sectors, inside/private information, and even their personal biases.' Indeed, many PM's
portfolio allocations are governed to a great extent by their proprietary views because they
are driven to add value to their portfolio and outperform the market. In this thesis, I propose
an estimation algorithm that disentangles the proprietary views from the public information;
given a set of portfolio weights and the public information, my algorithm estimates the num-
ber of views that the PM had, which assets each view involved, and the strength of each
view. Being able to solve such an "Inverse Problem" allows us to exactly determine what
the PM's value added is to his portfolio and whether he has "outrageous" views. Such infor-
mation can be useful to both the risk management committee of the firm as well as to the
'I group these manager "inputs" into the term "proprietary views" for brevity.
PM himself. From here on, I term the above problem the Inverse Problem.
To explore the effects of incentive structure at the financial system level, I analyze an
agent based model of the financial system inspired by recent empirical evidence of levered
financial intermediary active balance sheet management practices and propose an optimal
rate setting rule for the Federal Reserve (Fed) which mitigates some of the undesired effects
arising from endogenous financial system agent interactions. The key players in my model
are: the leveraged sector (e.g. hedge funds), the unleveraged sector (e.g. pension funds),
and the Fed. These agents pursue local optimization strategies and their interaction dictates
the amount of investment in the real economy at each point in time, the deviation of this
investment amount from that which is justified by the fundamentals, and the buildup of
risk in the system. In my analysis, I first explore the natural system dynamics under a
constant Fed Funds Rate (FFR) so as to isolate the effects of the leveraged sector's procyclical
behavior.2 Subsequently, I propose an optimal FFR setting rule which mitigates the frictions
to investment channeling caused by the endogenous interactions of these locally optimizing
agents; furthermore, I demonstrate that there is a fundamental tradeoff as it is not generally
possible to simultaneously have investment reflect fundamentals and have risk stay constant
in the system by only controlling the FFR.
The two models discussed above which I analyze in this thesis are essentially two pieces
of work which contribute to two different levels of applied finance, unified by the theme
that incentive structures affect risk in ways which are not captured by prevailing theoretical
paradigms: thus, this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part formulates and solves
the Inverse Problem; the result is an algorithm which allows the user to identify the PM's
portfolio deviations from the efficient frontier implied by the prevailing public information;
furthermore, the algorithm estimates exactly what the deviation implied PM's proprietary
views are. The second part formulates an agent based model of the financial system which
incorporates an active levered financial intermediary who acts in a procyclical fashion; the
effects of this behavior on aggregate investment and systemic risk are analyzed and a miti-
gating FFR setting rule is proposed.
2 A constant FFR is also a realistic assumption given that this rate stays approximately constant for long
periods of time compared to the typical decision making frequency of the levered and unlevered sectors.
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Extracting Portfolio Manager Alpha:
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2 Motivation for Inverse Problem
The recent financial crisis started as a banking crisis yet quickly spread to the real economy.
Indeed, one of the main culprits of the current crisis is widely believed to be the morally
hazardous "bonus culture" of Wall Street which results in excessive risk taking. From a
portfolio manager's (PM for brevity) perspective, since his compensation schemes mainly
take into account the short term profits he rakes in, he has an incentive to take huge risks
because if they pay off, he gets rewarded handsomely; on the other hand, if the risky positions
cause large losses for the portfolio, the PM does not lose his own money.
In this paper, we concern ourselves with portfolio managers; for intuition, you can think
of them as managing equities although the type of asset really doesn't matter in terms
of the techniques we present.3 Typically, PM's at large hedge funds, mutual funds, and
investment banks are paid handsomely because of their investment ideas and input. Such
PM's have to combine publicly available information with their own proprietary views.4 If
PM's used only public information for their investment decisions, they would be obsolete.
In fact, it is plausible that many PM's portfolio allocations are governed to a great extent
by their proprietary views because they are driven to add value to their portfolio and beat
the market; a manager's ego often adds to this phenomenon.
When observing the PM's portfolio allocations, an interesting question to ask is what
part of those allocations are due to the PM's proprietary views as opposed to the public
information available: in other words, can the proprietary views be disentangled from the
public information? Being able to solve such an Inverse Problem. would allow us to exactly
determine what the PM's value added is to his portfolio. Such information can be useful
to both the risk management committee of the firm as well as to the manager himself.
For example, a PM may consistently have outrageous views (given market circumstances)
on some of the assets that he manages; knowing that the PM is consistently inputting
outrageous views could be very useful for the risk committee. PM's rarely explicitly state
their outrageous views and senior management rarely intervenes when PM's are profitable, no
matter how the PM's make their investment decisions. Clearly, having an inference algorithm
which can pick out PM's who make wild bets can be used in mitigating company-wide risks.
Such an inference algorithm could also prove useful for the PM himself. For example,
an equity PM may have the proprietary view that the German DAX index will outperform
the US S&P 500 by 10% next year and change positions in his portfolio to reflect his belief;
however, due to the complex interaction of the assets in his portfolio through factors such
as correlations and currency risks, it may well be the case that his positions do not adjust
to consistently reflect both the public information and his proprietary view; in other words,
the PM may be incapable of updating his portfolio correctly to consistently incorporate his
subjective beliefs. An inference algorithm which would output the proprietary views implied
3 However, some of the assumptions used in the model are more realistic for highly liquid assets such as
equities.
4Note our use of the term proprietary views does not imply that these views are correct or that they
contain any predictive power for future asset returns; it is just a term used to describe any information set
that the PM has which is not part of the public information set.
by his portfolio allocations would be a useful "self check" tool.
A third application of such an inference algorithm could be "insider trading" detection.
Typically, when endowed with inside information on a particular stock, a sophisticated PM
will try to mask his view; he may adjust his position in multiple stocks so as to conceal his
information. With an inference algorithm that can separate proprietary views from public
information, a regulator can track a PM and see if he often inputs proprietary views on a
particular asset that uncannily turn out to be "right" most of the time. Tracking a PM's
proprietary views could also be used to predict his future proprietary views; for example, if
a PM often has a positive proprietary view on a stock, one can "frontrun" him and make a
profit.5
A fourth application of such an inference algorithm involves the aggregation of the propri-
etary views of a set of PM's. For example, at the firm level, one can aggregate the proprietary
views of each PM in the firm and generate an aggregate firm consensus or anti-consensus.
Thus, instead of just trusting the investment advice that a firm offers its clients, one can
examine whether the firm is implementing the advice that it gives to its clients. In theory,
there should be an overall proprietary view consistency result for the market as a whole: if
one could back out the proprietary views of every market player, these views should net out
to zero in some sense. For every positive proprietary view on an asset, there must be an
equally negative proprietary view from the rest of the market; else, the positive proprietary
view could not have been implemented in the first place.
The consistent way of combining public information with proprietary views is through
Bayesian updating: the public information results in a prior and the proprietary views
"update" the prior to form the posterior. In the portfolio management literature, much
emphasis is given on the expected returns. The Black-Litterman (BL) asset allocation model
([16] and [17]) is essentially a Bayesian updating algorithm which updates the prior on the
expected asset returns by incorporating the PM's proprietary views. The BL model is quite
popular in the portfolio management industry due to its intuitiveness, flexibility and ease of
implementation: the PM can express an arbitrary number of proprietary views on subsets of
the assets that he manages and obtain the updated market returns distribution that reflects
these views in a consistent way. Given that a PM is using the BL model framework, we seek to
develop an inference algorithm which will take as input the PM's portfolio allocations and the
public information available and will detect how many proprietary views the PM has, which
assets these proprietary views are on, and what these proprietary views are. We call this
problem the Inverse Problem. In what follows, the relevant previous literature is presented
in Section 3, the description of the BL model is presented in Section 4, some key theorems
needed to solve the Inverse Problem are presented in Section 5, the inference algorithm to
solve the Inverse Problem is presented in Section 6, simulation reults are presented in Section
7, and an empirical application of the inference algorithm on mutual fund data along with
5Frontrunning is the act of taking a position in an asset in advance of an action which will move the
asset's price in a predictable fashion. For example, if we know that a portfolio manager will have a positive
view on a stock in the next period, we know that he will buy more of it thus raising its price. We can take
advantage of this by buying the stock today and selling it to tomorrow since its price will be driven up by
the manager's action.
discussion are presented in Section 8.
3 Literature Review for Inverse Problem
There are two main versions of the BL model: the original model, which was created by
Black and Litterman ([16] and [17]), and the "simplified" model, which assumes that the
prior on the mean of the returns is a point estimate instead of a distribution. Relatively good
presentations of the original BL model can be found in [40] , [41], and [28]. The simplified
model is presented in [56] and Meucci ([49] and [51]). Although there is no shortage of
literature discussing the BL model, the presentations are largely mediocre: mathematical
derivations are often questionable and/or missing and explanations are disappointing. It is
our opinion that much of the BL literature copies previous literature resulting in mistakes
and omissions being carried through. In fact, we believe that the "simplified" model came
as a result of a shallow understanding of the original BL papers ([16] and [17]). Since the
BL model related publications are mainly from investment management practitioners who
either don't want to give explicit details regarding their ideas/methods or are not trained in
rigorous academic technical writing, the aforementioned problems should not be a surprise.
[40] compares the performance of the BL model with that of traditional mean-variance
optimization through an application to a portfolio consisting of the major stock index of the
G7. They demonstrate that the BL model gives more stable portfolios than the traditional
mean-variance approach. [36] modifies the classical BL model by applying different priors
for asset returns (the t-student distribution and alpha-stable distributions). [48] proposes
using a four moment CAPM risk model in the estimation of the prior distribution of returns;
however, they seem to ignore the posterior variance of the asset returns in their portfolio
optimization step. [33] illustrates how to incorporate a trading strategy in the BL framework:
they use the BL model to combine the output of a cross sectional momentum strategy (this
plays the role of the proprietary views) with the prior distribution resulting from public
information. [51] modifies the BL model so that the PM inputs views on the returns instead
of the expected returns: however, he simplifies the prior by assuming no estimation error. [27]
presents an extension of the BL model in which proprietary views can be on both individual
assets as well as on Fama-French type factor portfolios (see [34]). [63] presents an extension
of the BL model which allows for Bayesian learning from the data in addition to the PM's
proprietary views and the public information.
In terms of previous work related to the Inverse Problem, the only relevant paper seems to
be [35], which attempts to attack a somewhat related inference problem: in their paper, given
a set of portfolio weights and benchmark index returns, their goal was to derive the implied
expected returns that would make the given portfolio optimal; note that in their case, the
implied expected returns distribution was the "blended" return distribution resulting from
both the PM's proprietary views distribution and the prior returns distribution resulting
from a risk model such as the CAPM. Our Inverse Problem goal is much deeper than just
estimating what the PM's posterior returns distribution should be to make his portfolio
optimal: we wish to determine how many proprietary views the PM has, which assets the
proprietary views are on, and what these proprietary views are. It should be noted that
the inference method we present to solve the Inverse Problem can also be used (with slight
modifications) for the modified BL models of [48],[33], [51], and [63]. Furthermore, it can
also be used for the "simplified" BL model setup.
4 The Black-Litterman Model Setup and Intuition
In this paper, we use the original BL model because it is more complex, realistic, and rich.
Furthermore, the Inverse Problem solution is more complex and thus more interesting. The
assumptions underlying the BL model are the same as those underlying Modern Portfolio
Theory (MPT).6 In the BL setup, the PM is rational and faces a one period asset allocation
problem. He is risk averse and his risk-reward tradeoff can be described via a CARA (con-
stant absolute risk aversion) utility function, which reduces to a quadratic utility function
when returns are normal. In order to arrive at a portfolio allocation, he needs to have a
returns distribution on the assets. ' Given the returns distribution and his utility func-
tion, the PM runs an optimization routine so as to generate "optimal" (with respect to his
risk-return preferences) portfolio weights.
The BL model is a Bayesian updating algorithm which updates a prior returns distribu-
tion by incorporating the PM's proprietary views. More specifically, assume that there are
n assets in the market (which may include equities, bonds, and other assets); the returns
distribution of these assets is assumed normal:
x ~ N(p, E) (1)
where x represents the nz1 returns vector of the assets and the covariance matrix E is known.
With the Bayesian approach, the expected returns y are random variables themselves: they
are not observable and one can only infer their probability distribution. This inference
starts with a prior belief on p which comes from public information: this prior is updated by
incorporating the PM's proprietary views, resulting in a posterior distribution of the returns.
Below, we discuss the prior and proprietary views in detail.
4.1 The BL Prior
The prior distribution on p is formed through an asset pricing equilibrium model, such as
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).8 The main assumptions needed are that all in-
vestors have access to the same public information G (e.g. historical market data, announced
company-specific news, etc.) and that all investors maximize their expected utility (which
is CARA); furthermore, the returns distribution is assumed normal and there are no market
frictions. Thus, under the asset pricing equilibrium, all investors hold the same optimal
(with respect to their objective function) portfolio of risky assets;9 they differ only on the
amount of the risk free asset that they hold, which depends on their risk aversion. Since all
investors hold the same optimal portfolio, it must be the portfolio that the market holds as
a whole; this is called the market portfolio. By observing the market portfolio, one can back
out what the expected returns r implied by the asset pricing equilibrium are: these are the
6For a discussion of MPT and its assumptions, see Markowitz ([47]).
7 Unless otherwise noted, all returns refer to excess returns; an asset's excess return is defined as its return
minus the risk-free rate.
8The CAPM was originally proposed by Sharpe [57] and Lintner [45].
9Unless otherwise noted, the term "portfolio" will be used to refer to the portfolio of risky assets.
expected returns for which the demand of each asset equals its supply [15]. Mathematically,
each investor decides today on the portfolio allocations to maximize his expected utility in
time 1 conditional on the public information G available at time 0. Without loss of gener-
ality, assume that at time 0, his portfolio is worth $1: we denote by W the vector of weights
on the risky assets, wo the weight on the risk free rate, r the random vector of total returns,
rf the risk free rate, and by M1 the value of his portfolio at time 1. The PM's optimization
problem is:
max Eo (UilG) = max Eo ( -e AMG max Eo -A(+±'r+(- '1)|G) (2)
- maE0  -~ (1+'r+1-w1)r G) max E 0 (-eAw'(r-1rf)jG)= max Eo e-+Cr_- '"G)=mxE 
-- o
/A
= max Eo - max -e 2
W W
= max 's 7- -- 'Ew2
where A denotes his risk aversion and r Eo (x|G) = Eo(r - 1rf|G) is the vector of
expected excess equilibrium returns. For the market representative agent, who by definition
holds only the market portfolio weq (implying 1'Weq =1), the first order condition (FOC) of
the maximization in equation (2) is:
mkt
where Amkt is the market risk aversion. 10 Thus, the equilibrium expected excess returns can
be backed out if one is given the market equilibrium weights weq and Amkt. The market
equilibrium weights weq are observable: for an asset, its market equilibrium weight is defined
as the ratio of its market capitalization with the total market capitalization of all assets
in the investment universe." Furthermore, Amkt can be estimated by noting that the ex-
pected market portfolio return is given by w'qw: thus, multiplying both sides of the market
representative agent's FOC in equation (3) by Wq leads to the following expression for Amkt:
'eq7 = Amkt - Eo(xmt) - AmktVaro(xmkt) -> Amt =Eo(xmkt)
eq Var0o(xmkt)(4
ioNote that if the risk-free rate asset is in zero net supply, Amkt is a "weighted average" of all market
players' A.
iiOf course, calculating the market capitalization of all possible investable assets is unrealistic in practice.
Depending on the type of assets that a portfolio manager invests in, the investment universe is approximated
accordingly. For example, a US equity portfolio manager may use as his investment universe all stocks listed
on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX when calculating the market equilibrium weights. A Global Tactical
Asset Allocation (GTAA) manager who invests in G8 world markets may use as his investment universe all
stocks and bonds traded in the countries which he invests in.
Thus, an estimate of Amkt can be obtained through equation (4) where historical data is
used to estimate EO(Xmkt) and Varo(xmkt) by their sample counterparts.
The equilibrium expected excess returns vector 7r is the mean of the prior distribution
on p; however, there is uncertainty attached to the estimate because the market may not
necessarily be in equilibrium and/or the equilibrium weight estimation may suffer from noise.
Thus, the BL model models the prior on y as a normal distribution with a mean of 7T and a
covariance matrix of rE:
po ~ N(F, rE) (5)
where the subscript G indicates that the prior is based on the public information and the
scalar r represents the confidence that the PM has in the market equilibrium excess return
estimation. The fact that the covariance matrix of the prior distribution on y is proportional
to E is based on the assumption that the asset pricing equilibrium model for -F is a linear
factor model (see [28]). As for T, it is smaller than 1 since the uncertainty in the mean
returns should be less than the uncertainty in the actual returns. There will be a further
discussion of r later on.
4.2 The PM Proprietary Views
The PM may input proprietary views on various subsets of the assets that he manages:
for our purposes, it does not matter how and why these proprietary views are formed. The
proprietary views are statements on the vector y and can be of varying degrees of confidence.
They may be absolute views of the form "I expect stock a to return 5% with an uncertainty
of x%" or portfolio views of the form "I expect the portfolio consisting of 1 unit of stock
b and 1 unit of stock c to outperform the portfolio consisting of 1 unit of stock d, 1 unit
of stock e, and 1 unit of stock f by 10% with an uncertainty of y%". Denoting by k the
number of views that the PM has, we define the (kxn) matrix P as the pick matrix, where
n is the number of assets in the PM's investment universe: each view occupies one row of
P. Furthermore, we define the (kxl) views vector v, which contains the PM's views. A main
assumption of the BL model is that the PM's views v conditional on y can be modeled as a
normal distribution centered at Py:
V = Pp + E2 , C2 -~N(0, Q) (6)
where Q is a matrix containing the PM's uncertainties on his views. For illustration purposes,
if the PM has the two views specified in the first paragraph, then P and v are populated as:
assets
a b C d e f 1A 1 21^- 0.05
P= 1 0 0 0 0 0 ... 0 ,0.= 0.1
0 1 1 -1 -1 -1 ... 0- -
As for the uncertainty in each view, this is really just the standard deviation of the view
according to the model in equation (6): thus, in the example in the first paragraph, the Q
would be a diagonal matrix with x and y as elements. However Q need not be diagonal: the
model allows for correlation between the PM's views. The only requirement on Q is that
it be positive definite. As an example of correlated PM views, consider the following: the
PM believes that Apple will outperform Walmart by 3% and that Google will outperform
CVS by 7%. These views may both stem from a belief that financials will be stronger than
consumer staples. Thus, allowing for view correlation enriches the model.12 ,13
4.3 The BL Posterior
Given the prior on y and the PM's views, we can determine the posterior distribution on
y and thus the posterior distribution of x. Given the setup, the natural way to proceed is
through Bayes rule. Mathematically:
pdf (v| p)pdf ( p)pdf (jpv) = oc pdf (v Ip)pdf (p) (8)
pdf (V )
pdf (v) =f pdf (v p)pdf (p) d p is just a constant. Since both pdf (vIp) and pdf (P) are normal,
the posterior distribution is normal as well with mean IBL and covariance matrix EBL:
pdf(pv) ~ N(pBL, EBL) (9)
where
1 BL = [(TE)' + P'Q-'P] 1 (TE)- 7 + P'G- 1v] (10)
EBL T[(r) 1 + P'i 1 PV' (11)
The above result can also be derived through a mixed estimation approach." Notice that
IBL can also be written as:
PBL = YBL [(TE<' + P' 1 v] (12)
Equations (10) and (11) can also be rewritten in a more intuitive manner as:
PBL = 7 + TEP(TPEP'+ ) '(V - P7) (13)
EBL T - T2 Ep'(TP~p' + q)'pE (14)
12 Many authors mistakenly assume that Q need be diagonal in order to derive the BL posterior.1 3 If the manager uses quantitative factor models to form views, Q is simply the covariance matrix of the
residuals.
1 4 See [60] for a presentation of mixed estimation.
The variance of the posterior mean distribution is lower than that of the prior because more
information is added thus reducing the uncertainty of the model. The proof of equations (13)
and (14)can be found in the Appendix. Given the posterior distribution of P, the posterior
distribution of the returns is:
xlv ~ N(pjiv, Elv) = N(pBL, E - EBL) (15)
Since the posterior mean of the returns is a distribution itself, the variance of the posterior
returns needs to reflect this added uncertainty. Thus, the covariance matrix of the posterior
returns distribution is that of the prior plus the uncertainty in the posterior mean estimate
YBL. Armed with the posterior distribution, the PM can now proceed to optimize according
to equation (2), resulting in the BL portfolio weights:
11
WBL =IE BL) IpBL (16)
Before continuing, a few notes about Q and T. As is evident from equations (10) and (11),
TE and Q weight the prior expected excess returns and the PM views respectively. Thus,
higher uncertainty in an information source leads to a lower weight on that information. It
is clear that PBL can be written as a function of the "uncertainty ratio" Q/r. However, this
is not the case for EBL which can only be written as T times a function of /r. Thus, if
both T and Q go to zero (meaning full confidence in both the prior and the views on p) yet
/r goes to a non-zero finite matrix, then the posterior p becomes deterministic since EBL
goes to 0.
4.4 The Intuition Behind BL Portfolios
The basis of the BL model rests on the fact that in the absence of proprietary views, the
PM should hold the market equilibrium portfolio and possibly the risk-free asset, depending
on his risk aversion relative to the market risk aversion. Essentially, the BL weights reflect a
weighted average of two sources of information on p: below, we present 4 intuition building
observations, which are straightforward applications of the BL formulae:
1. If the PM has complete confidence in the equilibrium market prior (i.e. T = 0) then:
LJBL,T= = A eq (17)
Thus, if the PM has complete confidence in the prior, he will chose to hold the market
equilibrium portfolio. If his risk aversion is higher than the market risk aversion, then
his BL weights sum to Amt/A < 1, implying that he will also hold some of the risk-free
asset. If the PM is less risk averse than the market, his BL weights sum to Amkt/A > 1
implying that he will be short some of the risk-free asset in order to further invest in
the market portfolio.
2. If the PM has no confidence in his views (i.e. Q - oc) then:
1 E 1 T 'Amkt WeqWBL,+coo = A7li=T(18)
ZII+rT A 1+rT
Thus, if the manager has no confidence in his views, he will allocate his assets according
to the market equilibrium weights, scaled by 1/(1 + r), which reflects his uncertainty
on the prior. As his uncertainty T about the prior increases, he allocates less of his
wealth to risky assets. His risk-free asset allocation also depends on Amkt/A as was
the case above.
3. If the PM has no views (i.e. P=O), then:
1 ~ 1 mkt Weq
BL,P=o - 7 = lt (19)
A1+rT A 1+rT
Thus, if the manager has no views, he will allocate his assets in exactly the same way
as in the case where he has no confidence in his views (case 2 above).
4. If the PM is completely confident in his views (i.e. Q = 0) , then the entries in pBL
corresponding to the assets on which the manager has views on will depend only on the
views and not on the market equilibrium. For illustration purposes, assume that the
manager has absolute views on all n assets in his investment universe. Then, P = In
and the resulting BL weights are:
1
WBL,=O,PI (20)A
Note that equation (20) is exactly analogous to the standard FOC of equation (3),
where -r has been replaced by v and Amkt has been replaced by A. Thus, the PM is
allocating assets based solely on his views vector v.
5 Key Theorems and Definitions Needed to Solve the
Inverse Problem
Given the intuitiveness of these extreme case results presented in the previous section, one can
conjecture that the BL weights are a weighted average of the two sets of weights that would
be implemented under each of the two information sets. Clearly, the posterior distribution
on p is a blend of the two information sets: this leads to a posterior returns distribution, of
which the PM passes the first two moments through a mean-variance optimizer in order to
arrive at his BL allocation. Thus, it is not obvious what the relationship is between the BL
weights and the two sets of weights that would have been implemented under each of the
two information sets separately. However, if such a relationship did exist, then a solution to
the Inverse Problem may be possible.
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Figure 1: Flow chart depiction of the PM's BL
Problem logic (bottom panel).
allocation process (top panel) and the Inverse
The top panel of Figure 1 depicts the flow chart of the PM's BL allocation process; the
bottom panel depicts the logical flow of the Inverse Problem. The Inverse Problem uses the
PM's observed allocation in conjunction with the public information available in order to
estimate three things: the number of views k that the manager input, the assets that each
view involves (i.e. the P matrix), and the magnitude of each view (i.e. the v vector). By
definition, the Inverse Problem is ill defined in the sense that the PM may have views on
only a subset of the n assets that he manages (i.e. k < n); furthermore, these views may be
complicated portfolio views involving multiple assets. Moreover, we do not know how many
views the PM has. Thus, given the public information and PM's allocation on n assets, the
"system" is intuitively ill defined: loosely speaking, even if we had the information about
how many views the PM has and which assets each of these views involves, we would still
have n data points for estimating the magnitude of each of these views (i.e. the kxl views
vector v).
The beauty of the inference algorithm we present is that under a set of loose and realistic
assumptions, the Inverse Problem can be transformed into an exactly identified problem
thus allowing us to obtain a unique and exact solution. In order to develop an inference
algorithm to solve the Inverse Problem, we first present the necessary definitions needed and
derive the key theorems which lay the groundwork: these are presented in this section.
We denote the PM's proprietary views with the triplet (P, Q, v). Below, we provide the
definition of the concepts of internal consistency and informational equivalence of the PM's
proprietary views.
Definition 1 Internal Consistency: Assume that the PM expresses a (kxn) matrix P of
rank (I < k), a (kxl) views vector v, and a (kxk) confidence matrix Q. Furthermore, define
as B the (kxk) matrix which transforms P to its row reduced echelon form Prre f; in other
words, Prref = BP. The PM's proprietary views (P, Q, v) are internally consistent if all
three of the following hold:
1. There exists at least one solution vector p which satisfies the condition:
v = Pp (21)
2. The last (k-l) rows and the last (k-l) columns of the matrix rrerf B=-?B' are zero
vectors.
3. The "upper left" (xI) submatrix of Q.rre f BQB' is positive definite.
The intuition of the first condition in Definition 1 relies on the fact that each PM's view
is a statement on the expected return of some combination of assets. In other words, he
is making statements on the realization of the random vector Pp. A violation of the first
condition in Definition 1 would mean that there exists at least one asset on which the PM
has conflicting views. Note that if P has full row rank (I = k), then condition 1 above holds
for any v.
The intuition of the second and third statements comes from the main assumption of the
BL model that the manager's views can be modeled as:
o = PP + e2, E2 ~ N(O, Q) (22)
where S2 is a matrix containing the PM's uncertainties on his views. If we apply the B
matrix to both sides of equation (22):
By = BPpi + BE2 -> Veref = Prref/ + Be 2  (23)
where v.ref - Bv. From equation (23):
orref ~ N(Prref P, BQB') (24)
Note that since the matrix B performs the row operations on P required to get it in its row
reduced echelon form Prref, B is invertible. Since P has rank 1, the last (k - 1) rows of Prref
are zero vectors. Thus, since the first condition in Definition 1 must hold, the last (k - 1)
entries of the vector Vrref must be zero. Therefore, the condition that requires the last (k - 1)
rows and the last (k - 1) columns of Q = BQB' to be zero makes intuitive sense. As for
the "upper left" (lxi) submatrix of Q = BQB', we require it to be positive definite because
we assume that no linear combination of the I "independent" views has full certainty. Note
that for the remainder of this section, we assume that the confidence matrix Q is positive
definite (as is the case in the classic BL setup).
Definition 2 Informational Equivalence: Assume that the PM expresses a (kxn) matrix
P, a (kxl) views vector v, and a (kxk) confidence matrix Q. Furthermore, define B as some
(kxk) invertible matrix. For a given public information set, all triplets (P, I, ,v*) of the
form (P., Q, v.) = (BP, BGB', By) for some B are said to be informationally equivalent:
they all carry the same information about the manager's beliefs.
The above definition is best illsutrated through and example: the following three internally
consistent statements are informationally equivalent:
1. "asset 1 is expected to outperform asset 2 by 5% and asset 1 is expected to return 8%"
2. "asset 1 is expected to outperform asset 2 by 5% and asset 2 is expected to return 3%"
3. "asset 1 is expected to return 8% and asset 2 is expected to return 3%"
In terms of our notation, the above three views correspond to the following three triplets:
1, -1 0 0 ~ 5% 1 0 1=
P ~[I 1 0 0 0 v1= j8% ' 1
P2 1 -1 0 0 V2 5%W IU 1 -1 (5
0 1 0 0 2= 3% rr-1 21
Prref 1 0 0 0 8%r.f L WJ']L 1 1ePrer= 0 1 0 0 re 3% ' re = 1 2
The following theorem shows that for any (P, Q, v) triplet in a family which results in a
given WBL, the row reduced echelon form of the triplet is also in the family; the proof is
presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 Assume that the PM has internally consistent views. Assume that based on
his (P, 0, v) triplet, the PM's BL allocation is WBL. Define B as some (kxk) invertible
matrix. If P has full row rank, all allocations using the informationally equivalent triplet
(P., ,, v.) of the form (P,, Q*, v) = (BP, B7B', Bv) lead to the same BL allocation WBL -
A special case of such an informationally equivalent triplet is the row reduced echelon form
triplet (Prref, Orref Vrref5).
For the Inverse Problem, we seek to find an element of the triplet family which led to WBL
as our goal is to find the PM's proprietary views, not the specific (P, Q, v) triplet which
he input. Thus, the above theorem allows us the flexibility of assuming a relatively simple
structure on P, namely its row reduced echelon form. We will discuss the merit of this
later on in this section. Given the complicated expressions for pUBL and EBL involved in
the FOC in equation (16), the task of proving that a tractable closed form expression which
disentangles the public information from the PM's proprietary views exists seems daunting.
[40] conjectures that such a expression exists and propose the one given below, yet they
do not present a proof. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no other paper in the relevant
literature mentions or proves this result. In what follows, for simplicity, we assume that the
PM's risk aversion A is the same as the aggregate market risk aversion Amkt; however, this
assumption is not critical and a directly analogous result exists when the two risk aversions
differ. Theorem 2 below presents a key decomposition of the BL weights; it is proved in the
Appendix.
Theorem 2 The BL weights given in equation (16) can be factored into the following form:
Weq + Pm (26)
1 + r
where the (kxl) vector m is given by:
1 P7r PEP'
m =-A-(v - ), A -+ (27)A 1+T T +T
The (kxl) vector m is the "tilt" vector. Each view ultimately results in an element in
m: stronger views result in larger (in absolute value) m elements and thus cause a larger
deviation from equilibrium. The beauty of the factored form of the BL weights given above is
that it is intuitive and forms the basis for our attempt to solve the Inverse Problem, in which
P, v, , and T are unknown. The next section presents the inference algorithm created for
solving the Inverse Problem.
6 Solving the Inverse Problem
6.1 The Key Idea
Utilizing the factorization presented in Theorem 2 is the stepping stone for solving the
Inverse Problem. However, it is a seemingly impossible task: even if we knew T, the system
in equation (26) boils down to factoring an (nxl) vector into the product of a (nxk) matrix
and a (kxl) vector:
X= (1+ T) (WBL- I Weq P'm (28)
To make matters worse, we don't even know k: thus, we are factoring x into a product of
a rectangular matrix with another vector without even knowing what their dimensions are.
Clearly, solving such a system is impossible as there are an infinite number of (P, m) solution
pairs. Thus, we proceed by placing some relatively general and intuitive restrictions on the
P matrix. We will discuss how to get a reasonable estimate of T later on; for now, assume
it is given and thus that x is observed.
Definition 3 Allowable P Matrices: A (kxn) pick matrix is allowable if the following
two conditions hold:
1. Each asset in the PM's investment universe may be involved in at most one proprietary
view. A proprietary view may involve an asset in a "long" or in a "short" position.
Thus, if asset j is involved in view k, then all entries in the jth column are zero except
for the k th one.
2. If an asset is involved in a view, it must be involved as a whole unit. Thus, if asset j
is involved in view k, then the (kj) entry of the P matrix must be +1 or -1.
The following three P matrices illustrate the two definition conditions.
1 -1 0 0 0 0
P 0 0 0 -1 0 0 allowable
0 [ 0 0 0 -1 1
1 -1 0 0 0 0
P = 0 1 0 -1 0 0 not allowable
0 0 0 0 -1 1
1 -1 0 0 0 0
P = 0 1/2 0 -2/3 0 0 not allowable
0 0 0 0 -1 1/4
If we assume that the P matrix is allowable, then we can turn the ill defined system of
equation (28) into an exactly identified system. Consider what happens when asset j is not
involved in a view: then, the j'h column of P will be a zero vector. That means that the jth
row of P' will be a zero vector, which means that the jth element of P'm is 0. Mathematically:
W - 1 l+
BL + (c e (29)1 + r 1 +
Thus, if asset j is not involved in any views, then its BL weights should be exactly the same
as its equilibrium weight, normalized by the confidence in the CAPM prior.
Now, consider the case where asset j is involved in a view k in a long (short) manner.
Then, the (k, j) element of P will be a +1 (-1); the rest of the entries in the jth column will
be zero. That means that the jh row of P' will be a zero vector, except for the kth column,
which will be a +1 (-1). Thus, the Jth element of P'm will be +mk (-mik), where mk is the
kth element of the tilt vector m. Mathematically:
WBL 1 (i -l-'m±M) (30)
All assets involved in the kth view will be tilted by ±mk: the sign depends on whether the
view is long or short on the particular asset.
Thus, if there are 1 > k assets involved in k views, the system becomes an exactly
identified (kxk) system if one restricts P to be allowable. Using the logic behind equations
(29) and (30), each column of P' can be identified up to a sign: thus, there are 2k allowable
P matrices which we could infer from a given x. Later on, we will prove that all 2k lead
to informationally equivalent solutions. After having identified an allowable P, the system
is exactly identified. This is because there are (n - 1) equations of the form 0=0 due to
the fact that (n - 1) assets are not involved in any views. Furthermore, there are (I - k)
redundant equations as each asset in the same view has the same equation. Thus, there are
k independent equations (they are independent since P is allowable and thus must have a
rank of k) and k unknowns in m which means that there is a unique solution for m.
By placing intuitive restrictions on P, we have reduced the factorization in equation (28)
to an exactly identified system of equations. Conditional on P being allowable, we can arrive
at 2 k (P, m) pair solutions which are informationally equivalent. These restrictions on P are
relatively loose and mesh well with how the BL model is used in practice. There are two
justifications for the first condition of allowable P matrices:
1. Typically, the PM has views on a small number of assets compared to the size of his
investment universe (i.e. k < n). Thus, an asset being involved in more than one view
is not too common.
2. According to Theorem 1, the row reduced echelon form (Prref, 2rref, Vrref) triplet is
always in the family of informationally equivalent solutions for a given WBL. Often
times, a P matrix may not be allowable, yet its row reduced echelon form is allowable.
A good example of this is the situation in equation (5), where the first two P matrices
are not allowable yet the row reduced echelon form is. Thus, the restriction of having
an allowable P is really a restriction on at least one P matrix in a given family of
informationally equivalent solutions being allowable. Clearly, the latter fact allows for
a broader set of proprietary views by the PM.
As for justifying the second condition of allowable P matrices, recall that the proprietary
views are statements on the random vector of expected asset returns p. Thus, using different
units of assets within the same view is less natural. For example, statements of the form
"1 + 1/2pu2 = 3%" are mathematically valid yet unintuitive given the setup. Note that as
long as there exists a P matrix in the informationally equivalent set which satisfies:
mod(P, c) = 0 (31)
for some scalar c, then there exists a linear transformation of that matrix into a P matrix
which satisfies the second condition of allowability. Note that the mod(.) operator above
takes the modulo of each element in P. According to the above, the view "21 1 + 2[12= 6%"
can be transformed to an informationally equivalent view "PI +p2= 3%", which is consistent
with condition 2 of the definition of allowability. If we solved the Inverse Problem, we would
estimate the latter, which is informationally equivalent to the former.
Once we have identified m, finding v is straightforward because there is a 1-1 transfor-
mation between the two: solving equation (27) for v, we get:
P7r
v = AAm + 1+ (32)
1 + r
The transformation is 1-1 since A is positive definite and P is full row rank. Note that
assuming that P is full row rank is valid because of the first condition of allowability. Of
course, up to now, we have not discussed how to get Q; given the current setup, we will
need to make a parametric assumption on it. This is discussed below in the key assumptions
paragraph of the next section.
6.2 The Inference Algorithm for the No Noise Case
In this section, we present the inference algorithm we developed to solve the Inverse Problem
and the assumptions needed for it to lead to a solution.
Assumption 1 We use the same public information as the PM and define the "appropriate"
investment universe.
Assumption 2 The PM inputs the posterior returns distribution through a mean-variance
optimizer in order to arrive at an allocation.
Assumption 3 For the (P, Q, v) triplet that the PM inputs, there exists at least one infor-
mationally equivalent triplet whose P matrix is allowable.
Assumption 4 The elements in m are unique and nonzero: in other words, each view
results in a distinct tilt magnitude from equilibrium.
Assumption 5 The view confidence matrix Q is given by:
Q = PTEP' (33)
This form of Q is used heavily in the literature (see for example [50]) because 0 is an
unintuitive parameter matrix to set. This specification of Q gives more confidence to views
which involve less volatile assets and vice versa. Intuitively, this makes sense: saying that
Exxon-Mobil stock will return 5% is a more confident view than saying that Dryships (a
Nasdaq listed shipping company) will return 5% as the latter is more volatile and thus a
same magnitude view on it should give "less information". In any case, this assumption is
needed in order to reduce the number of unknowns. Nevertheless, it is intuitive, used by many
in practice, and is still a parametric function of two unknowns (T and P). It should be noted
that this assumption can be generalized to any Q which is a function of known parameters
and (possibly) T and P. However, we use the parametrization in equation (33) due to its
intuition and widespread use.
Assumption 6 The risk aversion A of the PM is the same as the market risk aversion
Amkt. Alternatively, assume that A is known. Below, we proceed as if Amkt = A; the
algorithm can easily accommodate having Amkt -/ A and can be straightforwardly modified
accordingly.
Given the above assumptions, we proceed to present the inference algorithm and then de-
scribe how each step is implemented: next to each step, we list what parts of the public
information and/or what variables estimated in previous steps we need.
Algorithm Steps Data Needed at Each Step
Step 1 Estimate the confidence in the prior T WBL, Weq
Step 2 Estimate the number of views k X - (1+ T) (JBL - - +Weq
Step 3 Identify the P matrix x, k
Step 4 Identify the tilt vector m x, k, P
Pwr
Step 5 solve for v = AAm + P,rT 7, E, AS+ rt
Table 1: The 5 steps of the inference algorithm and the data needed for each step.
For now, assume that we have estimated T. The next step is to estimate the number of
views that the PM had. Recall that all assets which are not involved in a view have a 0 in
the corresponding entry in x. Furthermore, all assets in the same view must have the same
absolute value in x because of the fact that P is allowable. Thus, estimating the number of
views boils down to grouping the elements of |x| and counting the number of resulting groups
with non-zero entries. This is represented graphically in Figure 2 below. After estimating
the number of views k, we must build the columns of P': each column corresponds to one
view. For a given view k, we find the indices of the elements of x which are in group k. For
every asset in that group, input a +1 in the corresponding entry of the column if its entry in
x is positive and a -1 if the entry is negative. For all other entries of that P' column, input
a zero. The process is illustrated in Figure 3. Having estimated all columns of P, solving
the resulting (kxk) system for m is straightforward: after obtaining m, v can be found by
using equation (32).
If the assumptions presented in the beginning of this section hold, then following the
inference algorithm is guaranteed to result in at least one (P, m) solution pair. The following
theorem formalizes this and is proven in the appendix.
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Figure 2: The above figure gives a graphical depiction of the procedure of estimating k.
We look at the absolute value of the entries in x and count the number of distinct nonzero
entries.
Theorem 3 Assume that the assumptions in the beginning of the section hold. Then, there
exists at least one solution pair (P,m) to the factorization problem x P'm if and only if:
1. Every element xi of the x vector belons to the set S:
xi E S, where S = {0,± , ± m 2 ,..., imk}, mi m $0 Vi $ j (34)
2. Each nonzero member of the set S', which contains the absolute values of the elements
of S, is present in |x|.
If one follows the convention for generating the P' columns above, the resulting m vector
will have only positive elements. In fact, one can follow any sign convention and arrive at
informationally equivalent results, as long as it is consistent within a group (i.e. all elements
in a group of x of the same sign will get the same sign in the P' column and all elements
in a group of x with different signs will get different signs in the P' column). Furthermore,
the ordering of the P' columns does not matter. The following theorem formalizes this and
is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 4 All possible (P, Q, v) solutions resulting from following the inference algorithm
under different sign convention and/or different group ordering are informationally equiva-
lent.
The inference algorithm is quite straightforward if we know what T is. However, if we were
to implement the inference algorithm in practice, we would not have access to the PM's T
and thus, we would have to get some sort of estimate of it. The issue of estimating T is
discussed in Section 6.4.
6.3 The Inference Algorithm when x is Noisy
In the real world, we would expect the x vector to be noisy because the PM may not be
able to obtain exactly the BL proportions he desires due to market frictions such as trading
costs and/or liquidity problems. Thus, the deviations from equilibrium for each asset may be
corrupted. Another part where noise shows up is in the estimation of the market equilibrium
weights Weq. Overall, due to the noise, we would not expect to find duplicate elements in |x|.
This makes it more challenging to estimate both the number of views and to partition |x|
into view groups. However, if the PM were a BL investor, we would expect to see clusters in
|x|. Thus, in the noisy case, estimating k and grouping the elements becomes a "clustering
problem". Figure 4 depicts a real Ix| vector from the iShares Small Growth Fund (July
2009 holdings). This is one of the mutual funds in Section 8 whose holdings we apply the
inference algorithm on. The x-axis is the deviation from equilibrium of each asset and the
plot is a 1-dimensional plot. The inference algorithm requires us to group the assets into
k view groups, where k is unknown. We must first decide which assets have 0 (or close to
zero) deviation from equilibrium; in the figure, this is the left most cluster without a circle
around it. Then, for the "non-zero view" elements, we must run an unsupervised algorithm
to determine both the number of clusters and which elements belong to each of the clusters.
This is harder than just running an unsupervised "clustering" algorithm because a view
may only involve 1 or 2 assets whereas another one may involve many. Furthermore, the
overall number of data-points can range from tens to thousands, yet clustering algorithms
typically are designed for datasets which have millions of data points and each cluster has
a comparable number of elements (biology applications). Nevertheless, so as to preserve
generality, we proceed without making any structural assumptions on the noise except that
Figure 3: The above figure graphically depicts the procedure for generating the P' matrix.
We group the nonzero entries of |xl into k groups, where k is estimated from step 2 of the
algorithm. Then, for each group, a column of P is generated in the following manner: for
every asset in a given group, we input a +1 in the corresponding entry of the column if its
entry in x is positive and a -1 if its entry is negative. For all other entries of the column, we
input a zero.
it is zero mean. Furthermore, we prove a "consistency" theorem which links Inverse Problem
solutions when the number of clusters is misestimated.
The main approach we take to partitioning |x| involves looping over a set K of possible
cluster numbers. For each k E {2... kmax}, we cluster the data according to the K-means
algorithm and compute a cluster validity index; we pick the k which maximizes this index
and keep the corresponding partition. After obtaining the partition, we find the center of
each cluster by averaging the elements in that cluster; we then assign each element of |xl the
value of its cluster center; we call this new vector |Y| . Finally, we create the vector y, which
is defined as:
y = sgn(x) j|J (35)
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of the elements in Ix vector from the iShares Small Growth Fund July
2009 holdings. The x-axis is in (%) units.
where sgn(x) is an (nxn) diagonal matrix whose (i, i) element is the sign of xi. Note that
y, satisfies the two conditions in Theorem 3 and thus, steps 3-5 of the inference algorithm
can be applied as in the no-noise case.
The cluster validity index which we used is a variant of the silhouette statistic. 15 This
validity index was chosen because it outperformed other validity indices in simulation, such
as the Calinski-Harabasz index ([26]), the average consensus statistic ([53]), and the average
fuzziness index ([14]).
For observation lxil, let a(i) be the average distance to other points in its cluster, and
b(i) be the average distance to points in the nearest cluster besides its own, where nearest
is defined by the cluster minimizing this average distance. Then the silhouette statistic for
that element s(i) is defined by:
s(i) - b(i) - a(i) (36)
max {a(i), b(i)}
Note that the silhouette statistic is between -1 and 1 by definition; element i is well clustered
if s(i) is close to 1. We modify the above definition of the silhouette statistic slightly for any
element in |xl which is clustered alone in order to alleviate the bias introduced by the fact
that elements clustered alone get a +1 when using the originial silhouette statistic formula
in equation (36). Clearly, this is undesirable as it will bias our estimate k upwards.
15For a good discussion of K-means clustering and the silhouette statistic, see [52] and [43].
For an element |xil that is clustered alone, define as dieft as the distance to its closest
neighbor on the left and dright as the distance to its closest neighbor to the right. If |xil is
not the smallest or largest element in |xj, we define its silhouette statistic as:{1  min {dient,drightl
s(i) = min 1 i lf dih (37)
s mxi I - mean(deft, dright)I I
If |xil is clustered alone and happens to be the leftmost element, we define its silhouette
statistic as:
s(i) = min 1, dright (38)
mean(jIxj|}
Analogously, if |xil is clustered alone and happens to be the rightmost element, we define its
silhouette statistic as:
s(i) = min 1, dieft (39)
mean(jxjj)
The optimal number of clusters k is that for which the resulting partition has the highest
average s(i) over the data set:
Sk
k = arg max (40)kEK n
Note that sk(i) is not defined for the k = 1 cluster case. However, in practice, this is ok
because one cluster would mean that either all the PM's assets are involved in one view or
that he has no view on any of the assets; furthermore, a visual inspection of the data can
easily pick up such cases.
Given the intricacies of deciding the number of clusters in |x|, there is a chance of misesti-
mating the number of clusters. The following theorem provides a consistency result between
two (P, m) factorizations which differ in the number of clusters.
Theorem 5 Assume that the noisy vector z is observed. Consider two different factoriza-
tions (]Pk, Mk) and (P1, mi) of 5F resulting from estimating two different view numbers k and I
respectively, where 1 > k. Define the resulting views vectors as ok and v, respectively. Define
as L the set of all (kxl) matrices which satisfy the following 3 conditions:
1. All entries are 0 or +1.
2. Each column of A c L has exactly one +1.
3. Each row must have at least one +1.
Then, there exists a matrix A E L such that Pk = AP 1 . Furthermore:
1. If i is not corrupted by noise, then Vk= Avj.
2. If 1 is corrupted by noise, then E (Avi - vk) = 0.
The above theorem basically says that if the number of views is overestimated, and if one
knows the matrix A, which "sums" the rows of P in such a way so as to get Pk then one
can reconstruct the correct views vector ok by applying the same matrix A to vi. This means
that overestimating the number of views does not cause a loss of information. There is a
consistency between the various (P, v) solutions of different dimensions. Note that such a A
matrix is guaranteed to exist because the P matrices are allowable.
6.4 Estimating T
Recall that for the BL model to make economic and statistical sense, T must be smaller
than 1. If there were no noise, one could loop over X(T) and keep all T which lead to a
number of groups in x(r) (including the "no view" group) less than or equal to the number
of assets n. However, this is clearly not an optimal strategy as it may not lead to a unique
T. Furthermore, in practice, there is noise in x and thus the above approach doesn't make
sense. In theory, we can only pinpoint a unique T if we add an additional restriction to the
type of views that the PM can have. To understand what type of restriction we would need,
observe that:
k
1+ E ncmc
lWBL = 1 (1+1'P'm)= c= _ + z (41)
1+rT 1+r i-+T
where the scalar z is the "net bullishness" of the overall views of the PM. If view k is a long
(short) biased view, then 1'P' = nk, where nk is the sum of the elements in the kth column
of P', which is positive (negative). If view k is a portfolio view (i.e. same number of long
k
positions as short positions), then 1'P' = 0. Thus, intuituvely, the quantity z ncmc
c=O
is the net bullishness of the PM. If z 0, then we could solve equation (35) for r:
1
r - 1 (42)
1'WBL
Of course, if the BL weights sum to more than 1, we know that the net bullishness cannot
be 0. If they sum to less than one, then we can't differentiate between a higher r and a more
negative net bullishness given the information set that we have. Fortunately, in practice,
we have a prior about a PM's investment style focus (e.g. Large Cap stocks vs Small Cap
Stocks or High Value stocks vs Low Value stocks): we can use this information to justify a
practical way of estimating T and validating the result.
The idea for estimating T stems from the following piece of intuition: there is probably
an aggregation of the PM's portfolio into a 2x1 vector such that it is quite likely that he has
only one long-short view. For example, take a portfolio and classify each element as a Large
Cap or Small Cap stock. Do the same for the market portfolio and look at the difference. If
for some T E [0, 1] the resulting difference looks like:
X2(r) [+a + El, where 1'x 2 (T) < 0 (43)
- a+ E2
where E1 and E2 are relatively small, then one can convincingly make the argument that:
P2 = +1 m = a + and 1'P'2m = 0 (44)
-1 2
meaning that it is valid to search for a T* in the vicinity of T such that I1'x 2 (T*) is minimized.
Proceeding more formally, denote by x,(T) the original x vector of portfolio holdings. One
can create an arbitrary 2x1 aggregated portfolio by left-multiplying xn(T) by a (2xn) matrix
A E L where the family L is defined as in Theorem 5. Thus:
X 2 (T) = Axz(r) (45)
Essentially, we want to find a (2xn) matrix A C L and a T such that the entries in x2 (T)
are of opposite sign yet of similar magnitude: then, we can make the argument in equations
(43) and (44), and then find a T* in the vicinity of T such that I1'x 2 (r*) is minimized.
If there exists a region T C [0, 1] of taus such that for all T C T, there exist at least two
elements z4(r) and x(() in Xn(T) such that x'(r)x(T) < 0, then there exists at least one
A E L such that x2r)x (T) < 0 . One could then do the following minimization and get an
estimate of T*:
min 1'Axn(T)| (46)
AEL,-rET
The closer the objective function gets to 0, the more confident we are about our estimate
T*. Note that the above approach will yield a negative r* if 1'X2(r) > 0. Thus, a necessary
condition for getting a non-negative 7 is to have a non-negative investment in the risk-free
asset so that l'x 2 (T) < 0. If this is the case, then the minimization in equation (46) can be
simplified to:
min -1'Axz(T) (47)
AEL,TT
In any case, mimizing the argument in equation (47) is an NP-Hard problem. However,
in practice, we typically have some idea on which A matrices to try because as mentioned
before, we typically have some idea of the PM's investment strategy. Thus, the set of A
matrices we would need to search over is significantly reduced.
7 Simulations
In this section, we explore the robustness of our inference algorithm by running simulations.
Given the problem setup, there are three main sources of noise which can corrupt x in
practice:
1. The PM may not be able to obtain exactly the BL weights he desires due to market
frictions such as trading costs and/or liquidity problems.
2. The estimation of the market equilibrium weights may be noisy due to a misspecifica-
tion of the PM's investment universe.
3. The T estimate may be noisy.
Our aim is to examine the robustness of steps 2-5 (see Table 1) of our inference algorithm:
in other words, given an observed noisy i, how does each estimation step perform? Recall
that from a single vector, we need to estimate the number of views k, the assets involved in
each view, and the magnitude of each view. Since this is a sequential procedure, mistakes in
a given stage are carried through. To build some intuition about the nature of what could
go wrong, consider the following possible errors:
1. The number of views could be overestimated or underestimated: thus, the dimension-
ality of the problem is corrupted. In the "overestimation" case, some views will involve
fewer assets and extra views are "created" that the PM does not have: for example,
having the original view of "the portfolio that is long 1 unit of Apple, long 1 unit of
IBM, short 1 unit of Exxon-Mobile, and short 1 unit of BP, will return 5%" is quite
different from having the 2 views "the portfolio that is long 1 unit of Apple, long 1
unit of IBM, and short 1 unit of Exxon-Mobile will return 8%" and "the portfolio that
short 1 unit of BP will return -3%". Thus, if the PM has a pairwise sector bet (i.e.
the original view), estimating two views which are directional and of which the second
is asset specific is clearly not desirable from a practical point of view.
In the "underestimation" case, assets involved in different views are lumped into one
view: for example, the PM may have two absolute views on two assets based on his
analysis. Clearly, information about the PM's input is lost if the two distinct views
are lumped into one.
2. Even if the number of views is estimated correctly, the assets involved in a given
view may be misspecified. For example, an estimated view may end up having either
"additional" or "omitted" assets.
3. Even if both the number of views and the assets involved in each view are estimated
correctly, the magnitude of each of the views is vulnerable to estimation error due to the
noise in i. Although undesirable, this is less of a problem because the dimensionality
of the problem is not affected. Essentially, erros in 5 are filtered through the A matrix
(see equation (32)). Since in this scenario, P is assumed to be estimated correctly, the
magnitudes of the errors in v depend purely on the magnitudes of the errors in Y vis
a vis the errors in m resulting in step 4 of the algorithm.
In the simulations we present, we aim to understand the errors introduced in each of the three
possible stages described above; we will present 3 simulation cases of varying complexity.
In our simulations, we use a portfolio of 25 assets; the reason for using 25 assets is that in
Section 8, we apply the inference algorithm to real mutual fund portfolios where we aggregate
a fund's holdings into 2x3 and 5x5 Fama-French portfolios. In each simulation, we start with
a set of public information, a P matrix, and a T. Then, we follow the steps below:
1. We vary the "strength" of the views vector input v from (P7 - 2%) to (P7 + 2%) in
increments of 0.1%, resulting in 41 different view vector inputs.
2. For each of these 41 view vectors v that we input, we create the corresponding x vector
of equilibrium deviations.
3. For each of these 41 x vectors, we generate 2000 noisy observations Y which are cor-
rupted by adding a zero mean Gaussian noise random vector. We use a "low" noise
level of standard deviation 1% and a "high" noise level of standard deviation 2%.
4. For each of the 2000 noisy Y vectors resulting from each of the 41 x vectors, we run
our inference algorithm. For each of the 41 different PM view vector inputs, we report
the following:
(a) The average and median error in the estimation of the true number of views k
over the 2000 trials.
(b) The average and median number of P rows that are identified correctly over the
2000 trials.
(c) For each of the 2000 trials where both the number of views k and the P matrix
are estimated correctly, we calculate the distance between the estimated views
magnitudes vhat and the input views vector v'', where the distance measure is
defined as:
k
v hat _ true
d(Vhat, rtrue) 1 k (48)
We report the average and the median of this distance. It is worth noting that
it would not make sense to report the performance of the v estimation statistics
for the case where not all rows of P are estimated correctly: this is because v
is a linear function of m (see equation (32)) and the matrix A is a function of
PEP'. Thus, if a set of rows of P are misestimated, this will corrupt not only
the magnitude of the corresponding views but also the magnitude of the views
corresponding to the rows of P that have been estimated correctly. The degree
of this corruption will depend on the matrix E. Therefore, it makes sense to
quantify the distance measure proposed in equation (48) only if the estimated P
is fully correct.
In the following 3 sections, we present and discuss the results for each of the three simulation
cases in order of increasing complexity.
7.1 Case 1: One Portfolio View
In this section we present the simplest of the three simulation cases that we explored. It
involves one portfolio view on 4 assets: more specifically, the view is of the form:
ai - a5 + a21 - a2 5  v (49)
where ai refers to asset i. Figure 5 plots the mean and median estimated number of views for
each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7 and under each of the two noise scenarios (low
and high). Overall, the inference of k is very accurate: the larger the deviation of the views
from equilibrium, the more accurate our estimate is. The number of views is estimated to
be 1 for all 2000 trials for equilibrium view deviations above (in absolute value) 0.7% for
the low noise case and 1.4% for the high noise case. This is very promising and underscores
the robustness of Step 2 of our algorithm in this simple case. In practice, most of the PM's
views will deviate significantly from equilibrium: being able to pick up views that deviate
so little from the equilibrium is a very significant result.
Figure 6 depicts the results for identifying the P matrix. More specifically, for each of
the 41 equilibrium deviations v - Pqr, we plot the mean and median number of the rows
of P that are estimated correctly: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases.
Again, the performance is very strong: the P matrix is estimated correctly 90% of the time
for equilibrium view deviations above 0.3% (in absolute value) for the low noise case and
0.7% (in absolute value) for the high noise case. Notice that for some small equilibrium view
deviations, although the number of views is estimated correctly, the P matrix may not be
estimated correctly. This happens when clusters are close by and some elements may jump
from one cluster to another without altering the estimate of the number of clusters.
Figure 7 depicts the distance between the estimated and true v vectors for all the sim-
ulation trials where the number of views and the P matrix were estimated correctly. More
specifically, for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r, for each of the trials where k
and P are estimated correctly, we plot the mean and the median of the distance between the
estimated and true v: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases. Overall, the
mean and median errors are mostly below 0.02% for the low noise case and below 0.06% for
the high noise case. Note that there is a "gap" in the plot for the 0% and ±0.1% equilibrium
view deviation points: this is because for such small deviations, either k and/or P were
misestimated for all of the 2000 trials. Thus, we conclude that the last step of the algorithm
performs very well if k and P are estimated correctly.
Overall, it seems that the noise in Y has the potential to severly impact estimating
k; however, if k is estimated correctly, then P will be estimated correctly unless the noise
corrupts some points so much that they actually switch clusters without affecting the number
of clusters. If steps 2-3 of the algorithm go well, then essentially, the noise in 3 is transferred
directly to m. Recall that each element in m is a "tilt" from equilibrium due to a particular
view; in our inference algorithm, within a group k of IF|, we average its elements in order to
get mk. If the noise is zero mean, then on average, nk is unbiased; thus, the more elements
a group has, the more likely it is that the estimated ik is close to the true value. The vector
m is then filtered by the matrix A (step 5 of the algorithm), which essentially is a covariance
matrix. Given that the elements of A are much smaller than 1, small noises in m result in
even smaller noises in v. This is exactly why the errors in v in Figure 7 are on the order of
hundredths of a percent compared to the order of the noise we added to x which is on the
order of 1%.
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Figure 5: Mean and median estimates of the number of views for each of the 41 equilibrium
deviations v - P r and under each of the two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 1.
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Figure 6: Mean and median estimates of the number of the rows of the P matrix that are
estimated correctly for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r and under each of the
two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 1.
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Figure 7: Mean and median estimates of the distance between the estimated and true v
vectors for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r and under each of the two noise
scenarios (low and high) for Case 1.
7.2 Case 2: Three Views
In this section, we present a more complex example where the PM has three views which
are not all portfolio views and which involve different numbers of assets:
-a 21 +a 2 5  V1
+a 16  +a 17 -a 20 = V2  (50)
+ai,= V3
Figure 8 plots the mean and median estimated number of views for each of the 41 equilibrium
deviations v - P7 and under each of the two noise scenarios (low and high). As was the
case in Case 1, the larger the deviation of the views from equilibrium, the more accurate
our estimate of k is. The number of views is always estimated correctly for equilibrium
deviations above 0.7% (in absolute value) for the low noise case and for deviations above
1.4% (in absolute value) for the high noise case. Although there are now three views instead
of just one, the performance is as robust as that of Case 1. Clearly, the clustering algorithm
we use in Step 2 is able to handle more complex cluster structures; this is a testament to our
modified Silhouette Statistic criterion for selecting the number of clusters (see Section 6.3).
Figure 9 depicts the results for identifying the P matrix. More specifically, for each of
the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7, we plot the mean and median number of the rows of
P that are estimated correctly: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases. The
P matrix is always estimated correctly for equilibrium deviations above 0.7% (in absolute
value) for the low noise case and above 1.4% (in absolute value) for the high noise case.
Figure 10 depicts the distance between the estimated and true v vectors for all the
simulation trials where the number of views and the P matrix were estimated correctly.
More specifically, for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7, for each of the trials
where k and P are estimated correctly, we plot the mean and the median of the distance
between the estimated and true v: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases.
Overall, the mean and median errors are mostly below 0.04% for the low noise case and
below 0.08% for the high noise case. Note that the "gap" in the plots for points near an
equilibrium deviation of 0% is due to the fact that either k and/or P were misestimated for
all of the 2000 trials: compared to Case 1, the gap covers the same (small) band because
our k and P estimates are as accurate as in Case 1. As was the case in Case 1, the last step
of the algorithm performs very well if k and P are estimated correctly.
Overall, although this case has added complexity compared to Case 1, the performance
of our algorithm is as robust.
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Figure 8: Mean and median estimates of the number of views for each of the 41 equilibrium
deviations v - Pr and under each of the two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 2.
Number of P Rows Estimated Correctly per Equilibrium View Deviation
2.Z5 -
-o2
U
E
0.15-
0
.0
E
z
0.5 -
S--mean, noise standard deviation =1%
median, standard eviation =1%
- mean, noise standard deviation =2%
0 
- median, standard eviation =2%
-2 15-1 -05 0 05 1 1.5 2
Equilibrium View Deviation (%)
Figure 9: Mean and median estimates of the number of the rows of the P matrix that are
estimated correctly for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r and under each of the
two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 2.
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Figure 10: Mean and median estimates of the distance between the estimated and true v
vectors for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - Pr and under each of the two noise
scenarios (low and high) for Case 2.
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7.3 Case 3: Six Views
In this section, we present an even more complex example where the PM has six views which
are not all portfolio views and which involve different numbers of assets:
+a 4  +a 5  V1
+a 6  -a 7  -a 8  -ag -aio = V2
+all 
-a 14  V3 (51)
+a 16 -a 17  -ai 8  -a 20  - V4
a22 v 5
a21  -a 24 -a 25  V6
Figure 11 plots the mean and median estimated number of views for each of the 41 equilibrium
deviations v - P7r and under each of the two noise scenarios (low and high). As expected, the
larger the deviation of the views from equilibrium, the more accurate our estimate of k is.
Although the median estimate of the number of views is equal to 6 for equilibrium deviations
above 0.3% (in absolute value) for the lwo noise case and 0.6% (in absolute value) for the
high noise case, the average remains elevated above 6 even for equilibrium view deviations of
2% in the high noise case. This indicates that there are some outlier cases where the number
of views are misestimated: in any case, the trend shows that if deviations get larger towards
3%, the number of views will always be estimated correctly.
Figure 12 depicts the results for identifying the P matrix. More specifically, for each of
the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r, we plot the mean and median number of the rows
of P that are estimated correctly: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases.
As the equilibrium view deviation increases, the fidelity of our P matrix estimate increases.
Although the median number of correctly estimated P rows settles at 6 for equilibrium
deviations above 0.6% (in absolute value) for the Iwo noise case and 1.1% (in absolute
value) for the high noise case, the average remains slightly below 6 even for equilibrium view
deviations of 2%. Part of this phenomenon is due to the fact that if for a certain trial, the
number of views is misestimated, then not all 6 rows of P can be estimated correctly. In
any case, the trend shows that if deviations get larger towards 3%, the P matrix is always
be estimated correctly.
Figure 13 depicts the distance between the estimated and true v vectors for all the
simulation trials where the number of views and the P matrix were estimated correctly.
More specifically, for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - Pir, for each of the trials
where k and P are estimated correctly, we plot the mean and the median of the distance
between the estimated and true v: we do the above for both the low and high noise cases.
Overall, the mean and median errors are mostly below 0.1% for the low noise case and below
0.2% for the high noise case. Note that the "gap" in the plots for points near an equilibrium
deviation of 0% is larger than in the previous two cases (compare to Figures 7 and 10); this
is merely a reflection of the fact that k and/or P were misestimated for all of the 2000 trials
in a larger band around 0% equilibrium deviation. However, as was the case in the previous
2 cases, the last step of the algorithm performs very well if k and P are estimated correctly.
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Figure 11: Mean and median estimates of the number of views for each of the 41 equilibrium
deviations v - P7r and under each of the two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 3.
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Figure 12: Mean and median estimates of the number of the rows of the P matrix that are
estimated correctly for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - P7r and under each of the
two noise scenarios (low and high) for Case 3.
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Figure 13: Mean and median estimates of the distance between the estimated and true v
vectors for each of the 41 equilibrium deviations v - Pr and under each of the two noise
scenarios (low and high) for Case 3.
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8 Applying the Inference Algorithm to Mutual Fund
Holdings
In order to test the performance of the inference algorithm on real data, we apply it to
various mutual fund holding data obtained from Morningstar. However, we do not apply
it at the individual stock level; rather, we apply it at a Fama-French (FF) portfolio level.
Thus, our goal is to estimate the proprietary views of the PM on the FF portfolios: we focus
on the 5x5 FF portfolios. There are two main reasons why we chose to focus on the FF
portfolios:
1. Running the inference algorithm at an individual equity level would return views on
individual stocks. However, it would be much more interesting to measure whether
a PM has views on FF factors such as value or size because such funds typically self
proclaim themselves as "Large Cap Growth", "Mid Cap Value", etc.
2. A typical equity portfolio manager holds between 100-500 stocks. However, the appro-
priate investment universe for a US equities PM has more than 7000 stocks. Thus, in
practice, we would observe that the PM would have many assets with a 0 weight, which
would be considered a deviation from the market equilibrium if interpreted strictly un-
der the BL paradigm. However, in reality, there are numerous reasons why a PM may
invest in much fewer stocks compared to the size of his investment universe. Some of
the key reasons include limited time, attention, and liquidity.
8.1 Data Description and FF Portfolio Formation
We present the results for two mutual funds with different stated investment strategies. For
each fund, we ran the inference algorithm on their portfolio holdings twice a year since 2005:
thus, we were able to track each PM's views over time. We chose funds that have a relatively
large number of holdings and report those holdings on a regular basis. Furthermore, we chose
funds which invest only in US equities and "risk-free" securities (such as money market funds)
so that we can readily define the FF factors. Table 2 presents the two funds we analyzed
along with their stated investing style and the average number of stock holdings over our
sample period.
In order to organize the market and mutual fund stock level portfolios into FF portfolios,
we used the market cap data from the CRSP database and the book value data from the
Compustat database. We defined the FF factors exactly as in [34]. At a given time, for a
given stock in a portfolio, we use the respective FF cutoffs for that time in order to classify
the stock as belonging to one of the FF portfolios: the PM's weight in a given FF portfolio
is defined as the sum of the portfolio weights of the stocks in the mutual fund which fell into
that particular FF portfolio category as defined by the FF cutoffs for that period. Thus, at
a given time, for each fund, we obtained a 251 (6x1) vector for the 5x5 (2x3) FF portfolio
case. We performed the analogous procedure to determine the market equilibrium weights
at each time. In order to organize the market and mutual fund stock level portfolios into FF
portfolios, we used the market cap data from the CRSP database and the book value data
from the Compustat database. We defined the FF factors exactly as in [34). If the portfolio
date was between July-December of year t, we used the (market equity) ME at the end of
June of year t: furthermore, to get the book to market (BTM), we used the book value for
the fiscal year ending in year t-1 and divided it by the ME at the end of December of year
t-1. If the portfolio date was between January-June of year t, we used the (market equity)
ME at the end of June of year t-1: furthermore, to get the book to market (BTM), we used
the book value for the fiscal year ending in year t-2 and divided it by the ME at the end of
December of year t-2.
In order to estimate E and Amkt for the 2x3 and 5x5 FF portfolios, we used the reported
returns series on Ken French's website. We used monthly data for a 6 year rolling window
starting 72 months before the portfolio date. The vector ir was estimated by using equation
(3). Each PM's tau for a certain portfolio date was estimated according to the methodology
presented in Section 6.4: the result is presented in Figure 14.
Fund Name Fund FF Strategy Average Number of Assets
Fidelity Mid Cap Value Fund Mid Cap Value Stocks 114
GMO US Core Equity Fund Core Stocks 266
Table 2: Summary of the two mutual funds we analyzed.
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Figure 14: Left: Graphical illustration of FF portfolio notation for the 5x5 case; the 2x3
case is analogous. Right: tau over time for the mutual funds that we analyze.
In terms of annotating the results, we use letters to indicate the size and numbers to indicate
the value of a portfolio: this is graphically depicted in the left panel of Figure 14. Thus, for
example, in the 2x3 case, b3 indicates a relatively small core stock (i.e. size is between 2 0 th
and 4 0 th percentile, value is between 4 0 th and 6 0 th percentile).
For a given fund, the PM may have a different number of views involving different assets
at different times. In our notation, this means that the P matrix has different dimensions
and/or different rows at each time. Clearly, reporting a sequence of (P, v) results is not a
practical way of displaying results. Thus, for each fund, we separate the views by the number
of assets that they involve and present those which best illustrate each fund's overall views
for clarity.
8.2 Mutual Fund Results
The The Fidelity Mid Cap Value Fund reports that its strategy is to invest in Mid Cap
Value stocks. The The GMO US Core Equity Fund reports that its strategy is to invest in
Core stocks but does not specify the size. Figure 15 plots all of the one asset equilibrium
view deviations v - P7T and Figure 16 plots all of the two asset equilibrium view deviations
v - P7r that were estimated over time for the Fidelity Mid Cap Value Fund. Figure 18 plots
all of the one asset equilibrium view deviations v - P7 and Figure 19 plots all of the two
asset equilibrium view deviations v - P7r that were estimated over time for the GMO US
Core Equity Fund. In these plots, each point corresponds to a view at a given time: in other
words, each point corresponds to a row of a P matrix. The y-axis depicts the estimated view
deviations from equilibria in annualized %: for a given view, this is simply the estimated
view magnitude less the market implied expected return for that combination of assets.
Given the Fidelity fund strategy, we would expect it to be bullish for midsize value stocks
and bearish for small growth stocks and/or large growth stocks compared to the market. In
Figure 15, it is clear that compared to the market, the fund is consistently very bullish on
the c5, d4, and d3 portfolios (i.e. Mid Cap Value and Core) and slightly bearish on the el
and e2 portfolios (i.e. Large Cap Growth). In Figure 16, it is clear that the Fidelity fund is
consistently bullish on mid cap and large value stocks in its 3 pairwise bets as well as for its
d4+e4 and c4+e5 views. Thus, overall, although the fund advertises itself as a "Mid Cap
Value" fund, it seems that it focuses on the larger mid cap value stocks.
Given the GMO fund strategy, we would expect it to be bullish for large core stocks and
bearish for small stocks compared to the market. In Figure 18, it is clear that compared to
the market, the fund is consistently very bullish on the el portfolio and is slightly bullish
on the e2, e3, and e4 portfolios. Furthermore, it is bearish on the cl and dl portfolios. In
Figure 19, it is clear that the fund is slightly bullish on combinations involving large core
and growth stocks. Furthermore, it is slightly bullish for combinations of mid cap growth
and core stocks. Thus, overall, although the fund advertises itself as a "Core" fund, it seems
that it focuses on the larger mid cap core stocks and some large growth stocks.
Figure 17 depicts a scatter plot where each plotted point corresponds to a row of an
estimated P matrix at a certain time for the Fidelity fund; in other words, each point
represents a portfolio of FF portfolios that we have inferred that the PM had. The points are
color coded depending on how many assets a particular view involves. The PM's estimated
view magnitude for each such view is plotted on the y-axis and the actual return of that
portfolio over the subsequent month is on the x-axis: note that the returns are monthly and
are not annualized. Figure 20 is the analogous plot for the GMO fund. For both funds,
the betas are positive (0.03 and 0.05 respectively). However, the GMO fund does a slightly
better job in forecasting future returns compared to the Fidelity fund.
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Figure 15: The PM's estimated one asset equilibrium view deviations v - P7r over time.
Note that the y-axis is in annualized %.
Fidelity Mid Cap Value Fund: 2 Asset Views at Each Time
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Figure 16: The PM's estimated two asset equilibrium view deviations v - P7r over time.
Note that the y-axis is in annualized %.
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Figure 17: Scatter plot of the PM's estimated view magnitudes on the next month's returns
for the assets involved in his views (y-axis) versus the realized returns of those aseet combi-
nations over the next month (x-axis). The points are color coded to reflect the number of
assets that each view involves. Note that the numbers are monthly percentages and are not
annualized.
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Figure 18: The PM's estimated one asset
Note that the y-axis is in annualized %.
equilibrium view deviations v - Pr over time.
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Figure 19: The PM's estimated two as
Note that the y-axis is in annualized %.
set equilibrium view deviations v - P7r over time.
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Figure 20: Scatter plot of the PM's estimated view magnitudes on the next month's re-
turns for the assets involved in his views (y-axis) versus the realized returns of those aseet
combinations over the next month (x-axis). The data from August 2008 is excluded. The
points are color coded to reflect the number of assets that each view involves. Note that the
numbers are monthly percentages and are not annualized.
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8.3 Further Discussion of Results
In this chapter, we have presented the results of our inference algorithm at the 2x3 and 5x5
FF portfolio level. The funds we chose differed in investment style both in terms of stock
size as well as in terms of stock "value". Overall, our estimated PM views are consistent
with the stated objective of that fund. Short of being able to actually interview the portfolio
managers in order to cross validate our results, examinig their consistency with the funds'
stated investment styles is the next best thing. Overall, our results are very encouraging in
terms of picking out which assets belong in a given view and whether that view is bullish or
bearish compared to the market equilibrium. Of the funds that we analyzed, the GMO US
Equity Core Fund has the smallest average estimated view magnitude. This can be partly
explained by our parametric assumption on Q, which is proportional to the estimated r
(see equation (33)). Thus, A is inversely proportional to T and therefore, v is as well (see
equation (27)). All else being equal, a higher r will result in lower view magnitudes.
Another phenomenon worth pointing out is that in the scatter plots depicting the PM's
estimated view magnitudes have regression betas are small in absolute value. The reason
that the betas are small in absolute value comes from the fact that the y-axis variables are
expected returns whereas the x-axis variables are realized returns. Thus, for the market
implied expected returns scatter plots, the y-variable comes from historical data and is a
"slow moving" average 16 and therefore, it makes sense for the realized returns (x-axis) to
exhibit a higher volatility and a wider range thus resulting in low betas (in absolute value)
and small R 2 values.
16Recall that both Amkt and E are estimated from 6 years of historical data
Part II
Investment Deviation from
Fundamentals and Systemic Risk
9 Motivation for An Active Leveraged Sector
The recent economic crisis started as a financial crisis; as is typical with such crises, it
quickly spread to the real economy. This crisis has highlighted the reality that over the
past decades, the financial system has evolved into a market based system where leveraged
financial intermediaries (called levered players from here on) play an active role instead
of their traditional role of passively channeling capital from ultimate lenders to ultimate
borrowers. This active behavior is driven by an imposed regulatory value at risk (VaR)
constraint. However, adherence to the VaR constraint causes a series of unintended dynamics
which are typically not captured by existing standard macroeconomic models; these dynamics
tend to be nonlinear in nature and can be summarized as "invest more following good
investment returns and divest more following bad investment returns".
Over the past 25 years, levered playeres have grown in size significantly. A large part of
this growth has come from the increasing willingness of the unleveraged sector to lend money
to the leveraged sector: money market funds, which have grown rapidly over the past two
decades, have been one of the primary channels from which the leveraged sector has been
able to attract yield chasing investors. One of the key issues is that money market funds are
generally viewed as riskless investments, even though they lend short term funds to leveraged
players. Figure 21 plots the year end net funds invested in US money market accounts (blue
line) and the percentage of these funds invested in the short term risky debt of leveraged
financial intermediaries (red line), including repurchase agreements and commercial paper.17
The amount invested in US money market funds reached an astonishing 2.2 Trillion dollars in
2007; the percentage of these funds invested into risky levered debt varied between 70% and
90% before 2008, when it dropped to 60%. Furthermore, this percentage seems to increase
during boom periods (1986-1989, 1993-2000, 2003-2007) and drop during strenuous economic
times. Figure 22 plots the difference between the the 30 day financial commercial paper rate
and the 30 day risk free rate. 1819 The difference has been extremely low historically and
even during the peak of the crisis, the differential was less than 0.25%. Thus, it seems
that investors are typically happy to invest in risky levered debt and receive a yield slightly
higher than the prevailing risk free rate, especially during economic expansions. The relative
ignorance of money market fund investors aided the growth of the leveraged sector, as it was
able to borrow a large amount of funds through the money market channel at cheap interest
rates due to the fact that investors viewed the money market as a very safe investment.
One of the biggest worries in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse was that
money market funds would "break the buck". Indeed, one of the primary factors which
exacerbated the financial crisis was the inability of levered firms to roll over their short
term borrowing as investors were spooked. This was so unprecedented by everyone, from
investors to politicians, that the Federal Government was forced to provide temporary deposit
insurance guarantees for money market funds in order to stop the panic.
Another important determinant of the ability to the leveraged sector's ability to borrow is
17The data is obtained from the Investment Company Institute (www.ici.org).
18 The latter is proxied by the one month Federal Funds Rate.
19 The rates are not annualized; they reflect the effective return of an investment over 30 days.
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Figure 21: The blue line plots the year end net Figure 22: This figure plots the difference be-
funds invested in US money market accounts tween the the 30 day financial commercial pa-
in US$ Billions. The red line plots the per- per rate and the 30 day risk free rate. The
centage of money market fund assets invested rates are not annualized; they reflect the ef-
in the short term risky debt of levered players. fective return of an investment over 30 days.
the short term risk free rate. This rate is essentially controlled by the Federal Reserve (Fed),
which views it as a monetary policy tool used primarily to control inflation expectations.
However, there is a large body of recent empirical evidence showing that the short term
Fed Funds Rate (FFR) plays an important pricing role through the funding cost effects that
it has on levered players; furthermore, levered players' balance sheet aggregates have been
shown to predict future real economic activity. This additional channel of monetary policy
is termed the "risk taking" channel in [81 and is distinct from the "inflation expectations"
channel. However, it is not the case that the FFR rate setting criteria formally take into
account the workings of the leveraged sector: it is well documented that the Fed gradually
adjusts the FFR in response to inflation and the output gap so as to achieve its mandate of
sustaining "maximum employment" and low inflation; thus, there are large periods of time
where the FFR is constant, and this has non-trivial effects on the leveraged sector. 2 0
In a nutshell, a constant risk free rate coupled with the positive feedback behavior of the
leveraged sector aided by the willingness of the unleveraged setor to lend to the leveraged
sector may have effects on real economy investment and systemic risk. In order to assess the
effects that the levered players' behavior has, we analyze an agent based model inspired by
the recent empirical evidence of levered financial intermediary active balance sheet manage-
ment. In our model, there are dynamic interactions with respect to real economy investment
between three key players: the leveraged sector (e.g. hedge funds), the unleveraged sector
(e.g. pension funds), and the Fed. The dynamic interaction between these players resulting
from their localized optimization behavior dictates the amount of investment in the real
economy at each point in time and the deviation of this investment amount from that which
20 The Fed sets the FFR only eight times a year and any rate adjustments are extremely gradual; if there
is a change, it typically happens over a large time horizon at 0.25% increments.
is justified by the fundamentals.2 1
In this paper, we find that under a constant risk free rate environment, the positive
feedback effects resulting from the leveraged player's VaR constraint adherence causes in-
vestment to deviate from fundamentals and an increase in the potential systemic cost of a
default; the magnitude of these effects depends of the relative size of the leveraged sector
to the unleveraged sector. In order to mitigate these undesired effects, we propose a FFR
setting rule: among other parameters, the optimal FFR depends on the relative size of the
leveraged sector to the unleveraged sector. Furthermore, the frequency of rate adjustment
needs to the same as the decision frequency of the leveraged and unleveraged player. How-
ever, by using only the risk free rate as a policy tool, it is not generally feasible to stabilize
the potential systemic cost of a default and have investment reflect fundamentals at the same
time.
The dependencies of the optimal FFR described above are interesting when thinks about
the current monetary policy framework. In current monetary policy models, the relative size
of the leveraged sector is not an input; this is in part due to the fact that leveraged financial
intermediaries are viewed as passive players and did not used to have as much importance in
the financial system as they do today. Furthermore, the current monetary policy norm is one
of small gradual adjustments to the FFR; in contrast, the decision making of the leveraged
and unleveraged players typically is of much higher frequency. Most investment banks, hedge
funds, and pension funds make investment allocation decisions daily. Given the importance
of the short term risk free rate in our model as a variable affecting real economy investment
and potential systemic costs, it is the case that monetary policy and financial stability are
linked.
In what follows, Section 10 presents the relevant literature, Section 11 presents the model
setup, Section 12 presents the key results, Section 13 presents the optimal rate setting
strategy for the FFR, Section 14 summarizes and concludes, and Section 16 is the Appendix.
21The term fundamentalsis is intuitively related to the net present value (NPV) of the future cashflows;
see Section 11.2 for a detailed description.
10 Literature Review
As the authors in [3] state, it is "difficult, if not impossible, to find a systemic risk measure
that is at the same time practically relevant and completely justified by a general equilibrium
model"; the authors also identify the need to bridge the gap between economic theory and
actual regulations. Our approach is a step in this direction: the literature seems to lack a
dynamic microfounded agent based model which generates phenomena commonly observed
in the financial market and explicitly incorporates both an active leveraged sector and an
active Fed which sets short term interest rates according to the financial system's "state".
Our approach lies on the intersection of monetary policy, financial economics, and systemic
risk, and we review the relevant literature from each field below.
The literature on systemic risk in the financial system is in its infancy as most of this
literature has been written after the crisis of 2007; furthermore, most of it focuses on empirical
methods in identifying and assessing various metrics of systemic risk. Our focus is on the
effects arising from the localized decision making of the players, and our aim is to propose an
optimal risk free rate setting rule; thus, we adopt a structural approach instead of a reduced
form approach so as not to suffer from the Lucas Critique (see [46]), which states that reduced
form models derived from observed relationships between various macroeconomic quantities
produce relations which will differ depending on what macroeconomic policy regime is in
place. Goodhart's law (see [37]) nicely summarizes this point: "Any statistical relationship
will break down when used for policy purposes".
The importance of leveraged players, such as broker/dealers (B/D from here on) and
hedge funds, in the supply of credit to the broader economy, has increased dramatically over
the past 25 years due to the growth of securitization and the changing nature of the financial
system toward one based on the financial markets (see [6]). Both [9] and [7] document that
total financial assets of B/D's have increased tremendously over the past 30 years, compared
to both commercial bank assets and to US household assets. 22 Thus, broker/dealers and other
leveraged non-deposit taking institutions have taken a much larger role in intermediating
betwen ultimate savers and ultimate borrowers. [6] finds that broker/dealers actively manage
their leverage in a procyclical manner: when their asset values grow, they increase their
leverage and vice versa; this behavior is the exact opposite of a passive player. The authors
attribute this procyclical behavior to their VaR constraint adherence.
Risk management via VaR is the standard in the financial industry due to the relevant
guidelines in the 1996 amendment on market risk regulation, where the Bank of International
Settlement (BIS) chose VaR as the regulatory reporting tool for bank risk. There is a good
deal of literature focused on measuring VaR (see for example [32]). In terms of studying
the role of VaR in an asset pricing equilibrium context, [10] analyzes the dynamic portfolio
selection effects of a VaR constrained representative investor in the familiar continuous time
complete market Brownian motion setting. The authors find that stock market volatility
and risk premium increase in down markets and decreases in up markets. Along a similar
22There are also numerous studies that document a large increase in hedge fund assets over the past 20
years (see for example [44]).
line, [31] examines asset price dynamics when a large number of small myopic agents manage
their risk via VaR constraints and update their beliefs of the returns distribution over time;
the authors find that asset prices are lower, have time paths with deeper and longer troughs,
and exhibit a greater degree of volatility.
Having discussed the relevant literature on VaR constraints, we now proceed to examine
the significance of the leveraged sector with respect to the real economy. There is a large
body of empirical evidence regarding the effect that levered players' balance sheet quantities
have on financial market prices and real economic variables. [6] finds that changes in short
term borrowing by broker/dealers forecasts changes in financial market risk measures such as
the CBOE VIX. [9] and [4] document that B/D asset growth forecasts durable consumption
and housing investment. The empirical work in [8] and [5] builds on this theme by exploring
the channel through which broker/dealer balance sheet quantities influence real economic
variables. These authors hypothesize that the tightness of levered intermediaries balance
sheet constraints determines their "risk appetite". Risk appetite, in turn, determines the set
of real projects that receive funding, and hence determines the supply of credit.
It is clear from the above empirical literature that levered financial intermediaries have
become important players in the financial markets and that their procyclical balance sheet
management has the capacity to affect both financial and real economic variables: this
raises the need to explicitly incorporate an active levered sector into macroprudential policy
prescriptions and models.
Before continuing, we present the key tenets of current monetary policy thinking: the
term "thinking" is appropriate because the FFR decisions are not strictly rule based (see
for example [54]). They are a result of the combination of model outputs and discretion and
are typically influenced by the residing Fed Chairman's philosophy. The Fed has a mandate
from Congress to sustain "maximum employment" and low inflation; its primary tool in
meeting its goals is the FFR. Under normal circumstances, the FOMC meets 8 times a year
to decide the FFR. In models of monetary economics that are commonly used at central
banks, the active role of financial intermediaries is ignored; banks and B/D's are passive
players that the central bank uses to implement monetary policy (see [7]). The "expectations
channel" dominates current monetary thinking,2 3 where short-term rates matter only to the
extent that they determine long term interest rates, which are seen as being risk-adjusted
expectations of future short rates. Thus, an important theme in the expectations channel is
managing the expectations of future short term rates by charting a path and communicating
this path clearly to the market; in doing this, the thinking goes that the Fed can influence
long rates, such as mortgage rates and corporate lending rates, which are important for the
economy's performance. According to Alan Blinder, a former Vice Chairman of the Fed's
Board of Governors, monetary policy has important macroeconomic effects only to the extent
that "it moves financial market prices that really matter - like long-term interest rates, stock
market values and exchange rates."2 4 This type of thinking overlooks the effect that short
term rates have levered players' borrowing.
2 3For a description of the expectations channel, see [11], [59], [61], and [62].
2 4See [20].
As one would expect, the Fed does not disclose the exact models it uses in setting the
FFR. However, it has been shown that Taylor rules track the actual FFR quite well (see for
example [29] or [30]). Thus, historically speaking, the Fed has been reacting to inflation and
GDP growth data in its rate setting decisions, which is in accordance with its mandate. The
Fed has a publication regarding a large-scale quarterly macroeconomic model that it uses to
simulate the US economy called the "FRB/US" model (see [23]); this model contains 300
equations and identities although the number of stochastic "core" equations of the economic
behavior of firms, households, and investors is around 50 equations. Although it is described
by a large state-space, the empirical fits of the structural descriptions of macroeconomic
behavior are comparable to those of reduced-form time series models, such as the Neo-
Keynesian (NK) model. The publication does not explicitly present the FRB/US model but
presents key characteristics about it. As is the case with the NK model, the FRB/US does
not model financial intermediary balance sheet dynamics of the type described earlier in
this section. Furthermore, it emphasizes the expectations role of the FFR as opposed to its
pricing variable role.
In terms of setting the FFR, it is well documented that there is a large degree of policy
inertia (see for example [55] or [29]); in other words, the adjustment of the FFR towards the
policymaker's desired rate is typically "gradual" and persistent, which results in tightening
or loosening FFR cycles. [30] shows that the source of the observed policy inertia in the
U.S. is due to deliberate "interest-smoothing". [30] also finds that credit and asset market
conditions do not have a direct explanatory effect on the FFR. The authors also present
suggestive narrative evidence from FOMC discussions and Fed governor speeches during
which monetary policymakers explicitly framed their decisions in a policy smoothing context:
in fact, disagreement among FOMC members is typically about the speed of interest-rate
smoothing instead of whether it should be a practice.
Clearly, an important variable in determining the ability of levered players to actively
manage their balance sheet is their cost of borrowing: they finance their investments in the
real economy by borrowing short term funds. As explained in [8], the FFR determines other
relevant short term interest rates, such as repo rates and interbank lending rates. Thus, the
FFR is important in setting short-term interest rates more generally. [9] finds that an increase
in the FFR decreases B/D short term borrowing and vice versa. Furthermore, [7] finds that
an increase in the FFR decreases B/D assets and vice versa. [8] and [5] conclude from
their empirical results that the FFR plays an explicit role in the transmission of monetary
policy, which is independent of the expectations channel. The authors therefore argue that
monetary and financial stability policy are related by their effects on levered players' balance
sheet management.
A key policy question which central bankers have pondered around the world is whether
monetary policy should take account of asset prices and react to asset price bubbles. There
are differing views on whether the Fed should explicitly respond to asset prices in its monetary
policy: among others, [12] and [13] posit that an inflation-targeting approach is sufficient and
that changes in asset prices should affect policy only through inflation and GDP expectation
adjustment. This opinion is shared by Alan Greenspan, who's famous speech in 2002 (see
[39]) states that it is not the role of the Fed to pop asset price bubbles. However, there also
exist proponents of an activist Fed with respect to asset price bubbles, such as [19], [22], and
[38]: the general logic is that asset prices may affect demand via direct and indirect wealth
effects leading to altered consumption plans. In our model, we show that the optimal FFR
policy needs to respond to the exogenous investment return due to the latter's effect on the
distribution of wealth in the financial system.
In terms of relevant theoretical models which incorporate active financial intermediaries,
the two most relevant papers to our model are [25] and [8]. [25] presents a dynamic macroe-
conomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents in order to
invest in financial assets. They derive full equilibrium dynamics and argue that steady-state
analysis misses important effects. Among other results, they find that volatility effects and
precautionary hoarding motives lead to a destabilizing deleveraging phenomenon;15 prices
play an important role in this process. The authors also find that endogenous volatility and
correlation is generated in asset prices during deleveraging episodes.
[8] presents a one period simple model which involves a VaR constrained levered player
borrowing from an unlevered player in order to invest in a risky asset; the unlevered player
can also directly invest in the risky asset. In their model, there is no explicit risk free
asset and there are no defaults. Furthermore, there is no coupling between the two players
because the unlevered player will lend as much as the levered player wishes at a constant rate
of interest which is deemed to be risk free (exogenously). Thus, leverage will be constant
unless there is a change in the statistics of the returns distribution.
Our multiperiod model builds on the one period model in [8]; however, apart from being
multiperiod, a key enrichment is that both the amount that L borrows and its cost is a result
of market clearing. Furthermore, in our model, the return on the investment is exogenous,
as opposed having the dividend amount be exogenous; we also do not assume a particular
distribution on the return. Moreover, an additional enriching feature is that there is an
explicit risk free asset in which both players can invest in. Our model's added richness results
in some interesting phenomena. For example, as we will see, L's leverage can decrease even
as L's ownership of the investment increases. Thus, procyclical leverage is distinct from
procyclical demand in our model.
Starting from our enriched multiperiod model, we define and study the evolution of two
key metrics: the investment deviation from fundamentals and the potential systemic cost of
a default by the leveraged player (which we sometimes abbreviate by the term "risk"). We
find that as the relative size of the leveraged player increases, investment deviates more from
fundamentals and risk "builds up". We subsequently propose an optimal FFR setting rule
which ensures that investment reflects fundamentals and show that this does not necessarily
stabilize risk (although it may slow its growth).
2 Such a deleveraging phenomenon is similar to so called "margin spirals" (see for example [24]).
11 The Model Setup
In this section, we present the setup of the model. Overall, we seek to balance "model
selection" tradeoffs on multiple levels; the driving philosophy of this work is that simple
behavioral rules generate complex system dynamics. We seek to make the model simple
enough such that useful policy prescriptions can be derived, yet sophisticated enough to
capture the key flow of funds characteristics between the leveraged and unleveraged sectors.
We also seek to focus on the financial sector and abstract the investment in the real economy
as well as omit real economic variables such as labor income; this is done in order to isolate
the key dynamics of high freqency financial variables (e.g. daily or weekly) induced by the
leveraged sector's behavior; the underlying philosophy here is that the endogenous risks
generated by agent behavior in the financial system can build up and affect real economic
variables and we present recent empirical findings on this later in this section.
Our model has three heterogeneous agents interacting; the leveraged sector (L), the
unleveraged sector (U), and the Fed. At each point in time, the net investment depends on
L's ability to borrow from U as well as U's direct investment. The uncertainty in the system
is due to the real economy investment performance, whose value is driven by an exogenous
random variable reflecting changes in sentiment about economic growth. The key coupling
results from the market clearing condition, which is that the amount that L wants to borrow
must equal the amount that U wants to lend: the interest rate that clears the market is called
the risky debt rate. In the model, this ends up depending on the relative size of the leveraged
player and on the risk free rate. Although in reality, there exist many heterogeneous levered
players with different business lines, our aim is to understand the effect of macroprudential
policies on aggregate variables, such as the amount of risky assets held by the levered sector
as a whole and the flow of funds between the aggregated players.
In what follows, Section 11.1 presents the players and their preferences, Section 11.2
discusses the real economy investment, Section 11.3 presents the "game's" solution, Section
11.4 presents the properties of the solution, Section 11.5 presents a simplification of the game
solution, and Section 11.6 presents the two key metrics we focus on.
11.1 Players and Preferences
The financial system model is in discrete time and has 3 agents: a levered agent (L), an
unlevered agent (U), and the Fed. Furthermore, there is a risky investment "asset" which
represents the net investment in real economic projects which produces stochastic future
returns. Moreover, there is a risk free asset, whose rate of return is controlled by the Fed.
e The levered sector: Think of L as consisting of investment banks, hedge funds, and
other levered players of the financial system such as the SPVs of the shadow banking
system. L is able to invest in the risky asset and the risk free asset. In addition to
investing his equity at time t (denoted by wf), L can issue debt and use the proceeds
(denoted by bt) to further invest in his opportunity set. At each period, L invests so
as to maximizes his expected equity in the next period, subject to a VaR constraint.
The VaR constraint limits the amount he can borrow bt such that his probability of
bankruptcy is less than c, an externally imposed amount:
max Et [w,,,]1 max (wtL + bt) (qtEt[Vt+1] + (1 - q1 )Ft) - btXtbt,qt bt,qt
S t(b+w) ( qt)F
st P(wL I < 0) < C - P %t+1 < bt Xt-( tt<c
t + qt (bt + w)
(52)
where Vt+l denotes the exogenous random asset return, Xt denotes the equilibrium
interest rate that L pays on the amount he borrowed, Et[.1 denotes the expectation
given the information set at time t, and qt denotes the proportion of the money that
L has at his disposal at time t which is directed towards the risky asset; qt is between
0 and 1 by definition. It should be noted that L's optimization results in a supply
function bt(Xt) of how much he wants to borrow. The actual amount he borrows at
time t is determined by a market clearing condition where his supply of risky debt
equals U's demand of it.
The fact that L wants to maximize his expected equity is consistent with the insti-
tutional framework of how such institutions operate; the mission of the CEO is to
maximize shareholder value, not to manage shareholder risk. This is one of the inher-
ent frictions in corporate finance: if one believes that higher risk gives higher rewards,
then the CEO must pursue these higher risk higher reward opportunities to satisfy
shareholders. Of course, the debt-holders would prefer the low risk low reward strat-
egy as this would decrease the probability of bankruptcy. The VaR constraint is a
form of regulation put in place to limit the levereaged player's riskiness. For a more in
depth discussion of such issues, see [21].
* The unlevered sector: Think of U as consisting of pension funds, mutual funds, and
other "real money" agents who invest their wealth (denoted by w) and are not allowed
to borrow money and lever up.2" U has an additional investment option compared to
L, in which he can lend money to L." However, U is risk averse and is a mean-variance
optimizer in each period:
max E[ r t (53a)
a-,a 'at wt 2T my1
w Z = wwze ' = u (a'Vtl i + aPD ti+ + atF) (53b)
26Such agents typically invest household wealth invested in 401(k) and other saving accounts and are thus
not allowed to lever up.
"Sometimes, we will refer to this as "investing in L's risky debt".
where T denotes the "risk willingness" of the agent,28 zt+1 denotes U's return, af
denotes U's portfolio weight in the risky asset, af denotes U's portfolio weight in L's
risky debt, at denotes U's portfolio weight in the risk free asset, and Dt+1 denotes the
return on investing in L's risky debt; note that Dt+1 5 Xt because although L has
promised to return Xt (a quantity agreed upon at time t) for every dollar borrowed,
he may end up returning less than that if lie goes bankrupt; in fact, it can be shown
that:
Dt+1 -- mi + 1) t+1, Xt (54)
because although Xt is the return on the debt agreed upon at time t through supply and
demand, a bad enough V will make L default, causing U to seize any of L's remaining
assets.
For U to be unlevered, the following must hold:
at + at +at-i (55a)
av , a , at > 0 (55b)
* The Fed: The Fed is the entity which sets the short term risk free rate Ft (we may
also refer to this as the short rate). As discussed in Section 3, the FFR determines
other relevant short term interest rates. In this model, we assume that the Fed can
exactly determine the short term risk free rate, although in practice, the short term
risk free rate would be the yield on an extremely short term US government bond,
which moves in tandem with the FFR, yet may theoretically deviate from this spread.
Figure 23 graphically depicts the model: the black arrows highlight what investment oppor-
tunities are available to each agent and the green arrows refer to the returns of each of the
two assets.
The frequency of the agent's decisions is relatively fast; one can imagine L making de-
cisions at frequencies faster than weekly due to the fact that L is constantly pressured to
return value to shareholders. Having U make decisions at the same frequency as L is a
simplification; however, although arguments can be made that households care about long
term performance, an argument can also be made that real money managers, who manage
household wealth, such as pension funds and mutual funds, compete intensely for customers
and thus care about short term performance. Such fund managers do indeed face short
term assessments of their performance. Given that portfolio manager bonus compensation
practices are similar accross firms such as investment banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, and
pension funds, it is reasonable to assume that U acts as fast as L.
28Note that the typical risk aversion parameter y -
Figure 23: Graphical depiction of the investment opportunities available to each agent.
11.2 The Risky Investment
In the model, the risky asset can be viewed as an investment in the real economy. One
can think of the investment funds channeled via the financial system as going to a set of
"producers", who use the capital to undertake real economic activity, such as investing in
houses, factories, etc. In our model, the producers accept whatever capital is given to them
and go about investing in real economy projects. The fundamental value of these projects
is an exogenous random variable and reflects short term changes in expectations and/or
sentiment regarding the performance of the broader economy; we denote this exogenous
random variable by V. As we will see, the agents' locally optimizing behavior in response
to V ends up affecting reinvestment in the real economy.
Overall, it is desirable that reinvestment in the economy is not affected by short term
financial frictions. Real economy investments such as those mentioned above typically have a
large horizon as such projects take time, real labor is involved, etc. Project plans should not
have to be readjusted at every time due to the financial system's response to the exogenous
process V, which captures short term changes in expectations/sentiments about the future
cash flow potential of the real economy projects. Investment decisions should not be dictated
by short term changes in sentiment; they should be made according to the long term potential
that they may have.
In our model, due to the locally optimizing characteristic of the financial system, the
producer is given additional "unplanned" capital to utilize following a "good" V outcome,
whereas an "unplanned" divestment of capital from the producer results from a "bad" V
outcome. Thus, an unplanned divestment resulting from a bad V outcome will cause the
producer to have to liquidate/terminate parts of the project which have a good long term
expected trend; an unplanned investment resulting from a good V outcome will give the
producer additional capital to invest in additional long term projects with long term poten-
tial; however, since this excess capital may be unexpectedly "pulled" following a subsequent
bad V, this long term positive project, which was initialized in response to a good V by
hiring personnel, buying machinery, etc., may be discontinued due to another short term V
outcome; thus, having the producer adjust long term investment undertaking in response to
short term "noise" is not desirable.
We now proceed with the notation we will use. At time t, an amount of Pt is invested
in the project (risky asset); this amount is endogenously determined. However, the change
in value per dollar of investment Vt+1 is an exogenous random variable. At time t + 1, the
fundamental value of the project is:
St+1 = PtVt+1 (56)
In other words, St+ 1 reflects the time t+ 1 net present value (NPV) of all future profits of the
investment. The NPV at time t + 1 depends on the (endogenously determined) investment
at time t and the exogenous random variable Vt+ 1 . Deviations of the amount reinvested at
time t + 1, Pt+1 , from St+1 are a result of the interactions from the financial sector (i.e. L
and U), not from the actual investment's long term potential.
V is modeled as an IID random variable, where the mean m and standard deviation s are
known to L and U; furthermore, we assume that the cth percentile is a known value, where c
is the regulated maximum allowed probability of bankruptcy. However, we do not make an
assumption on the type of distribution as this is not needed for our analysis.
11.3 The Solution
In this section, we present the model solution. We first present the demand functions of
U and L, which are the result of their optimization problems; we then present the market
clearing (X, b) solution.
11.3.1 U's Allocations
U's optimization problem is presented in equation (53); we assume that the statistics m and s
of the process for V are known. Furthermore, in accordance with the behavioral assumption
of U viewing L's short term debt as quite safe,29 he assumes that the debt has an expected
return of Xt, which is the endogenous market clearing risky debt rate, yet attaches a small
standard deviation of SD to reflect its risky nature. In the same spirit, U assumes that Dt+1
and Vt+1 have a zero correlation. Thus:
Et [w +1 ] = w' (aim + a DXt + atFt) (57a)
29 This behavior was discussed in the introduction and comes from the observed reality of most people
fearlessly using money market funds as if they were equivalent to risk free assets (i.e. government guaranteed
bank accounts).
Vart [w'+] (w't)2 ((a)2.2 + (af ) 2 s2) (57b)
Thus, at each time t, U solves:
1
max Et[zt+1] - -Vart[zt+1]
av,a ,at 2T
st a +af +at=1
(58)
which leads to the following portfolio weights:
D T
at = 2cD(Xt - F), CD 2s (59b)
D
at - a - a (59c)
Thus, U has a demand function of L's risky debt; the proportion of his wealth that he will
lend to L is a function of the interest rate Xt he will receive.
11.3.2 L's Optimal Borrowing
We now turn to L's problem, which is given in equation (52); as mentioned in Section 11.1,
it can be shown that the optimal proportion of L's investable funds invested in the risky
asset is q*= 1 (see the Appendix). Thus, L's problem can be reduced to:
maxEt[w +1 ] maxwfLm + bt (m - Xt)
eb
Sbe + wt
(60)
L's optimization results in a supply function of debt, meaning the amount he wishes to
borrow depends on the interest rate Xt that he will pay. By equating the demand and
supply functions of L's risky debt, Xt and bt are jointly determined.
In fact, L's objective function is concave since bt and Xt move in the same direction:
increasing the desired borrowing amount will actually increase the interest rate Xt demanded
by U in order to incentivize U to allocate a larger proportion aD of his wealth w' to L's risky
debt. Thus, when optimizing, L will increase bt until either:
1. He hits his VaR constraint. In this case, the optimal borrowing bt as a function of Xt,
denoted by bvaR, can be found by manipulating the VaR constraint:
Vt+ 1 < b 4 -bv a R K b K (61)t±< VaR± + 2 b~~aR + wL t
where K -- D--1(c) and <D(.) denotes the CDF of the random variable V. Note that
typically, K will be a number less than 1, signifying a loss from investment in the risky
asset. For example, if V is a lognormal random variable whose logarithm is normally
distributed with mean y = 8% and o- = 15%, and c = 5%, then K = 0.846, meaning
that L is solvent as long as his risky asset investment does not lose more than 15.4%
until the next period.
2. He hits his optimal borrowing b" before hitting his VaR constraint: thus, in this case,
buc < b vaR. Note that under this case, the VaR constraint is not tight meaning that
L's probability of bankruptcy is smaller than c. 30
11.3.3 The Equilibrium Solution
The exogenous process for V drives the system, yet the system's investment response is
determined endogenously and depends on the state variables of the system at a given time.
There are two variables that are determined at each time t: the amount L borrows at time
t, bt, and the interest rate that he has to pay at time t + 1 on the amount he borrowed at
time t, Xt. 3 ' The (Xt, bt) solution determines the amount of investment in the risky asset
Pt.
It is clear that the time t investment Pt depends on the amount that L borrows from U: in
this model, since there is one supply and one demand for the risky debt, Xt and bt are jointly
determined by the market clearing condition. The interest rate Xt should be such that U's
demand for risky debt equals L's supply of risky debt. Mathematically:
a?(Xt)w? = bt(Xt) (62)
where a? is the fraction of U's wealth invested in the risky debt. Note that for the amount
that L borrows to be positive, the following must be true:
Xt > Ft (63)
Armed with this relationship between the risky debt supply and demand, we can solve for
the (Xt, bt) pairs in both of L's modes of operation:
30 See the Appendix for a proof of this.
3 1A note about the notation: if at time t, I invest 1$ in the risk free asset, I will have Ft dollars at time
t + 1. If I had invested in the risky asset, I would have Vt+ 1 dollars at time t + 1. Although both are rates
of return between times t and t + 1, the subscript t on Ft refers to the fact that this quantity is known at
time t. The subscript t + 1 on Vt+ 1 reflects the fact that this quantity is a random varianble observed at
time t + 1.
1. VaR Constrained Mode: In this case, we need to solve equations (61) and (62)
simultaneously:
wK
Xt-K = 2cD(Xt - Ft) wX -> X'- =
F + K k(Ft-K)2 ±2wt
CD t' (64)
However, the X- solution is rejected since X- < F, which contradicts equation (63).
Plugging in the expression for Xt into equation (62) gives bt:
bt =WtCD
2K wLK - Ft + (7F1 - K) 2 + CD Wt ) (65)
Thus, both Xt and bt are increasing functions of the relative size of L to U, W.
2. Unconstrained Mode: Plugging in equation (62) into L's FOC and solving for bt
gives:
bt= CDWj (m - Ft) (66)
Thus, according to equation (63):
m+ Ft
(67)
It is worth highlighting that in this mode of operation, bt and Xt do not depend on
the relative size of L to U; furthermore, if F is constant, then bt and Xt are constant.
From here on, we denote the relatiove size of L to U, W, by yt. To summarize,
on L's mode of operation, the (Xt, bt) solutions are:
mn + -
Xt =min(
2
b = min (CDw
Ft + K + (F - K)2 + 2 KyCD
'I
(m - Ft) , wtucD - Ft + (F - K)2 + 2KY
CD)
It should be highlighted that aD = b. Thus, the solution (Xt, bt) implicitly gives an a ;
as we will see, the change in aD is key in determining investment deviation from fundamentals
and risk.
depending
(68)
Given the solution (Xt, b, aD), the prevailing time t investment can be found by aggre-
gating the investment from both L and U:
Pt = U) +bt(Xt) +a(Ft)w= w +a (Xt)wu+at(Ft)wu (69)
11.4 Solution Properties
11.4.1 Levered Balance Sheet Dynamics
As we saw, L is maximizing his expected equity in the next period subject to a VaR con-
straint. The realized outcome of V will affect his constraint adherence and he will have
to readjust his borrowing accordingly; this behavior is pro-cyclical as a "good" V outcome
will cause his constraint to be loose; L will thus look to borrow more in order to invest.
Analogously, a "bad" V outcome will cause him to be in violation of his constraint and thus,
he will be forced to borrow less.
This is graphically illustrated in Figure 24. At time t, L borrows bt. Thus, L owns
wL + bt dollars worth of the risky asset, financed by ot (his equity) and by bt (the amount
he borrows from U). At time t + 1, before he rebalances his portfolio, L owns assets worth
(wt + bt)Vt+1 and owes to U an amount of btXt. Thus, his time t + 1 equity is:
LLtL W ~ t +1 d t 1 = m ( ( w t + b t ) b t t 0( 0
w?+ +,+1 1 t max L t+1 L X,0(0I wt
where dt+1 denotes the return on equity (ROE) and the max operator is there because equity
cannot be negative due to its limited liability nature; thus, if Vt+ 1 is small enough to cause
the equity to go negative, U starts to lose money and the equity remains at 0. We denote
this critical value of Vt+1 as K, which can be read off from equation (70) as:
K bt-b (71)
wt + bt
It is worth observing that K is a constant because at each time t, L rebalances his portfolio
so that P(wf+1 < 0) = P(Vt+1 < K) < c.
In terms of balance sheet adjustments, if Vt+1 is sufficiently "high", then L's increased
equity at time t +1 will cause the VaR constraint to be loose; this means he can borrow more
in order to buy more of the asset; he will do this until he hits his time t + 1 VaR constraint
since in his utility function, he is maximizing expected returns. This situation is graphically
depicted in Figure 2, where a good V initially leads to an increase in L's asset value and a
decrease of the debt to equity ratio (middle panel); the debt to equity ratio decreases since
the debt value does not increase as the asset value increases. Since in the middle panel, L
has "slack", he increases his position in the asset by borrowing more money and buying more
of the asset until he hits his VaR constraint (right panel); this action makes L hold more
of the asset after rebalancing than he would have held had he been passive. Analogously, if
Vt+ 1 is sufficiently "bad", L's decreased equity will cause him to be in violation of his time
t + 1 VaR constraint; thus, he will borrow less at time t + 1 and thus overall decrease his
risky asset position.
This behavior is called "pro-cyclical", because a good fundamental outcome causes L to
further increase his position and a bad fundamental outcome causes U to further decrease his
position. This positive feedback response is the key dynamic in the model, which effectively
causes funds to be sucked into the system from the risk free asset if V is good and vice versa.
Time t+1 Balance Sheet Time t+l Balance Sheet
Time t Balance Sheet Before Rebalancing After Rebalancing
Assets Liabilities Assets iabilities Assets Liabilities
Figure 24: Graphical depiction of L's balance sheet dynamics in response to a "good" Vt+i.
11.4.2 Solution Dependence on Relative Size
From the solution expressions (Xt, be), it is clear that they are increasing functions of the
relative size yt when L is operating in the VaR constrained mode. More importantly, aD is a
function of yt; this means that a larger yt will attract a larger proportion of U's wealth. This
is one of the key properties of the model; as y increases, more of U's wealth is brought into
the financial system from the risk free asset and channeled towards the risky investment.
If L becomes large, then he ceases to be operating in the VaR constrained mode because
his optimal borrowing is below the limit imposed by the VaR constraint. In this mode of
operation, the solution (Xt, bt) is not dependent on yt.
We now proceed to find what this "cutoff relative size" is, denoted by yt, where bufc
b "aR=
b1 flc= byVaR
2K
m - Ft K - Ft + (F -K) 2  2K
CD
S= [(in - K) 2 - (Ft - K) 2]
(72)
Thus, if yt, is above this cutoff, then L's optimal borrowing does not cause him to hit his
VaR constraint and is given by equation (66). Therefore, his probability of bankruptcy is
below c. Intuitively, this means that there is a natural leverage limit of the system; if L is
much larger than U, then the interest rate on his debt will be quite high, meaning that his
optimal borrowing amount will be lower than that dictated by his VaR constraint.
11.4.3 Relative Size Growth Barrier
The relative size of L to U will grow if Vt+1 > Vt+1. Solving analytically for this value Vt+1:
dt+1(Vt+1 ) = zt+1(Vt+1) -=>
wtL + bt bt eVt+1 L X = (a'Vt+1 + a Xt + at F)L L -Extt t
(73)
Since the ratio of L's
as:
assets to his equity (wfr+bt) is his leverage It,
wt
we can rewrite the above
Vt+1(it - a") = (it - 1+a)Xt + atFt ->
I - 1 + aD at
Vt+1 = I - Xt + t Ft
li-at it-a 1
(74)
DNotice that Vt+1 is a convex combination of Xt and F since it - 1 + at + at = ±I + at
and it > 1. Note that in deriving the above, we assumed that Vt+1 > K and used the
corresponding "non-default" dt+1 and zt+1 expressions. If Vt+1 had been less than K, then
dt+1 = 0 < zt+1; the only case where dt+1 = zt+1 = 0 is when Vt+1 = 0 and atFt = 0, leading
to Vt+1 = 0.32
Overall, the take home message of this section is that the "hurdle" Vt+1 depends on yt.
11.4.4 Leverage Versus Size
We now turn to examine how L's leverage depends on yt for the case where he is operating
in the VaR constrained mode.
Recall that L's leverage is defined as the value of his assets over his equity. At each
rebalancing time, L adjusts his portfolio such that his VaR constraint is tight. This however
does not mean that his leverage stays constant. Starting from equation (71), the following
expression for L's borrowing bt can be derived:
3 2This is a trivial and unrealistic case which happens with 0 probability and thus we ignore the case where
Vt+1 = 0.
, Lt~ L KK = -t > bt = w  (75)
wL +bt t X - K
L's leverage it is defined as the ratio of his assets to his equity. Using equation (75), it is
easy to express It as:
It = (76)
wt Xt - K
Since Xt is an increasing function of yt, L's leverage decreases as his relative size increases.33
Since the relative size yt increases if dt+1 > zt+1 and vice versa, L outperforming U in a
period will lead to L having lower leverage in the next period and vice versa.
11.4.5 Solution Dependence on Outcome
In this section, we show that yt+1 and thus (Xt+1 , a+1, bt+1 ) are increasing in Vt+ 1 , and lt+1
is decreasing in Vt+1 . Note that we examine this for the case where %+1 > K; for Vt+1 < K,
yt+1 = 0, and thus yt+1 will not vary with Vt+1.
Starting from the fact that yt+i = yt dt+
Zt+1
dyt+1 d'+1zt+1 - zt+1dt+1
d B+1 z +1
= it (ltzt+1 - (ltVt+1 - (It - 1)Xt)a)Zt+ 1
i (1t(arXt + atFt) + (l - 1)Xtav)Zt+ 1
> 0 (77)
where we have used the fact that it > 1 since L will always invest all of his equity plus any
additional amoun he borrows from U.
Thus, yt+1 is increasing in the Vt+1, meaning that (Xt+1 , a D+1, bt+1 ) are also increasing in
Vt+1 whereas it+1 is decreasing in Vt+1.
11.4.6 Dynamics of Pt
The dynamics of the investment process Pt are driven by the dynamics of the state variable
yt: the time t + 1 investment Pt+1 will depend on yt as well as on the exogenous return Vt+1.
Assuming that at time t + 1, Vt+1 > K and thus L is solvent, Pt+1 can be expressed with the
help of equation (69) as:
Pt+1 = wt+ 1 + bt+1 + a +1jwut1
33 Note that Xt > K is guaranteed in the model if F > K is assumed, which is realistic since K is less
than 1 by definition and F is greater than 1 in practice.
(wf + bt) Vt±1 - btXt + wu~~1 ti=( t +1bt tw+1(1 -at+1)
(w + bt)V+ 1 - btXt + (wuaj%+1 + wua DX1 + wuatFt) (1 - at+i)
= (w + bt)V+1 - btXt + walVt+1 + wuafXt + wuatF - wti+at+1
= (W + bt + wuat)Vt+ + wuatFt - wfu+1at+l
= Pv+1  (wiatFt - wtu+1at+1)
PtV+1 + wu (atFt - zt+1at+1)
(78)
where we use the debt supply/demand relationship in equation (62) throughout the proof.
Furthermore, in line 2 of the proof above, we use the fact that U's weights sum to 1.
The above dynamics for Pt+1 state that the investment tomorrow is equal to the funda-
mental value of the investment plus an additional term, which is equal to the inflow of funds
into the system from the proceeds of U's time t risk free asset investment minus the outflow
of funds arising from U's time t + 1 investment in the risk free asset. Figure 25 graphically
depicts these one period investment "flow" dynamics. At time t + 1, there is a net inflow
of money into the U/L system from both their risky asset investment proceeds and from
their risk free asset investment proceeds (green arrows) ;31 these inflows determine yt+1, and
U and L rebalance accordingly; this rebalancing determines the time t + 1 risky asset and
risk free asset investments (red arrows); the time t + 1 deviation of the investment from its
fundamental value depends on the endogenous interactions of U and L at time t + 1.
Time t Time t+1
Figure 25: Graphical depiction of the system's monetary inflows and outflows
In order to gain some intuition on the system behavior, we consider two limiting cases:
34Note that in the figure, the relative size yt+1 is different from the relative size yt.
1. No Risk Free Asset: If the system did not have a risk free asset investment option,
then reinvestment would always reflect fundamentals. Mathematically, this case is
described by setting at = at+1 0 in equation (78); this results in Pt+1 = Pt +1 =
St+1 . Intuitively, all net inflows from the proceeds of the risky asset would ultimately
be reinvested in it: L and U may trade, yet ultimately, U's investment in L's debt is
channeled to the risky asset.
2. Only U: If the system did not have L, U could only invest in the risky asset and the
risk free asset. In such a case, there would be underinvesment in the risky asset during
"good times" and overinvestment during "bad times". Intuitively, this is a result of
U's risk aversion: assuming a constant risk free rate, in the case that the risky asset
outperforms the risk free asset, U will divert some of the risky asset profits to the risk
free asset. If the risky asset underperforms the risk free asset, he will divert some of
his risk free asset profits to the risk free asset. Mathematically:
Pt1=t +1 Y+1
ajwu (a'Vt+1 + (1 - av)F)
P (avVtl+ + (1 - av)F)
= Pzt+1
(79)
where we have used the fact that if the risk free rate is constant, then av = at+1 . Thus,
there are two cases:
Outperformance: I7+1 > F . zt+1 < V+ 1 =# Pt+1 < PtVt±1
Underperformance: Vt+ < Ft > zt+1 > V+ 1  Pt+1 > PtVt+1
(80)
11.5 Solution Simplification
The expressions for the solution (Xt, bt) have a square root term which makes their analysis
in closed form difficult. We thus present a linearized approximation to the (Xt, bt) solution;
this simplified solution is accurate when yt << 1.3 This assumption is realistic in practice
and the Appendix provides a rough estimate of yt using worldwide data.
3 5 We sometimes refer to the simplified solution case as the "simplified model". Furthermore, we sometimes
refer to the non-simplified solution as the "full model".
11.5.1 The Linearization
A Taylor series approximation of the square root term for Xt gives:
F + K + (Ft - K)2 + Ky,
Ft + K2F
~- F + K21 2 (F - K)2 CDY)l+ (Ft - K)
=FFt 1+ 2cD Ft - K
(81)
Note that Xt is still increasing in yt, yet the dependence is now linear; note also that it is
still greater than or equal to Ft, as desired.
In order for the above approximation to be valid, we assume that:
1 2K
-yt < 6i << 1(F - K) 2 CD
(82)
Given the simplified expression for Xt, we present the resulting expressions for other key
variables:3 6
bt - wu2cD(Xt - F) WtF K Y wt(lt
wL + b1 wj K KIt t = 1 + -- yt = 1 +=
wf w Ft- K F - K
D bt K
aD Ft - K
at =c(m - F)
1)yt
Ft
Fe - K
at = 1 - cv(m - Ft) - F y =KYt 1 - cv(m - Ft) - (It - i)yt
(83)
11.5.2 Simplified Model Properties
11.5.2.1 The Dynamics of yt and zt
36In the Appendix, we give an in depth discussion about the effect that the X, approximation has on
various model properties.
83
K) 1 2K
K) F 1 +) -yt( F - )2CD
+ (Ft
We now proceed to derive the dynamics of ze and yt for the simplified model. If V+1 > K,
the dynamics of U's ROE are:
zt+1 a'Vt+1 + a fXt + atF,
= a"Vt+ 1 + t Xt + atF
wt
(wP+bt)K D(- 
wt~
= a'V 1t+ + (1 - av)Ft + g1K + aK - aFt
SaVt+1 + (1 - av)F + ytK +(l - 1)ytK - (l - 1)ytFt
= aVVt+1 + (1 - av)F + IytK - (lt - 1)ytFt
= at"Vt+1 + (1 - a") Ft + FtyK - yt FtFt -  F - K
=avVt+1 + (1 - a" )F
(84)
where in the third line we have used the fact that L's VaR constraint is tight, i.e. btXt =
K(wf + bt). Thus, U's ROE is a convex combination of the exogenous return V 1 and of Ft.
We now derive the dynamics of yt, by starting from the observation that yt+lzt+l
Thus:
wt+1
wt
L
wt+1
wt + bt btXt
= Y V+1 - Wwe w
= yt t+1 + atVt+1 
-
= yt W+1 + (l - 1)yt W+1 -
= YtVt+1 + (It - 1)ytVt+1 -
(wt + bt) K
ytK - aD K
= itytVt+1 - ytK - (lt - 1)ytK
= ltytVt+1 - ley tK
= ytt t (Vt+1 - K)
(85)
where again, we have made use of the VaR constraint tightness in the fourth line. Thus, yt+1
is given by:
It (Vt+ 1 - K) It (1± - K)
t+1 = Yt (y1a
zt+1 avVt+1 + (1 - a ) Ft (86)
yt+1 It+1
The relative size of L to U in the next period increases (decreases) when L's ROE of dt+1 l
lt(Vt+1 - K) is higher (lower) than U's ROE of zt+1 = a'Vt+1 + (1 - av)Ft.
The above derivations were for the case where V+1 > K. If at some time Vt+1 < K, then
L defaults and yt+1 = 0.
The nice feature of the simplified model is that if F is constant, then L's and U's ROEs
are IID since they are only a function of the contemporaneous V outcome; this is not the
case in the full model due to the fact that leverage varies with yt.
11.5.2.2 Relative Size Growth Barrier
In this section, we elaborate on the process yt in the simplified model. Firstly, it should
be noted that when dt+1 = zt+1, the relative size stays constant. This happens if Vt+1  Ft.
To see why:
dt+1 =zt1 -I (Vt+1 - K) = a'Vt+1 + (1 - a')F -
ltK + (1- ai)F
F+t
F- K+(1 
-av)Ft
t+1 FtKFt - v --
Ft-K t
Vt+1 Ft
(87)
Thus, it is straightforward to see that:
> yt if Vt+1 > Ft
Yt+1 =yt if Vt+1 = F (88)
< yt if Vt+1 < F
Thus, the hurdle for yt to grow is for V to be larger than the risk free rate; in contrast to
the full model, this hurdle does not depend on yt and thus makes the analysis more simple.
We can also see that yt+1 is an increasing function of Vt+1 since:
dyt+1  Itzt+1 - it(Vt+l - K)av _ (1 - av)F + aK > 0 (89)
d~t1 t+1 zt+1
11.5.2.3 Solution Dependence on Relative Size
From the relationships in (83), it is clear that at, bt, and Xt, are increasing in the relative
size yt. This is exactly the same as for the full model case.
However, an interesting aspect of the simplified solution is that leverage does not depend
on yt; if Ft is constant, so is it. Clearly, if leverage is not dependent on yt, the effects of
L's interaction with U will be more pronounced than in the full model case, where leverage
is (slightly) decreasing in yt. Thus, the result that demand is pro-cyclical in the simplified
model is expected since we have already seen that this is the case in the full model.
11.5.2.4 Solution Dependence on Outcome
Since yt+1 is an increasing function of the outcome Vt+1, so are at+1 , Xt+1 , and bt+1 since
they are increasing in yt+1. This is the same as in the full model case.
Leverage however depends only on the risk free rate and is thus not a function of Vt+1.
11.5.2.5 Simplified dynamics of Pt
The simplified solution variables in (83) allow us to simplify the expression for Pt in (78)
when the risk free rate Ft = F is constant. Expanding the second term on the RHS of (78):
atF - at+1zt+1 = (1 - a')F - at F - (1 - av)zt+1 + atD+1 zt+1
= (1 - av)(F - zt+1) + (I - 1)dt+1 yt - (I - 1)Fyt
= (1 - av)a"(F - Vt+1 ) + (1 - 1)yt(dt+1 - F)
= (1 - av)a"(F - Vt+1) + (l - 1)lyt(Vt+1 - F)
= (V+1 - F)[(l - 1)lyt - (1 - av)aV]
(90)
Thus:
Pt+1 = PtVt+1 + wt'(Vi+1 - F)[(l - 1)lyt - (1 - av)a"] (91)
11.6 Metrics of Interest
We know proceed to define the two metrics of interest for the system which we will focus on.
11.6.1 Investment Deviation From Fundamentals
As discussed in Section 11.2, it is desirable for (re)investment to reflect fundamentals. Math-
ematically, the deviation from fundamentals at time t, At, is defined as:
At = P - St (92)
In other words, there is a deviation from fundamentals when the amount reinvested in
the economy either includes a net inflow from the risk free asset (positive deviation from
fundamentals) or a net outflow to the risk free asset (negative deviation from fundamentals).
The only way that investment will reflect fundamentals is if at each time, there are no
"additional" financial flows between the financial system and the producers. To relate to this
intuitively, think of this situation as buying and holding a stock; everyday, its value changes
based on exogenous (with respect to you) factors. On a given day, the stock has a value; on
that day, you could sell some of your ownership and put the money in the bank or you could
take some money from your bank account and buy some more. Both these situations involve
"additional" flows; having investment reflect fundamentals in the economy is intuitively like
you not doing anything on that day and thus implicitly "reinvesting" an amount equal to
the value of the stock.
With the help equation (78), it is clear that the time t +1 deviation from fundamentals,
At+1 , is increasing in Vt+1 since -at+1 and zt+1 are increasing in Vi+1.
11.6.2 Risk
By the term risk, we refer to the potential systemic cost of a default by L." If L is very
small and defaults, the repercussions intuitively should be less severe than if L is very large.
In our model, if L defaults, then U seizes control of L's assets, whose value is smaller than
the amount owed to U by L. In the subsequent period, L does not exist, and the system is
reduced to one involving only U (see Section 11.4.6). The post default period investment
will drop due to the fact the proceeds that U is able to recover from L will be shifted to
the risk free asset. The potential systemic cost is not something that is realized unless L
defaults; nevertheless, it is a quantity that can be observed at each time t, and its meaning
would be: "what would happen to investment tomorrow if there was an exogenous return of
Vb causing L to default"? The system is more "risky" when this potential systemic cost is
high, as future risky asset investment will be low.
Assume we are at time t and that a bad outcome V < K occurs, causing L to go
bankrupt. The time t + 1 post default investment amount is:
t+1 - at+w1t+1 - at+1w ((a + a + yt)V + atFt)
where we have used equation (54) to determine the return of U's risky debt holding. We can
also rewrite Pt as:
Pt=w +(av+a)w = w(y t + a + a) (93)
Thus, assuming that the risk free rate is constant, the post default investment pb as a
percentage of the time t investment is:
P ( w"t F at Ft v1 -(V Fp+ = + =tav (V+ -) D V )+ D (94)
PiPt yt + av + at yt + av a
The larger the second term in the parenthesis in equation (94) is, the smaller the impact of
a default by L is. We define the time t risk Rt as:
3 1We use the terms "risk" and "potential systemic cost" interchangeably. Think of "risk" as a term
reflecting post default investment as opposed to a term reflecting the probability of a default.
v DP_ __ y + a" + af _ y__+_a__+_a
wtuat Ft at F 1 av - af tF
Now, lets examine how the potential systemic cost could build up under a constant risk
free rate environment. If yt grows, so does Xt, meaning that aD increases and at decreases.
Thus, the numerator of Rt grows and its denominator decreases, thus making the overall
potential systemic cost increase. The extreme case occurs as at goes to 0, sending Rt to
infinity. This means that the post default investment as a percent of Pt will be avVb. To put
this into perspective, lets use some reasonable annualized numbers for a back of the envelope
calculation.38 Assume we are in a low rate environment (Ft = 1.02) and a relative size of
yt = 1% is large enough to attract a weight of aD = 20%; furthemore, assume U's direct
investment av = 30%, and the bad outcome V is a modest 0.9, which is below K (i.e. a 10%
pb
drop from t to t + 1). Then, pb ~ 83%; in other words, the post default investment drops
by 17%!
Figure 26 illustrates our concept of risk. In both panels, U has the same av. However,
the left panel has a low potential systemic cost since yt is small and thus U invests only a
modest amount of his portfolio into L's debt. The right panel has high potential systemic
cost since yt is large and thus U invests a large amount of his portfolio into L's debt.
Figure 26: Graphical illustration of risk. The left panel system, where yt is small, has a lower
potential systemic cost than the right panel system, where yt is large and L has attracted a
larger proportion of U's portfolio into his risky debt.
Clearly, the important determinant of risk in our model is the relative size of L, yt. It should
be noted that the risk at t + 1 is increasing in Vt+1 since both yt+1 and af+1 are increasing
in Vt+1.
38We use annualized numbers for simplicity; in reality, when looking at daily or weekly frequencies, we
would use realistic numbers for those frequencies. The simulation results presented later on are done assuming
a weekly frequency.
12 Key Results
In this section, we present the key results regarding the evolution of investment deviation
from fundamentals and risk in our model. We focus on the case where the risk free rate is
constant so as to understand the natural evolution of our metrics. As discussed in Section
3, the FFR is constant over long periods of time compared to the assumed frequency the
decision making by L and U. A constant risk free rate implies that Ft = Ft+1 = F and thus
av = a+ = av. For the relationships we derive that hold true in general, we do not drop
the time subscript. It should be noted that for many cases, closed form solutions can only
be derived for the simplifed model case. Thus, also present simulations which compare the
full model to the simplified model.
In what follows, Section 12.1 presents the expected growths of U and L, Section 12.2
presents the expected evolution of investment and its deviation from fundamentals, Section
12.3 presents the expected evolution of risk, and Section 12.4 presents simulation results
comparing the full model results with the simplified model results.
12.1 The Expected Growth of U and L
Because we are interested in examining the system evolution due to L's behavior, we focus
on expectations conditional on no default. Overall in this section, to simplify notation, we
do not explicitly annotate the expectation operator as conditional; all expectations should
be assumed to be conditioned on no default occuring unless explicitly stated otherwise.
12.1.1 One Step Case
For both the full and simplified model, the one step expected growth of L is higher than U.
Denote the non-default conditional mean of V as n'; clearly, this is (slightly) larger than
the unconditional mean of V, m.
If Ft < m, then conditional on no default occuring, L's expected growth is higher than
U's since:
[wVt+1 + b(Vt+1 -- Xt)Et [dt+1] = Et W L> mn
Et[zt+1] = Et [a"Vt+1 + a DXt + atFt] <in'
(96)
since Xt < m±F Km < in.
We have already seen that the relative size of L to U, yt, is very important for invest-
ment and risk. Since we have not assumed a particular distribution on V, evaluating the
conditional on no default Et[yt+1] = ytEt [dt22] is not feasible. However, a first order ap-
proximation of Et via the "Delta method" is in fact Et[t which is greater than
This is an increasingly accurate approximation as the mass of the V distribution becomes
more concentrated around m.
12.1.2 n-Step Case
For the simplified model, we now proceed to derive the n step forward looking expectation
of relative size when the risk free rate is constant at Ft = F over the interval of interest.
Et[ yt+n] = Yt Et ndt+i =t y(Et ~dt+i n>Yi=1 Zt+i 
_ t+i.
since Et [ > 1. Note that the expectation of the product becomes the product of
expectations because in the simplified model, the term dt-, is IID since it's just a function
Zt+i
of V+i, which is ID.
For the full model, deriving a closed form solution for Et[yt+n] is further complicated by
the fact that the ratios dt±, and (where 1 < i j < n) are correlated. However, later in
Zt+i Zt+j
this section, we present simulation results and compare them to the simplified model
12.2 Expected Future Investment and Deviation from Fundamen-
tals
In this section, we explore the investment deviation from fundamentals and its expected
evolution for the one step and n-step cases for the simplified model.
12.2.1 Deviation From Fundamentals Magnitude
From the Pt dynamics in (91), it is clear that there are two cases. If the outcome is "good",
meaning V+1 > Ft, then At+1 is increasing in yt; if the outcome is "bad", meaning V+1 < F,
then At+1 is decreasing in yt. Define yc as:
YC (1- a)a (97)( - 1)1
Note that yc is constant since F is constant. If yt > yc, then a good outcome will cause a
positive deviation from fundamentals, which is increasing in yt and t+1; analaogously, a bad
outcome will cause a negative deviation from fundamentals, which becomes more negative
as yt increases or as Vt+l becomes worse.
Overall, if the relative size is above a critical value, the magnitude of the deviation from
fundamentals will be increasing in yt. A good outcome will cause at+1 to decrease such
that there is a net inflow of funds from the risk free asset; a bad outcome will cause at+1
to increase such that there is a net outflow of funds to the risk free asset. These cases are
depicted in the top panel of Figure 27.
The situation where yt < y' is more subtle; here, yt is very small, which means that L's
behavior does not have an important effect on the system and the system resembles one with
U only in the limit. When Vt+1 > F, L's growth is not enough to prevent a net outflow of
funds to the risk free asset; at+1 does not drop enough so as to prevent this. The analogous
statement can be made when V1A < Ft; at+1 does not
net inflow of funds from the risk free asset. These cases
Figure 27.
Table 3 summarizes the possible scenarios:
increase enough so as to prevent a
are depicted in the bottom panel of
Outcome/State Yt > y' Yt < y"
A C
Vt~ >FtAt >0 At <0
V+1 > F |At| increasing in Vt+1  |At| increasing in Vt+1
|At| increasing in yt |AtI decreasing in yt
B D
At<0 At>0
Vt+1 <F |At| decreasing in Vt+1 |At| decreasing in Vt+1
|At| increasing in yt |At| decreasing in yt
Table 3: This table depicts the four possible deviation from fundamentals scenarios.
Good Outcome zt-1>Ft
Good Outcome zt,>F, Bad Outcome z.+1<Ft
a,, ~at -> P < St, at+ ~at -> P > St
Figure 27: Graphical depiction of the mechanism whereby investment deviates from funda-
mentals for the case where yt > yc (top panel) and yt < yc (bottom panel).
at+1Zt+1 <tF =* P,, > SI atnzt, > atF => P < S,
Bad Outcome zt.,.<Ft
12.2.2 One Step Expected Investment
Assume that we are currently at time t, and that the risk free rate Ft = F is constant.
Starting from the fact that total investment at a given time is equal to the sum of L and U's
investment at that time:
Pt+1 = w/+1 + WtH+1(av + aj+1)
= w/dt+1 + wuzt+lav + wzt+1a D
(98)
Since at+1 = (1 - 1)yt+1, Pt+1 can be expressed as:
Pt+1 = w dt+1 + wizt+1av + wuzt+1(l - I)yt+1
= wfdt+1 + wuzt+lav + wuzt+l 1 )t dt+1
zt+1
= w dt+1 + wuzt+1 av + w ( -)dt+1
= wLldt+1 + avwuIzt+l
(99)
In a similar manner, Pt can be expressed as:
Pt =w + wta" + wuaD
= L+ w1uav + wu'llY=w ta +w (I - 1)yt
= w +wuaV +w (l - 1)
= wl + wtaV (100)
Thus, since since Et[dt+1] > n' > Et[zt+1 ]:
Et[zt+1 ] < Et +1 < Et[dt+1] (101)[PtI
Thus, investment in the next period will grow faster than U's expected ROE and slower than
L's expected ROE.
To isolate the marginal effect of L's growth sucking in a higher percentage of U's funds,
consider an identical economy at time t where U does not adjust aD in response to L's
relative size; mathematically, this would mean aD = a +1 . In this alternative setup, the
expected next period investment would be below expected fundamentals and lower than the
expected investment discussed above. Denote the investment under this alternative setup as
Pta. Then:
p pa
L WZtav+D L (wD±
w~ dt~l+ ui a + wut~l z da~ + wjzt~iav±+ wu'zt~laf
= w t+1a+1 - at
(102)
since all time t quantities are the same; the only difference is U's time t + 1 response. Thus:
Et [Pt+1 - P+1] = wuEt (zt+1aj I - zt+1aD)
= wiEt ((It - 1)zt+1yt+1 - (it - 1)zt+1yt)
=wiEt ((it - 1)dt+1yt - (it - 1)zt+1yt)
= wu(lt - 1)ytEt (dt+1 - zt+1)
> 0
(103)
where the last inequality follows from (96).3
Thus, in the alternative setup, the expected investment is lower. This makes sense
intuitively if one considers that since the risky investment fundamental value is expected
to grow at a rate higher than the risk free rate, then the expected reinvestment should be
higher when aD varies pro-cyclically.
12.2.3 One Step Expected Deviation from Fundamentals
Using the investment dynamics expression in (91):
Et[Pt+1 - St+1] = w'(m' - F)[(l - 1)lyt - (1 - a')a"] (104)
Thus, the expected deviation from fundamentals next period is an increasing function of the
relative size yt. Furthemore, if yt > y', it is expected to be positive.
In the alternative setup, the investment in the next period is below fundamentals. Using
the expression in (78) and setting at+1 = at:
Pta+1 = tt+ 1 + atw7(Ft - zt+1) ->
Et [Pt'+1 = Ptm' + atw '(Ft - Et[zt+1])
Et [pt+1 < Ptm'
(105)
where the last inequality follows from (96).
39Note that (103) holds in the full model when E[at+ 1] > E[aD]; the benefit of the simplified model is that
the change in aD is linearly related to the change in y, allowing for a closed form expression.
Thus, the absence of U's reallocation in response to L's size causes expected investment
in the next period to be lower than it is in our model; furthermore, it is below m', which is
the expected fundamental return conditional on no default. Thus, in this alternative setup,
on average, funds are divested from the risky investment.
12.2.4 n-Step Expected Investment
Analogously to the one step derivations for the simplified model, we can derive the n step
forward looking expectation when the risk free rate is constant at Ft = F over the interval
of interest.
Pt+n = w+n+ wi+n(1  - at+n)
n n
= wt d±i + wt 17 zt+i(1 - at+n)
i=1 i=1
(106)
The interesting behavior is how investment is expected to evolve when L is constrained by
the VaR. Under this case, we can expand at+n:
1- aV - (1 -
1- av - (1 -
1)dt+n 1
zt+n
1) " dt+
fi=1 zt+i
(107)
Thus:
With this, we
n n n
Szt+iat+n= (1 - av) zt+i - yt(l - 1) f dt+
i 1 i=1 i=1
can expand the RHS of equation (106):
Pt+n = Wt dt+i + wu f zt+i(1 - at+n)
i=1 i=1
= wf dt+i + wu J zt+i - wi f zt+iat+n
i=1 i=1 i=1
n n n
=w'rdt+i +w zt+i-wi (1-av)fzt+i-yt(l-1)fHdt+i
i=1 i=1 i=1 i=1
(108)
at+n = 1 - a" - (I - 1)yt+n
n n
wt1 H dt+i + aVw 1 1 zt' i
i=1 i=1
(109)
Taking expectations on both sides gives:
n n
E[11wEt dt+j + avwtEt 11 zt+i
= w l (Et [dt+i])" + avwu (Et [zt±i))
=wfld" + a~w i "
(110)
where d and - are just short hand notations of the expectations of L's and U's ROEs respec-
tively; as discussed in Section 12.1, the expectation of the product becomes the product of
the expectations because dt+i and zt+i are IID variables in the simplified model.
Thus, the expected investment at horizon n, Et [Pt+n], is expected to grow faster than
U's expected ROE - but less than L's expected ROE d:
zEt [Pt+n- 1] Et [Pt+n] < dEt [Pt+n-1 ] (111)
Note that since - > F, 40, this means that the expected future one step investment increases
faster than the risk free rate. Even more interesting is the fact that since d > m, the expected
investment may grow at a rate greater than that implied by its expected fundamental return.
12.2.5 n-Step Expected Deviation From Fundamentals
The n-step expected deviation from fundamentals depends on the growth rate of expected
investment. Define as gt+n the growth rate of the expected investment between times (t +
n - 1) and (t + n). It is given by:
Et [ Pt+nl ] wIl n + a' w,-z"gt+n = n daw (112)
Et [Pt+n-1] w d" + avun"1
It is straightforward to show that dg"n > 0 by using the fact that - < d. This means thatdn
the growth rate of expected investment grows over time. Thus, in the simplified model, as
time progresses without any defaults occuring, the investment is expected to grow faster
than U's ROE and this growth rate is itself growing.
Recall that the deviation from fundamentals at time t + n, which we denote as At+n, is
defined as:
40Again, this stems from the assumption Ft < m.
Et [At+n] =Et[Pt+n - Pt+n-Vt+n] = Et[Pt+n] - Et[Pt+n-1]m' (113)
where we have utilized the fact that the time t + n - 1 is independent of the time t + n
fundamental outcome Vt+n. Since 9t+n is increasing in n, so is Et[At+n]; thus, although the
deviation from fundamentals may start out negative, it will become positive after some time.
At time t, we can find the time horizon n where this deviation is expected to go positive:
Et [At+n] > 0 #>
Et [Pt+n] > Et [Pt+n-1]m' )
wwllA ( 1 F~ in) > a~wiz"-- (in - a")m - F)
Ff17  K
w al(l - 1)d 1 a"(1 - a ')w "n 
a(1 - a) n-1 (1
t~ ~ -m 1) > a-w
(114)
Thus, the time n where the deviation is expected to first swing into positive territory is the
smalles n for which the above inequality holds. Note that since the RHS of the above is
decreasing in n, the condition will eventually be true.
Before continuing, one should keep in mind that the simplified solution is reflective of the
full model solution when y is small. As y stops being small, the simplified solution overstates
the amount that L borrows and thus expected future investment; in the full model, a point
would be reached where L can't borrow as much as is needed to sustain the dynamics of
Et[Pt+n] described above; of course, that happens after L has grown relatively large and thus
has attracted a significant portion of U's wealth. In any case, while the above relationships
hold for the simplified solution, their accuracy with respect to the full model decreases on
average as n increases.
12.3 Expected Risk
In this section, we show that the expected potential systemic cost is expected to grow over
time in the simplfied model. We first present the one step case and then proceed to the
n-step case.
12.3.1 One Step Expected Risk
Assume that we are currently at time t, and that the risk free rate F = F is constant.
Starting from the expression for potential systemic cost in equation (95) and using the fact
that aD = (I - I)yt in the simplified model:
yt + a" + av D lyt + av(1 - av - af )F (1 - av)F - (l-1yF
We already have established in Section 11.6 that risk is an increasing function of yt. Although
we cannot evaluate Et[Rt+1] in closed form, we can show that it is highr than Rt.
Et[[Rt+] = Et lyt+1 + av(1 - av)F - (I - 1)yt+1Fj
lEt[yt+1] + av covt ( + i+" F ( av)F - (1 - 1)yt+1F
Et [(1 - av)F - (1 -- 1)yt+1F] E [(1 - av)F - (1 - 1)yt+1 F]Et[( - a)( Iyt+i a
(lEt[yt+1] + a") + covt F l)yt+1F 
- t+IF
Et[(1 - av)F - (1 - 1)yt+1F]
lEt[yt+1] + av
(1 - av)F - (I - 1)Et[yt+1]F
lyt + av
(1 - av)F - (1 - 1)ytF
=Rt (116)
where we have used the well known identity that E [A] =[A - coy (B, j) in the second
line. Furthermore, we have used the fact that:
Covt lyt+1 + av ot,coo , (lY++ a 1)yt+ 1F)> (117)
( - av)F - (1 - 1)yt+1F (117)
since both functions are increasing in Vt+1. Furthermore, we used that Et[yt+1] > Yt.
Thus, the one step expected risk higher than the current risk. This result is intuitive
since yt is expected to grow in the next period.
12.3.2 n-Step Expected Risk
The n step result comes naturally from the one step result in the previous section. Assuming
that the risk free rate is constant between times t and t + n, the process Rt is a submartingale
and thus Et [Rt+n] > Rt Intuitively, this is clear: if yt is expected to increase in the future,
then the ratio of total system funds invested in the risky asset over those invested in the risk
free asset should decrease as L, who is growing faster than U, attracts more of U's wealth to
his risky debt.
12.4 Simulation Results for Full and Simplified Model
In this section, we present simulation results in order to compare the behavior of the full
and simplified models. We first give an overview of the simulations and then present some
simulation results.
12.4.1 Simulation Overview
As the goal is to compare the two solutions under the assumptions presented in this section,
we initialize the models with a "small" yo and observe the average evolution of the key
variables over time for a constant risk free rate. For each simulation, we use 2000 trials and
150 time periods, where each time period represents 1 week. We use parameter values which
reflect this frequency of decision making; all rates of return presented are not annualized
unless stated.
For each simulation, we discard the trials for which a default occurs as our aim is to
examine the behavior of the system when L exists and is adhering to his VaR constraint.
However, as part of our risk results, we depict the expected cost of a default at each time
were a default to occur at that time. After discarding the default trials, we average the
results of the remaining trials in the cross section in order to estimate the expectation of
each variable. It should be noted that in each simulation, very few trials are discarded due
to default since the imposed probability of bankruptcy is on the order of [0.0001, 0.00001].
In terms of the process V, we use a log-normal random variable due to its ubiquitous use
in asset modeling in finance and economics (see for example [18]). In our model description,
we have not assumed a particular distribution and we have seen that the evolution depends
primarily on the relationships between key parameters such as m, s, F, and K. Thus,
as long as the parameters of the distribution satisfy the constraints discussed in Sections
11 and 12, our results should not differ qualitatively. We ran simulations for two other
reasonable distribution choices, triangular and uniform, and found that the results did not
differ qualitatively.
With respect to variable initialization, we always start U's wealth at 1; the initial y
values are on the order of .001%; we choose these values so that we can observe whether the
two models are close under the assumption of small y and because they are consistent with
where the relative size of the leveraged sector would have been during the late 1980s, when
the shadow banking system started to take off (see for example [6]). Of course, depending
on the the simulation environment, the relative size will grow with different speed and have
different implications for risk and investment.
12.4.2 Additional Variables Definitions
In the simulations that follow, there are some additional variables that we depict either
explicitly or to compare to a given result. We present definitions of these here.
o Cost: We present a measure called "cost", which is what percent change in investment
trl - 1 would occur at time t + 1 if there were a bad outcome V 0.9 causing a
Pt t .
asn
Simulation Parameters m s F yo c
Simulation 1 8% 4% 2% 0.001% 0.001%
Simulation 2 8% 4% 3% 0.001% 0.001%
Simulation 3 8% 7% 2% 0.001% 0.001%
Table 4: This table depicts the parameter values used for the 3 simulations we present. All
quoted rates are annualized.
default. This is given by equation (94) and is related to risk buildup.
" Inverse Risk: Instead of presenting risk as defined in (95), we present its inverse
(i.e. ), which is directly related to the cost metric discussed above. The
maximum value that the inverse risk can attain is that where yt = 0, and we plot this
for comparison; it is called "Safest" on the respective plots.
" Crossover y: This is simply V as presented in equation (72).
12.4.3 Simulation Results
We now proceed to present some simulation results. Clearly, there are many parameters one
could play around with and hundreds of pages could be filled with plots; however, we pick
the ones we find most illustrative and compare them. Each simulation will depict 8 plots
organized in 4 figures: the variables depicted (in order of presentation) will be investment,
cost, aD, inverse risk, y, leverage, X; we also depict the pair (E1, 62), which are variables
that determine the accuracy of our linearized solution approximation and described in the
Appendix. For our linearized solution approximation to be accurate, these epsilons should
be much smaller than 1. Table 4 depicts the key parameters used for each simulation. Each
of the following sections will present and discuss a simulation.
12.4.3.1 Simulation 1: Baseline
We use this simulation as our base case and will change some parameters in subsequent
simulations so as to compare and contrast. Figures 28, 29, 30, and 31, present the simulation
results. The simplified model is very close to the full model, especially when y tends to be
small. However, towards the end of the period, the simplified model y tends to grow more
than the full model y. This is due to the fact that in the full model, as time goes on and
y tends to increase, leverage tends to decrease (see Figure 30); this is in contrast to the
simple model, where leverage does not depend on y and thus is constant over time. Thus, in
the simplified model, there are more extreme outcomes of y at longer horizons. The Ei plot
(Figure 31, bottom panel) is a testament to the fact that the approximation on average is
getting worse with time; recall that Ei << 1 for the simplified model to track the full model
well. However, 62 stays small throughout, meaning that the differential between X and F
remains small, and this can be seen in the top panel of Figure 31.
100
In terms of average evolution, although investment is below its fundemental path in
the beginning,4 1 as y tends to grow, investment starts to increase above fundamentals and
ultimately surpasses its fundamentals path. Furthermore, as y tends to grow, L sucks in a
higher percentage of U's funds (Figure 29, top panel); this causes inverse risk to decrease over
time on average and increases the average system cost of a 10% drop in the fundamentals.
As expected, for small y, the drop is less than fundamentals, but this drop becomes more
severe as y tends to increase: it reaches as low as -17% for the full model, which is far larger
of a drop than the fundamental's 10% drop.
4
'The fundamentals path is given by Pt = Po * mt; if the average investment in the system has a higher
slope than this path at a certain time, then average investment was above its fundamentals at that time and
vice versa.
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Figure 28: Simulation 1: Plot of the simulated average investment (top panel) and default
cost (bottom panel) for the simplified and full models.
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Figure 30: Simulation 1: Plot of the simulated average y (top panel) and leverage (bottom
panel).
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Figure 31: Simulation 1: Plot of the simulated average X (top panel) for the simplified and
full models as well as the simplified model epsilon approximations (bottom panel).
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12.4.3.2 Simulation 2: Lower Risk Free Rate
In this simulation, we lower the risk free rate to 1% (annualized), from 3% (annualized)
which was the case in Simulation 1. In this case, since K is the same as in Simulation 1, we
know that the simplified model leverage will be higher. Thus, we expect the simplified model
to track the full model less well on average as time progresses. Furthermore, for both models,
we expect faster y increases, higher aD, and higher default costs, compared to Simulation 1.
Figures 32, 33, 34, and 35, present the Simulation 2 results.
The simplified model is close to the full model, especially when y tends to be small.
However, towards the end of the period, the simplified model y tends to grow more than the
full model y on average. As was the case in Simulation 1, there are more extreme outcomes
of y at longer horizons due to the fact that the constant leverage assumption does not hold so
well as y grows; the 61 (Figure 35, bottom panel) shows that the approximation on average
is worse than in Simulation 1.
For both models, compared to Simulation 1, the average investment rebounds from below
the fundamentals path sooner; this is due to the fact that average y increases faster in this
simulation. Also, aD tends to grow faster (Figure 33, top panel) and inverse risk decreases
over time (Figure 33, bottom panel). In this simulation, inverse risk starts out lower because
a lower risk free rate cases a' to be higher. Also, note that inverse risk drops more over
time compared to Simulation 1 since every increase in aD "counts" more now that av is
higher. In terms of the cost, it is more severe on average than in Simulation 1 for all times;
furthermore, it reaches as low as -21% for the full model, which is far larger of a drop than
the fundamental's 10% drop.
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Figure 32: Simulation 2: Plot of the simulated average investment (top panel) and default
cost (bottom panel) for the simplified and full models.
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Figure 34: Simulation 2: Plot of the simulated average y (top panel) and leverage (bottom
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Figure 35: Simulation 2: Plot of the simulated average X (top panel) for the simplified and
full models as well as the simplified model epsilon approximations (bottom panel).
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12.4.3.3 Simulation 3: Higher Variance
In this simulation everything is the same as in Simulation 1 except for the fact that we
have raised the standard deviation of V. Intuitively, this will cause L to be more risk averse
because K will decrease due to the increased standard deviation. Note that although we
have assumed that the standard deviation is higher, we have kept c, constant because we
want to isolate the effect of L being more "risk averse". Figures 36, 37, 38, and 39 present
the Simulation 3 results.
The simplified model is close to the full model overall as y does not tend to grow very
fast; indeed, the e1 (Figure 39, bottom panel) shows that the approximation on average is
very good as it remains much smaller than 1.
For both models, compared to Simulation 1, average investment remains below its funda-
mentals path. Only towards the end does the slope of the average investment curve increase
above the slope of the fundamental's path, meaning that investment is growing above fun-
damentals on average towards the end. This is due to the fact that the average y is much
lower than in Simulation 1; a lower average y also results in lower aD (Figure 37, top panel)
and a smaller decrease of inverse risk (Figure 37, bottom panel). In terms of the cost, it is
less severe on average than in Simulation 1 for all times; in fact, it is smaller on average than
the fundamental's 10% drop.
Overall, in this simulation, the fact that L is effectively more "risk averse" due to K being
lower causes him to be less leveraged; note that this is similar to lowering the regulated
probability of bankruptcy. Since L is more risk averse, the expected growth rate of y is
smaller, meaning that a smaller percentage of U's money is sucked into L's debt. The result
that increasing the risky investment fundamental variance actually causes a slower buildup
of systemic risk is actually quite interesting and demonstrates that a regulation which causes
L to calculate his VaR risk using a very conservative s slows the increase of systemic risk;
however, the cost is that investment is tends to be below fundamentals.
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Figure 36: Simulation 3: Plot of the simulated average investment (top panel) and default
cost (bottom panel) for the simplified and full models.
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Figure 38: Simulation 3: Plot of the simulated average y (top panel) and leverage (bottom
panel).
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S2
13 The Optimal Risk Free Rate Rule
Having examined the system under a constant risk free rate environment, we now turn to
examine what the Fed could do in theory in order to mitigate investment deviation from
fundamentals. The important theme of this section is that the optimal level of the risk
free rate depends on the relative size of L to U. The same V outcome can have different
response implications in economies with different yt; for example following a good outcome,
the optimal response is to raise the risk free rate in economies where yt is above a threshold;
if yt is below this threshold, then the optimal response is to lower rates! The finding that
relative size matters is an important result, given the literature on the FFR discussed in
Section 3, where the risk free rate adjustment is gradual and follows a Taylor type rule
which does not involve the relative size of the financial sector.
In what follows, the risk free rate setting logic is presented in Section 13.1. We then
present the optimal rule for the full model case in Section 13.2 and for the simplified model
in Section 13.3. For the simplified model, we are able to analyze the dependence of the
optimal risk free rate on yt in closed form in Section 13.4, and show in Section 13.5 that
at a given time, it is generally not possible to stabilize risk and have investment reflect
fundamentals. Section 13.6 reflects on the overall findings.
13.1 The Logic Behind the Rule
As shown in Section 12, the frictions arising from the interaction between L and U cause
investment to deviate from fundamentals. Following a good fundamental outcome, L borrows
more from U, which may cause net investment to increase above fundamentals and vice versa.
As discussed in Section 11.2, it is desirable that reinvestment in the economy is not affected by
financial frictions. Once the producer makes an initial project decision in the real economy,
he does not want to have to readjust his project plans due to short term financial system
responses to V. The only way this can happen is if at each time, the amount reinvested
in the project is exactly that justified by fundamentals; this is equivalent to there being no
additional financial flows between the financial system and the producer at each time. Thus,
the adjustment of F should be such that it counterbalances the financial system frictions
resulting from the interaction of U and L.
Intuitively, we are faced with a flow management problem; the goal is to get the situation
depicted in Figure 40, where real economy investment is recycled; achieving this is equivalent
to having the risk free investment amount recycled. The control variable F affects all 3 of
U's investment allocations; however, y affects only the red arrows, corresponding to U's risky
debt and risk free asset investment. The goal is to find the rule for F which cancels out the
effect of y such that at each period, there is no net flow between the real economy and the
financial system as well as between the Fed and the financial system.
According to equation (78), the reinvestment at a given time is the sum of the funda-
mental term and a correction factor which reflects the net inflow of funds from the Fed to
the financial system. At a given time t, after having observed yt, the Fed can set the rate F
(which is the risk free rate earned at time t + 1 on a risk free investment made at time t) so
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as to set this net inflow of funds to 0.42
Figure 40: Graphical depiction of the situation where financial frictions do not affect real
economy investment.
At time t, if there is no default, the investment in the risky asset is:
Pt = P- 1 % + [wu 1at_1(Ft_1, yt_1)Ft-I - wI z t(Vt, Ft 1)at (Ft, yt)] (118)
where we have highlighted the dependencies of each variable. U's ROE between time t- 1 and
t is zt, which is a function of the risk free rate Ft_1 and the random variable Vt. Furthermore,
the time t proportion of U's wealth in the risk free asset depends on Ft and yt. Thus, varying
Ft will affect only at(Ft, yt). To set the second term to 0, the optimal risk free rate Ft* should
be set such that:
a*(Ft*, yt) = at- 1(Ft 1, yt 1)Ft_ 1  at_1(Ft_1, yt 1)Ft 1 (119)zt(%, Ft_1) at_1% + atiXt-1 + at _ 1F_1
Notice that the optimal a* > 0 since at_1 cannot be lower than 0. Furthemore, a* < 1; it
will be 1 only if at_1 = 1. This situation is the trivial case where U invests all of his money
in the risk free asset and L invests his own money in the risky asset; then of course, all of
U's risky asset profits will be reinvested as at will be 1 for all t and all of L's profits will be
reinvested in the risky asset. Although investment will reflect fundamentals in this case, it
is a trivial situation and we will not focus on it.
An interesting observation is that if U's ROE is higher than the risk free rate, the optimal
a* decreases compared to at_1. This might be counterintuitive at first, yet we will see that
"A note about the notation: if at time t, I invest 1$ in the risk free asset, I will have Ft dollars at time
t + 1. If I had invested in the risky asset, I would have Vt+ 1 dollars at time t + 1. Although both are rates
of return between times t and t + 1, the subscript t on F refers to the fact that this quantity is known at
time t. The subscript t + 1 on Vt+1 reflects the fact that this quantity is a random varianble observed at
time t + 1.
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this decrease may be smaller than the decrease that would have happened if the risk free
rate were held constant. Intuitively, if there is a very good V, U's wealth grows; if at did not
decrease, then some of the proceeds of the investment would actually be divested and sent
to the risk free asset. If the system were uncontrolled, then since yt would grow by a large
amount, a? would rise significantly at the cost of at, which would decrease significantly; this
would cause reinvestment to be above fundamentals as funds will be sucked out from the
Fed and into the risky asset. Thus, the controlled a* should be somewhere between these
two extreme cases.
The Fed needs to set Ft such U's risk free weight becomes a*. Since U's weights must
sum to 1, we can solve for Ft*:
1 - a"(Ft*) - a(yt, Ft*) a* (120)
Note that Ft* < m if a* < 1. This is due to the fact that a? > 0 (since X(Ft) > F). If
a* = 1, then the LHS of (120) can be 1 only if Ft = m since then, L will be in the non-VaR
constrained mode since yt = 0, making Xt = m, aD = 0; also, a' will be 0. Thus, if a* < 1,
then Ft < m for the LHS to be less than 1.
Lets think about the "balance" in equation (120). As V increases, the RHS will decrease.
If the risk free rate is not changed, the LHS will decrease as well since yt will increase, causing
aD to increase. The whole game in how rates need to be adjusted is whether the RHS or
LHS changes more for a certain V outcome. Roughly speaking, the LHS is less sensitive to
Vt if yt_1 is smaller; in this case, the RHS move will be more extreme and Ft will need to
be adjusted to make the LHS follow the RHS. If yt_1 is relatively large, then the LHS side
move is more extreme than the RHS side move, meaning that Ft will need to be adjusted to
compensate the large LHS move and bring it in line with the RHS. We further analyze this
for both the full model and the simplified model in the next sections.
13.2 Risk Free Rate Rule: Full Model Case
For the full model case, equation (120) can be rewritten as:
( c -cvm - a
Xt(F, yt) = F 1 + - + 1 t (121)2cD )2CD
where Xt(F, yt) is given by equation (68). The Ft* which solves the above equation is the
optimal risk free rate. One can solve it in closed form and there is a unique solution; however,
the resulting expression does not provide much intuition about how Ft* compares to Ft1. and
yt_1. Thus, we proceed to graphically illustrate these points. Figure 41 shows the graphical
solution of (121). The red line is the RHS (which we denote f(a*) as it is a function of a*)
and the blue line is the LHS. The green line shows the intersection point, whose x-axis value
is the optimal F*. The green arrows illustrate how each curve would move if V increased.
The RHS has a y-axis crossing of 1- -at. thus, as V increases, the red line would move up2CD
since a* would decrease. The LHS, which is represented by the blue curve, would adjust as
follows; its belly portion would move towards the upper left since yt increases as V increases;
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its linear portions would expand as the kinks would move towards eachother (the kinks are
depicted by the 2 dotted black lines). In the limit, the blue curve would tend to the line
m+Ft 43
2 *
It is straightforward to see that there is a unique intersection point between the red line
and blue curve. The red line has a slope which is greater than 1; the blue curve has a slope
of 0.5 in its linear regions; in its belly region, the slope is:
dX - 1 + K < 1(123)
dF 2 (F - K)2 + <(13(F1-K) 2 -vCD /
where the inequality is strict if yt > 0. Thus, there will be exactly one intersection point
and therefore a unique Ft*.
Table 5 illustrates the possible cases for V and the corresponding a* and yt movements
compared to a* 1 and yt-1 respectively. VtE is the value which V must surpass in order for
U's ROE zt to be greater than Ft_1. Vt, 1 is the value which V must surpass in order for yt
to go above yt_1. The expressions are simple to derive and are given below:
D
zt F1 1 eVft'=F _1 ->t1( X 1 1 -F F 1) <;F 1 1t-1
zt = dt # Vt_1 = a-+ t, IXt _1 + at, F_1 ;> Ft_1It_1 - a _1 t-_ - at _ 1
(124)
where we have used the fact that Xt-1 > Ft_1 (the inequalities are strict if if yt1 > 0).
For V- 1 , note that it is a weighted average of X_1 and Ft_1 where the weights are
positive (since leverage is always greater or equal to 1) and sum to 1.
V 1 < -1<Yi1V V Y-- V V% t-1 < Vt
zt < F_1 zt > F _1 zt > F- 1
a* > at_1 a <a 1  a* < at 1
yt < yt_1 yt < y1-i y > yt-i
Table 5: This table depicts the possible a* and yt movements compared to a* 1 and yt_1
respectively.
43The linear portions of the blue curve occurs when Ft is such that m Ft is smaller than the square root
expression for Xt in (68). Thus, the kink locations occur at:
2K
F1 = K i (m K) 2  Yt (122)
cD
Thus, these kinks move towards the center as V increases because yt increases with V1.
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For the "middle case" where V_ < Vt < Vt_1 , it is easy to see that Ft* < F_ 1 by looking at
the balance equation (120). If Ft = F_1, then the LHS would increase and the RHS would
decrease. Thus, the optimal response must be to raise rates so that Ft > F_ 1, making the
LHS decrease.
However, the direction of rates is not obvious for the left and right cases in Table 5 as in
both cases, which side of the balance equation drops (if Vt > V, 1 ) or increases (if 17 < /_)
more depends on the relative size at time t - 1, yt-1. Figure 42 illustrates this point for
the case where 17 > Vt_1 . In the top panel, the optimal rate Ft* increases from F_1 due
to the fact that yt_1 is relatively large; thus, in response to a good outcome which increases
L's relative size, the optimal response is to raise rates. However, in the bottom panel, when
yt 1 is relatively small, the optimal response is to lower rates in response to a good outcome
which increases L's relative size; this is an interesting result that may seem counterintuitive,
yet makes sense in the context of the balance equation; when yt_1 is small, even though a
positive outcome occurs, it is not enough to suck in enough funds from the risk free asset
in order for investment to reflect fundamentals. Essentially, the system resembles the case
where only U exists (see Section 12.2 for a brief description) and thus, rates must be lowered
so that all investment proceeds are reinvested.
The analogous behavior exists for the case where Vt < Vt-1 ; when yt_1 is large, the
optimal response is to lower rates in response to a bad Vt. However, if y,_1 is small, the
optimal response is to raise rates following a bad outcome.
From the graphical analysis of the optimal rate rule, it is clear that the relationship
between Ft*, Vt, and yt_1 is fairly complex. The critical size of yt 1 for which the optimal
response to a good V, involves a rate increase as opposed to a rate decrease depends on 17
itself. Essentially, the question is whether the uncontrolled at, denoted by at"c, would be
less than or greater than a*; in the former case, the optimal response is to raise the risk free
rate, whereas in the latter case, the optimal response is to lower it. Which case we are in
depends on yt_1; finding this critical ye_1 boils down to evaluating whether the LHS or RHS
decreases more if F = F_1 for a fixed 17. Solving for this yc 1 can be achieved by fixing a
V, evaluating the LHS of the balance equation with Ft = F_ 1, and comparing it to the RHS
of the balance equation. It turns out that yc 1 depends on the actual outcome V; this makes
assessing the sensitivity of Ft* to y,-1 and 17 in closed form a hairy task. We thus turn to
analyze the optimal risk free rate rule in the simplified solution setting, which approximates
the full solution well for small y, as discussed in Section 12.
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Visual Depiction of the Optimal Control Ft
Visual Depiction of the Optimal Control Ft
1.05
Ft
Figure 41: Graphical depiction of the optimal F* (top panel) and a zoomed in version
(bottom panel).
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Visual Depiction for F, Compared to F when y is Large
Visual Depiction for F; Compared to Ft1 when y is Small
1.05
Figure 42: Graphical depiction of the optimal Ft* response to V > Vt - 1 for the case where
yt-1 is larger (top panel) and for the case where yt_1 is smaller (bottom panel). Note that
for both cases, all parameters are the same except yt-1.
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13.3 Risk Free Rate Rule: Simplified Model Case
For the simplified model case, equation (120) can be rewritten as:
1 - a - (1, - 1)yt = a* (125)
One can easily solve the above for Ft* and the solution will be unique since the LHS is a
monotonically increasing function of Ft. However, our aim in this section and the next is
to understand when the optimal response involves a rate cut or a rate rise; thus, we aim to
understand the relationship between Ft* and Ft_1.
The advantage of the simplified solution in the risk free rate analysis is that leverage
depends only on the risk free rate. Furthermore, using the notation in Section 13.2, Vt VtzF
since the following set of inequalities holds:
V > Ft 1 - dt > V > zt > Ft 1
V < 1 -- dt < V < zt < Ft_1
(126)
Thus, it is the case that one of the following two situations is true: (a* < at_1, yt > yt_1)
or (a* > at_1 , yt < yt_1). Thus, the middle case of Table 5 does not exist in the simplified
model.
Table 6 summarizes the four possible scenarios: we refer to cases as A through D as
depicted in the table for brevity.
Outcome/State yt1 > y,_1 Yt_1 < Y _1
A C
V 1 > Ft _ anc<a<t 1 a* < anc < at 1
V > Ft* > Ft _1  Ft* < F_1 < V
B D
V < F_1 a u"c > a* > at _1 a* > anc > at 1
V < Ft* < Ft _1 Ft* > Ft_1 > V
Table 6: This table depicts the four possible risk free rate adjustment scenarios of the
simplified model. We refer to these cases as A through D as denoted in the table.
From Table 6,we can see that the optimal risk free rate movement depends on both the
relative size in the previous period and on the outcome. If yt_1 > y _1, then the optimal re-
sponse is to raise rates following a good outcome and vice versa; however, if yt-1 < yc 1, then
the optimal response is the opposite. While this latter situation may seem counterintuitive,
it is not; this latter situation occurs when yt_1 is very small and thus, a good outcome does
not increase the relative size appreciably, meaning that U's weights will not change much,
thus causing some of the investment proceeds to be funneled out; this can only be mitigated
via a rate cut. The analogous argument can be made for the bad outcome case, as relative
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size does not decrease appreciably and thus, U's weights will not change much, thus causing
some funds from the risk free asset to be brought into the system; this can only be mitigated
via a rate rise.
We now proceed to derive yc_ 1 as well as to prove the inequalities between Ft* and Vt
presented in Table 6.
13.3.1 Derivation of y'_1
Recall that yc_ 1 is the critical value of yt-i which differentiates whether there should be a
rate increase or decrease in response to a cerian Vt. There should be a rate increase if the
uncontrolled aurc is smaller than a* and vice versa:
aune < a*a1 t a "e < at 
_1Ft_1
at_1)Ft_1 - (It_1 - 1)yte Ftrj
- at_1)Ft_1 - (It_1 - 1)yt_1Ft_1
_1(dt - Ft_1)
1)yt 1 Ft1-(V - K) - Ft_1
Ft_1 - K
1)yt_j1l_1(Vt - F()
(127)
If Vt > F_1, then there should be a rate increase if:
(1 - av_1)ave
Yt-1 > t)a --1  y Y1 (128)t_1(le1 -)
Else, there should be a rate decrease. If Vt < F_1, then there should be a rate increase if
yt-1 < ye 1; else, there should be a rate decrease.
13.3.2 Derivation of Relationship Between Ft* and Vt
The inequalities between Ft* and Vt presented in Table 6 will be useful in assessing the
sensitivity of Ft* to yt-i as well as in assessing the effect that the optimal Ft* has on systemic
risk.
For cases C and D, proving these bounds
Ft* < F_ 1 < Vt for case C and Ft* > F_1 >
Let's consider case A now: showing that
at (Ft*).
is trivial. By examining Table 6, it is clear that
V for case D.
Ft* < V is equivalent to showing that at(Vt) >
at(Vt) > at(Ft*)
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->au" zt < at _1Ft_1
S(1 - av_1)zt - (It_1 - 1)ytzt < (1 -
-(1 - av_1)zt - (It_1 - 1)yt-idt < (1I
-(1 - av_1)(zt - Ft_1) < (tIt - 1)yt-
S(1 - a_1)a'_1(Vt - Ft_1) < (lt_1 -
-(1 - av_1)a_1(Vt - Ft_1) < (le_1 -
t (Vt) - (It (Vt) - 1) yt > -~ _
Zt
K
S(1 - a'(Vt))zt - K yt_ dt > (1 - a'_1)Ft_1 - (1t_1 - 1)yt_1Ft_1
K FK F ~-
(1 - ay'(Vt))zt - (V - K)yt_1 > (1 - a v)Ft - 1K
t V - K Ft _1 - K t-Ft _1 - K F-y-
S(1 - a(V))zt > Ft1 (1 - a1) (129)
The last relationship in (129) is true in case A since zt > Ft 1 1 and a'(V) < av_1.
Now, let's consider case B: showing that Ft* > V is equivalent to showing that at(Vt) <
at(Ft*). Following along the lines of the steps in (129):
at(V) < at(Ft*) # (1 - av (Vt))zt < Ft 1(1 - av) (130)
The relationship in (130) is true in case B since zt < Ft_1 and av(Vt) > au_1.
Having established the directionality of the optimal rate change, we explore the depen-
dency of the rate adjustment magnitude on yt_1 in the next section.
13.4 Sensitivity of Optimal Rate in Simplified Model
Having bounded the optimal risk free rate in each of the 4 cases of the simplified model,
we now proceed to examine its sensitivity to the relative size of L more explicitly. Before
continuing, we touch on the reasons why this is important. Firstly, as discussed in Section
3, the relative size of the leveraged sector is currently not a factor which monetary policy
considers; yet, even within our simple setup, the active role of the leveraged sector affects
the channeling of funds to the real economy. Furthermore, we have seen that in order for
investment to reflect fundamentals at each time, the Fed needs to act in every decision period;
currently, this is not the case. However, as we have seen in Section 12, when the risk free rate
is held constant, y1 tends to increase. Thus, when the Fed does act, the interesting question
is whether the actual risk free rate magnitude change should depend on yt. Intuitively, it
should, and the longer the Fed doesn't act and yt builds up, the more extreme this rate
change should be when the Fed does act.
Table 7 summarizes the results we find for the magnitude of rate adjustment. For cases A
and B, the magnitude of the rate adjustment is increasing in yt_1; thus, for economies with
a larger relative size of L to U, for the same outcome, the optimal risk free rate adjustment
is bigger. The opposite holds for cases C and D.
13.4.1 Derivation
Assume that we are at time t and the Fed will set Ft*. We know that the balance equation
for the simplified model in (125) must hold. We proceed to examine the sensitivity of Ft* on
yt_1. We fix V and take the respective derivative on both sides:
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Outcome/State I Yt-i > Yr_1 Yt-1 < y4
A C
V > Ft _1 Ft* > Ft - Ft* < Ft _1|Ft* - Ft_1| increasing in yt_1 Ft* - F- 1 1 decreasing in yt-1
B D
V < F1 Ft* < Ft _1 Ft* > F _1
|Ft* - Ft_1| increasing in yt-i Ft* - Ft_1| decreasing in yt_1
Table 7: This table depicts the rate adjustment magnitude results for cases as A through D.
dFt* K dF* dyt Ft-1 dat 1
cY + 2 t - (It - 1) d 1dyt-1 (F5* -K) dyt_1 dy_1 zt dyt_1 (131)
Note that on the RHS, the fact that only at_1 depends on yt-1 is a result of the fact that
we are interested in assessing the impact of relative size at t - 1 on the optimal rate at t;
this is interesting for the case where the Fed is not acting in every period, as is the case in
practice. Thus, F_ 1 is not the time t - 1 optimal rate; rather, it is the rate which was set at
some prior time t - T; in other words, the risk free rate has been constant over the interval
[t - Tt - 1].
For (131) to hold, one of the following must be true:
d O F(t*1)dye Fe_ idat _1dt_> 0 m (It - 1) dt< t- a1
dyt_1 dyt_ 1  zt dyt 1
dt_< 0 -(It - 1) dt> t- a1
dyt_1 dyt 1  zt dyt 1
We proceed to examine the condition under which (132a) holds:
(132a)
(132b)
dyt
dyt_ 1
-(it -1)-
Zt
(l - 1)lt_ 1 (V - K)
K Ft-_1 '(t-K
tV-K-K-F*- F _1-K( K
F_ 1 dat 1
zt dyt_ 1
< - (It_1-1)
Zt
> (It_1 - 1)Ft_ e
K
> - Ft _1
V4-KV- K>1
Ft* - K
(133)
When we are in cases A and C, V > Ft* (see Table 6), and thus, (132a) holds, meaning that
dFP > 0. In other words, if V > Ft_1, then Ft* is an increasing function of yt-1.dyt 1 I
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In case A, this means that the risk free rate increase Ft* - Ft_1 is increasing in yt_1: said
another way, the risk free rate rise is larger if L's relative size at the previous time is larger
and the outcome V is "good" (i.e. above Ft_1).
In case C, this means that the magnitude of the risk free rate decrease, IFt* - Ft_11, goes
towards 0 as yt_1 increases: said another way, the risk free rate cut is smaller if L's relative
size at the previous time is larger and the outcome V is "good".
In an analogous fashion to (133), one can show that when we are in cases B and D, (132b)
holds since Ft* > Vt. This means that dF ? < 0. In other words, if V < Ft_1, then Ft* is an
decreasing function of yt-1.
In case B, this means that the magnitude of the risk free rate decrease, |Ft* - Ft_11 , is
increasing in yt_1: said another way, the risk free rate cut is larger if L's relative size at the
previous time is larger and the outcome V is "bad" (i.e. below F_ 1).
In case D, this means that the risk free rate increase, Ft* - Ft_1, is decreasing in yt_1:
said another way, the risk free rate increase is smaller if L's relative size at the previous time
is larger and the outcome V is "bad".
To summarize, the magnitude of the risk free rate change is increasing in yt_1 if yt_1 >
y . However, if Yt_1 < ye_1, then the magnitude of the risk free rate change is decreasing
in yt-1.
13.5 Risk Under The Optimal Risk Free Rate Rule
We now proceed to examine how the potential systemic cost (i.e. risk) changes in the
simplified model if Ft* is set according to the optimal risk free rate rule. We summarize the
main findings in the two bullet points below:
" The potential systemic cost increases for the controlled system whenever V > Ft_1.
For case A, this increase is smaller than the increase in the uncontrolled system; for
case C, this increase is larger than in the uncontrolled system.
* The potential systemic cost decreases for the controlled system whenever V < Ft_1.
For case B, this decrease is less than the decrease in the uncontrolled system; for case
D, this decrease is larger than in the uncontrolled system.
13.5.1 Derivation
Recall from equation (95) that risk or potential systemic cost is given by:
Re - 't (134)
wt"at F
We denote the time change in risk from time t - 1 to t as 7y', = R. By using (134), we can
express y as:
Pt
Rt watFt _ Pt at-1 Ft 1  1 
Rt_1 U*-1 Pt-1 atzt Ft
w,1atiFt_1
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For each of the 4 cases in Table 6, we proceed to evaluate 7t for both the uncontrolled
(denoted 7t"') and controlled (denoted 7t*) cases. Before continuing, it is worth pointing out
that Rt is a decreasing function of Ft since increasing Ft decreases the numerator (through
P) and increases the denominator (through both at and F).
Proceeding, 7t* can be simplified to:
Pt at 1 Fti I (136)
P_1 atzt Ft Ft*
since under the optimal control, a*zt = at_1Ft_1 and Pt = Pt_1 .
Below, we prove our claims for all four cases:
1. Case A: We know from Table 6 that ag"c < a*. This means that ag"czt < at_1 Ft_1
and Pt > Pt-1 %V (see equation (78)); furthermore, since this is the uncontrolled case,
F = Ft_1. Using these facts along with the expression in (135) gives:
77"" > V(137)
Ft_1
Furthermore, since we are in case A, Ft_1 < Ft* < 14, and therefore:
7t* = Ft > (138)Ft*
Thus, under the optimal risk free rate setting rule, the potential systemic cost increases.
However, it increases less than the uncontrolled case since:
V V
77"' > Ft_1I Ft* = 7t (139)
In this case, stabilizing risk would mean that a rate F would have to be applied, where
Fr > Ft*; however, the cost of this would be to push investment below fundamentals
since a' > a* and thus Pt < Pt_1 Vt.
2. Case B: We know from Table 6 that aync > a*. This means that a nczt > at_1 Ft_1
and Pt < Pt_1Vi (see equation (78)); furthermore, since this is the uncontrolled case,
Ft = Ft_1. Using these facts along with the expression in (135) gives:
7unc < (140)
Furthermore, since we are in case B, V < Ft* < Ft_1, and therefore:
7t < 1 (141)
t*
128
Thus, under the optimal risk free rate setting rule, the potential systemic cost decreases.
However, it decreases less than the uncontrolled case since:
7n" < Fe 1- Ft* 7* (142)
t Ft-1  Ft*
In this case, stabilizing risk would mean that a rate Fr would have to be applied, where
F[" < Ft*; however, the cost of this would be to push investment above fundamentals
since a' < a* and thus Pt > Pt 1 1V.
3. Case C: We know from Table 6 that a"' > a*. This means that a"'zt > at_1F_1
and Pt < Pt_1 V (see equation (78)); furthermore, since this is the uncontrolled case,
Ft = Ft_1. Using these facts along with the expression in (135) gives:
7'" < - (143)
Note that from the above formula, it is unclear whether risk increases or decreases in
the uncontrolled case since v- > 1. However, we know from (95) that yt > yt_1 means
that afD > a/_1 and at < at1 ; thus, risk does in fact increase in the uncontrolled case.
Since we are in case C, Ft* < Ft_1 < Vt, and therefore:
* = > 1 (144)
Thus, under the optimal risk free rate setting rule, the potential systemic cost increases.
Furthermore, it increases more than in the uncontrolled case since:
7n"'Vt < = = * (145)
t F _1 Ft* Y
In this case, stabilizing risk would mean that a rate F[ would have to be applied, where
F[ > Ft*; however, the cost of this would be to push investment below fundamentals
since a' > a* and thus Pt < Pi1%.
4. Case D: We know from Table 6 that a"' < a*. This means that a"'zt < at_ 1Ft_1
and P > Pt_1 % (see equation (78)); furthermore, since this is the uncontrolled case,
Ft = Ft- 1.Using these facts along with the expression in (135) gives:
7 > (146)
Note that from the above formula, it is unclear whether risk increases or decreases in
the uncontrolled case since V- < 1. However, we know from (95) that Yt < yt-i means
that aD < a_ 1 and at > at_1 ; thus, risk does in fact decrease in the uncontrolled case.
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Since we are in case D, Ft* > F_1 > V, and therefore:
* = (147)
Thus, under the optimal risk free rate setting rule, the potential systemic cost decreases.
Furthermore, it decreases more than in the uncontrolled case since:
uc V V
7tf > > = 7t* (148)
In this case, stabilizing risk would mean that a rate Fr would have to be applied, where
' < Ft*; however, the cost of this would be to push investment above fundamentals
since a' < a* and thus Pt > Pt_1 V.
Thus, if yt-1 is above yc_ 1, following the optimal control rule "tames" the risk change in
the system both on the upside and on the downside. However, the opposite behavior occurs
when yt_1 < yc_ 1, where we see that the risk change is amplified both on the upside and on
the downside for the controlled case, compared to the uncontrolled case.
13.6 Optimal Risk Free Rate Discussion
In this section, we have presented a rule which the Fed could follow in every period to set
the risk free rate so as to have investment reflect fundamentals. Furthermore, we showed
that at a given time, one cannot generally have investment reflect fundamentals and risk not
change. Essentially, the problem can be viewed as managing the net inflow/outflow of funds
from the financial sector. For both the full and simplified model, the logic of setting at so
as to balance these flows is the same. The dependence of at on the rate Ft is more complex
in the full model; however, when yt is small, the resulting simplified and full model risk free
rates will be very similar.
As we saw, the most interesting case is when yt_1 > y' 1; if the Fed does not act in
every period, we know that the relative size tends to increase over time. We saw that the
magnitude of the rate adjustment |Ft* - Fe1 1 is larger for larger yt-1 if yt-i > yc1 (cases A
and B). In these cases, this adjustment magnitude would be even larger if the aim were to
stabilize the potential systemic cost. Thus, if the Fed does not act in every period, then the
rate adjustment it will have to make when it does in fact act will tend to be higher.
The behavior is also interesting when yt-i < yc_ 1. In this case, following a good outcome,
the uncontrolled potential systemic cost is lower than the controlled potential systemic cost.
Thus, the optimal response goes hand in hand with increasing potential systemic cost; this is
because a good V when L is small does not affect aD appreciably and rates need to be lowered
to incentivize U to lend more to L so investment can reflect fundmentals. The analogous
situation holds when yt-i < y'_ 1 and there is a bad outcome. Again, in this case, aD does
not drop appreciably and thus rates need to be increased so that reinvestment does not end
up being above fundamentals.
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Overall, our results in this section highlight that considering the relative size of the
leveraged sector should be incorporated into macroeconomic and financial stability models.
The risk free rate has important implications for leverage and potential systemic cost through
its effect on L's behavior.
14 Summary
In this part of the thesis, we presented an aggregate model of the financial system which
incorporates an active levered financial intermediary who acts in a procyclical manner. We
then analyzed the evolution of two important metrics, and proposed an optimal risk free
rate setting rule to mitigate some of the systemic effects. Focusing on leveraged financial
intermediary behavior was motivated by the recent empirical literature which finds that
leveraged financial intermediaries actively manage their balance sheet and expand them
during economic expansions and vice versa. The main model ingredients/motivations are
listed below:
* The allocation of household wealth to money market funds over the past 30 years has
increased dramatically, fueling the levered sector's impressive growth. Such money
market funds typically pay little more than the risk free rate, implying that most
investors are agnostic about the type of market exposure they have in bad outcomes.
o Financial regulators have imposed VaR as a measure of risk for levered financial in-
termediaries. Although institutions such as investment banks aim to maximize their
return on equity, they are bound by this VaR constraint on how much risk they can
take. Adhering to this type of constraint induces procyclical behavior, whereby the
levered intermediary will increase his borrowing in good times and vice versa. Adher-
ing to a VaR constraint actually makes good sense for institutions such as banks, who
report to their shareholdes; clearly, they don't want to default, but if they do, they
don't care what the possible losses are as the shareholders are wiped out irrespectively
and any additional losses are born by the debt holders.
o It has been documented that financial intermediary asset growth forecasts real eco-
nomic variables such as investment. This is not unexpected since financial intermedi-
aries channel investment funds to the real economy. The fact that their balance sheet
adjustments impact the real economy is an important motivation of why we choose to
focus on aggregate behavior and understand how this channeling of funds works.
o Monetary economists view the short term risk free rate from an "inflation expectation
management" view point. However, insofar as the level of this rate impacts the abil-
ity of the levered sector to borrow in order to lend, it has real implications for the
channeling of investment and systemic risk.
Although the model has a relatively simple setup, the resulting behaviors are complex
and nonlinear. The most important finding is that the relative size of the levered sector is
an important determinant of investment and risk. In "good times", the levered sector will
increase its borrowing from the unlevered sector, sucking in funds from the risk free asset to
the real economy; as the levered sector gets larger, this behavior causes larger investment
deviation from fundamentals. Furthermore, the potential systemic cost of a default by L gets
larger as the relative size of the levered sector gets larger. In "bad times", the levered sector
will decrease its borrowing, pushing funds out of the economy into the risk free asset; a larger
levered sector causes investment to fall more than that which is dictated by fundamentals.
The key effect of L's behavior is how it changes the indirect risky investment exposure of
the unlevered sector.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of our model is that economic overinvestment goes
hand in hand with the buildup of risk. One of the factors that made the recent financial
crisis quite memorable was the fact that very few people had a sense of the buildup of the
potential systemic cost in the years leading up to the crisis. Au contraire, during the boom
years of 2003-2007, the economy was perceived to be strong, investment was high (too high in
hindsight), growth was strong, and the financial sector was raking in huge profits. However,
what most people missed is that risk was building up quietly; in retrospect, the large growth
of the levered sector's size which was aided by its ability to borrow at low rates should have
rang alarm bells about the possible systemic cost of a default. Our model is able to capture
the tradeoff between investment and risk and shows that the underlying factor between both
is the relative size of the leveraged sector.
In our model, the risk free rate is an important variable as it affects the cost of borrowing
of the leveraged sector. We proposed a risk free rate setting rule which counterbalances the
frictions in the supply of funds caused by the interactions of the leveraged and unleveraged
sectors. We found that the optimal rate depends on the relative size of the leveraged sector;
furthermore, we found that it is generally not possible to set the risk free rate such that
time t investment reflects fundamentals and systemic risk does not change. The dependence
of the risk free rate on relative size is not always intuitive at first sight. Roughly speaking,
when the relative size of the leveraged sector is very small, the optimal response to a "good"
fundamental outcome, which increases the relative size of the leveraged sector, is to actually
lower the risk free rate; in this case, systemic risk will be higher than if there were no rate
adjustment. In contrast, when the relative size of the leveraged sector is larger, the optimal
response to the same good outcome is to raise the risk free rate; in this case, the potential
systemic cost will increase but be lower than if there were no rate adjustment. Furthermore,
the magnitude of this rate rise is increasing in the size of the leveraged sector. The analogous
result holds for the case of a bad outcome; a small leveraged sector actually calls for a rate
increase whereas a larger leveraged sector calls for a rate decrease.
Current macroeconomic models mostly view the short term risk free rate as a tool for
setting inflation expectations. However, the importance of the risk free rate in our model is
that of a contemporaneous regulating force on the investment channeling process; its level
affects the risk taking capability of the leveraged sector and thus, the relative size of the
leveraged sector needs to be a factor in determining its optimal level. Indeed, the fact that
the risk free rate affects both investment and risk suggests that monetary policy and financial
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stability are linked and thus, macroeconomic models need to be adjusted to incorporate an
active levered financial intermediary sector.
Of course, it is typically the case that "you can't manage what you can't measure". We
have seen that investment, the buildup of risk, and the "right" level of the risk free rate
depends on the relative size of the levered sector. While data for leveraged players such as
broker/dealers is available, this is not the case for many other leveraged players, such as
hedge funds and shadow banking system entities. Thus, from a macroprudential regulatory
perspective, it is imperative to be able to accurately measure the whole size of the levered
sector. Such data will allow policy makers to quantitatively incorporate financial sector
frictions in their optimal policies.
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15 Appendix for Part I of Thesis
In this appendix, we provide all of the proofs promised in Part I of this thesis.
15.1 Proof of Equations (13) and (14)
The derivation of equation (14) from equation (12) is a straightforward application of the
matrix identity:
[A + BCB']J1 = A- - A- 1B [C-- + B'A- 1 B] 1 B'A-1 (149)
where B is a rectangular matrix. Starting from equation (10), we can derive equation (13)
as follows:
pBL = EBL [(TE<' 7 + P'QV1
=[E - T2EP'(TPEP' + Q)-PE] [(TE)l 7r + P'~-Yv]
= - TP'(TPEP' + Q)- 1P7r + TEP'Q-lV - T2EP'(TPEP' + Q)-- PEP'-lv
= 7r - TEP'(TPEP + 2)-- P7 + TEP' I - PEP'+ - PEP' --
= 7 - TEP'(TPEP' + )-1 P7
+rTEP' PEP' + PEP' + - -PEP' + Q PEP' 2--1o
T T T
7r - TEP'(rPEP'+ )- 1P7r + TEP' + P)P' - - P '
= 7 - TEP'(TPEP'+ Q)'P7 + TEP' (TPEP'+ Q) v
= r + TP'(TPEP' + Q)- (v - P7r)
15.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We call W*L the BL weights vector resulting from (P,, Q,, v.). To prove this theorem, we use
the result of Theorem 2, which is proved in Section 15.3. With the help of the factorization
in Theorem 2, we can express WL*L as:
o Wq + Pmn (150)
Recall that m, can be written as:
n* = IA*(v P*7 (* + P*Ep* (v - (151)
A 1+ T A T 1+r 1+r
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Using the fact that (P*, 4, v.) = (BP, BQB', Bv):
I 1 + P*EP' P_
A T 1+r/
= (B- B + BPEP/B1) B v - ) (152)
A 1 PEP) P( )
= (B') + B-1B v -
A T 1+r 1+rT
1B)- 1 + PEP/)' (V P -
-(B') + v-
Thus:
weq + P',m* _ weq + P'*(B') m _ weq+ P'B'(B')-lm 
_
wLOL I+T 1+7 1+T -WBL (153)
It is easy to show that the row reduced echelon form triplet is a special case. We get Prref
by first performing an "LDU decomposition" of P and then performing more row operations
so that there are zeros both above and below the resulting pivots:4 4
MP = LDU (154)
U = ZPrref (155)
where L is a (kxk) lower triangular matrix, M is a (kxk) permutation matrix which puts
the rows of P in the right order in order to factor it, U is an upper triangular matrix with
1P on its diagonal resulting from the LDU factorization, D is a (kxk) diagonal matrix which
is set so that U has P on its diagonal, and Z-1 is a (kxk) upper triangular matrix which
performs row operations on U so that there are zeros above the pivots. Thus:
Prref = (LDZ)- MP (156)
Note that since M is a permutation matrix, it is invertible; moreover, M- = M'. Also, note
that the product LDZ describes the row operations needed to go from Peref to MP; since the
rows of Prref contain a basis of the row space of MP, LDZ is an invertible transformation.
Thus, the product (LDZ)- M is also invertible. Thus, the appropriate B matrix is Brref
(LDZ-1 )M. Therefore, the triplet (Prref, £rref, Vrref) - (BrrefP, BrrefrB'ref, BrrefV) re-
sults in the same allocation WBL
44A good presentation of LDU decompositions is presented in [58].
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15.3 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is a bit tedious as it involves many algebraic manipulations. We
start by rewriting equation (16) with the help of equation (12):
1
WBL =-(E+ BL) I'BLA
1
-(E + BL)
Our first objective
in equation (149):
.BL [(TE) 1 7 + P'Q-- v] (157)
is to simplify the (E + EBL) 1IBL term. With the help of the identity
(E + EBL) 1 BL - E ( L +1
and thus:
(E + EBL) EBL In - BL (BL
By plugging in the expression for EBL of equation (11):
E-1 (E-i + E- ) [(TE)" + '- 1 P] [(rE) 1 + ''lP 1 + P ]
[(TE) 1 + P'Q-1 P] 1 + T 1 + P 1
E1 1+ P1 ip
1+ I
+ P'Q-1 P
+ P'Q- 1 P T I
=[1 + r) In + TP'Q-PE P 1 + P'Q-1 P TE-1 + P'G-1 P E(E-
[(1 + T) In + TP'- 1 P] + P'- 1P [((1 + T) In + TP'- 1PE) (TE) 1 ]
- [(1 + T) In + TP'-- 1 P 1 + P'- 1PTE [(1 + T) In + TP'~-1PE]
- [In + TP'- 1PE] [(1 + T) In + TP'Q- 1PE]
Thus, by plugging in the result of equation (160) into equation (159), we get:
(E + EBL) - BL n - BL (EBL
= in - [In + TP'- 1PE] [(1+ T) In + TP'Q- 1PE]
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(158)
(159)
(160)
= in -- [In +rAn - A~n +rTP'QO PE] [(1 +rT)In + rP'QO PE] -
(161)
= in - [((1 + T) In + rP'i- PE) - TIn] [(I + T) In + TP'Q-PE]
= In -1,+r T(1 +rT)In +r T Pl ]1
-
T [In+ PE 11+T
1wJBL I( + BL -'BL
= -(E +EBL 
-IBL (E l7+PQ-V
i T F1Al-F -F
- -1
+T
The inverse term [In + T P' 1-PE] 1 in equation (162) is complicated; in order to obtain
the simple and intuitive result of Theorem 2, we must find a way to simplify the inverse
term: this is shown in Theorem 6 below:
Theorem 6 The following equality holds:
in - 1 P'A
1+T
where A -- " + 'l.T t hi
Proof With the help of the identity in equation (149), we can rewrite A as:
(163)
S1 T + -FP'-P j
TP'Q- PE
1+T
-TP'Q- 1 P
1+r T
+ TP'Q 1P TP'Q PE
1+T
TP'O 1 P
1+ T
P (in +TP'O 1 P 1+T + T
(165)
1
TP'Q-- 1PE
1+T
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Thus:
(162)
A-1 = T- 1 - rO-1P
Thus:
IP'A
1+ T
TP'Q 1 (164)
[(rE)- 7r + P'Q Iv]
In + TP'QO4P E
1 +r T
TP'Q-PE 
i T
1 TP'- 1PE
1+T
With the help of the result in equation (165), we can expand the RHS of equation (163):
TP'Q- PE
In -
TP'-IPE I +
-F T rP'
1
Pi 
-IP
TPP2-1p1
I+T
TP'Q-2PE
+F T In+ TP' 1  I
I 1+r T
1P 
-
TP'- 1 PE
1+T
TP'Q- PE
1+T
[In +TP'- P+
1+r T
TP'Q- 1 PE
I +T
TP'Q-1 PE
-F T
TP'--PE ~
I+ T [In+TP'Q
[I,+rP'Q-P 1
11 +r T
E -1-1+r
(166)
TP'Q-IPE
I+T
SIn + TP'Q2P E -1 - TP'Q1 PE
1 +r 1+rT
TP'Q-PE
+ I In
= [,+TP' 11
+ TP'Q- P 1
1+ T
TP'T- 1
+-T1 I- T
In + rP'Q-lP 1
PE TP'T-PE
-+ i-FT
In + TP'Q- P
I I1+rT
Q.E.D.
With the help of the
follows:
above theorem, we can express the BL weights of equation (162) as
iT
WBL A1-
o+ =T EIn +
A+T[I
1
- P'A
+T
With a little bit of algebra:
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1 , i
I P1A- PE
1+r T
P'f-IPE [(r E)-
+rT (167)
-1 7 + P'Q-'l]
1P E In + rP'Q-'PEI
1I+r) 1+r T
=In +rP'Q-lP EIn +rP'O
1+r [
'PE] [(r E)-1 I r + P'Q-'v]
1 T I
WBL - In -
A1 T
1 P'A
1+T
'PEI [(TE) 1 7 + '~f U] (168)
-(T) + P'-IV P'A- 1PE (rE) - A P'A-PEP v
.' A A (1 + r) A(+r
1 E-r + -P'- 1v
aA
- P'AP7r - P'A 1 PEP'Q
A(1+) A(1+T)
Recall that by the standard CAPM assumption, the equilibrium weights vector is given by:
Weq = E- r (169)
Thus:
BL 1+r
The last
fact that
[Weq + -P' 1 -- 1 P'A- Pr- P'A- PEP'Q-loA A(1+r) A(1+T)
(170)
term inside the brackets in equation (170) can further be simplified
A -- Q + P and thus:
T T(
A P'A-'PEP'-lo = P'A- A -
(+rT)A
)Q-L
= _P'Q-1o - _P'A-1-oAA T
T_ V-PI 1v
= _P'Q--v - -P'A-A A
Plugging the result of equation (171) into equation (170), we have:
WBL =TWeq+ -PQ 1 --
1 (I1 P'A
1 + TrUe A (1+-1 T)
1+T[
1
1 + T
Wcq + P' A-
weq + P'm)
1
-
1
~(1+r )
11P7 + -P'AA
1
A(1+)A
T
P7T - -PQA
1v]
P)]
1
A
(172)
1 A . 1 A
m n - A-1o - I A-
A (1 +T)
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=1
1+ T
=1
1+rT
v ]
by using the
(171)
where:
1
A
1V 
-
P7
1 + T
(173)
15.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Backward Statement Proof: Pick a P' according to the method outlined in steps 2 &
3 of the inference algorithm. If each element of xi belongs to the set S and Ixz contains
each nonzero member of the set S' at least once, then the vector x lies on a k-dimensional
subspace of R'. By construction, the (nxk) matrix P' satisfies the restriction in assumption
3 and thus, the k columns of P' form an orthogonal basis for a k-dimensional subspace of
Rn. Thus, x is in the column space of P' and the equation x = P'm will have exactly one
solution vector m. Furthermore, each entry in m will be distinct since Ix contains each
nonzero element of the set S' at least once. Now, recall that for an arbitrary x, there are
many P' matrices that can be constructed via the steps in the inference algorithm which still
satisfy the assumptions; the columns of P' can be generated in any order and/or the column
generating rule in step 3 of the inference algorithm can be changed to: "for every asset in a
given group, input a +1 in the corresponding entry of the column if the deviation (i.e. its
entry in x) is negative and a -1 if the deviation is positive (i.e. its entry in x): for all other
entries of the column, input a zero". Since every such P' is consistent with the allowability
conditions, then the equation x = P'm will have exactly one solution for each such P'.
Forward Statement Proof: if there exists a pair (P, m) for which the (nxk) matrix P'
satisfies assumption 3 and the (kxl) vector m satisfies assumption 4, then it is trivial to
see that each entry in x = P'm will be in the set S and that every entry of the set S'
will be present in |xz; this is because each row of P' will either be zero (in which case the
corresponding element of x will be zero), or it will have a single nonzero entry, say in column
j, in which case the corresponding element of x will be ±mj.
15.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Assume we use two different consistent conventions in factoring the vector x: under conven-
tion 1, we get (P 1 , mi) and under convention 2, we get (P 2 , M 2 ). The difference between P 1
and P 2 is that a set of rows differ in sign. Define by M a (kxk) permutation matrix such
that P 2 = MP 1 . Then:
P'm2 = P'mi
P'M'rn2 = P'1m (174)
M'm 2 = MI
where the last equality follows from the fact that since P is allowable, it must have full row
rank and thus the nullspace of P' is empty. Now, we seek the relationship between v2 and
vi:
V2  P2EP'2 +P21P2 P27
r 1+T 1+
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AM i + P1 P1  M'm 2 + MP17 (175)
r 1+r 1 + T
P1EP' + P1EP'1 Pn+ 17r
=1A + mi +
r 1+7 /1FT
= MI
Note also that:
-2 = P 2 EP'2 = MP 1 EP'1M' = MO1 M' (176)
Thus, the triplet (P 2 , Q2, v2 ) = (MP1 , MQ1 M', Mvi) is in the informationally equivalent
set.
15.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Part 1 Proof: Of course, if there is no noise added, then by following the procedure for
estimating the number of views presented in Section 6.2, we would never misestimate the
number of views. However, the theorem's result in the "no noise" case is nice in a theoretical
sense and serves as a foreground for understanding part 2 of the theorem. Since there is no
noise, Y - x. Recall that v, can be expressed as:
P1
1+r
PiEP' PiP' PiTr
=A(P IP + m- + 1T (177)
E + E Pm- P 17
\T 1+T 1+T
Since it was the observation of x that led to the factorization x = P'mi, we have:
v1 = A P1 - + E z + P1T(178)
Multiplying both sides by the (kxl) matrix A we have:
AAA E E__ APi~rAv=AAP1 -+ )x+ (179)
=APE +E ) P7
r 1+T 1+
Moreover, since X = P'mk, we have that:
Av = AP ( -+ E ) P'mk +F - Uk (180)
T 1 +r 1+T
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This concludes the proof of the first part of the theorem.
Part 2 Proof: The proof of part 2 of the theorem is similar to the proof of part 1. However,
due to the fact that i is now noisy, any factorization of it using the inference algorithm will
be approximate because in Step 4 of the inference algorithm, in order to apply theorem 3,
we create the vector y from Ii as described in equation (35); consequently, we estimate the
vector Fn (we use the tilde notation to indicate that this is the estimate resulting from a
noisy Y). Of course, the size of in depends on how many views we estimate that the manager
has in Step 2 of the inference algorithm. Analogously to the proof of part 1 of the theorem
above, we denote the case where we think he has I views by fi and the case where we think
he has k views by ink, where I > k. In order to proceed with the proof, we must describe
mathematically how to arrive to Fh1 given our estimate Pi and our observation 5. Without
loss of generality, assume that the vector I is ordered such that assets in the same view are
grouped next to each other. For the case where we estimated I views, x contains 1 + 1 blocks
(the first I for the views and the last one for the assets on which there is no view and thus
have a 0 entry); we denote the set of elements in block j by Cj. Denote each of the entries
of Y as V, where i = 1, ... ,n denotes the entry of Y andj 1, . . . , I + 1 denotes which
view-group we classified the element as being in; note that we are not assuming that this is
the correct classification as our goal is to show consistency between two estimated (P, m)
pairs where each pair was estimated with a different estimate of the number of views. Given
this setup, the j'th entry of m, takes on the value m, where m' > 0 and is given by:
C '''''l(181)3 dcC4
where |C| is the cardinality of the set Cj. Note that 7in1 has I elements because there is not
an entry in it for the group of assets on which there is no view.
In order to generalize equation (181) to a linear matrix notation, we define the matrices
S and B as follows:
sgn (xi) 0 ... 0
0 sgn (x 2 ) ... 0 (182)
0 ... 0 sgn (x,)
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1 1
0,...,0
0,.. .,0 ... 0,... ,0 0,...,0
0 . 0 : 0,...,0
|C 2 |' C 2 |
IC2
0,..., 0
1 1
0, ,0 ,C ... , C|CI| C|
0,... 0
0,...,
Ci 1I
c1+l
(183)
Note that the size of the diagonal matrix S is (nxn) and the size of B1 is (lx (ICi I + - - -+ C1+i 1 )).
The matrix B1 is an "averaging" matrix; when applied to Y, row j averages the entries of
block |Cj I. Note that the zero columns of B1 correspond exactly the the 1 + 1 group of Y.
With the above definitions in mind, we generalize equation (181) to a linear matrix notation:
-BiS ii
since:
(184)
(185)pI = Si
The important observation is that if Step 3 of the inference algorithm is followed for con-
structing PI, then:
BIS = DiP, (186)
where Di is an (lxI) diagonal matrix of the form:
0 ... 0
21 .0
0
With this in mind, we can proceed from equation (177):
S 1+ T 1+T
1+T) + -T1+rT
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(187)
Ai = AAP 1 - + (188)
0
D,
Ai = APk
r T
+ ' P'Difji +7
1+rf 1+rT
For the case where we estimate the number of views to be k, we can analogously write:
k k AP ( E + 1±7)
POT
Pkmik + 1 AP
1+rT
-- + P'D +
r 1+ T
Subtracting equation (189) from equation (188) and using the fact that Y = x + r/, where
Tj is the zero mean noise:
A - ik = APk + 1 T) (PDiPi - P'kDkPk) (x -- io)
Now, since x is the vector of deviations which is not corrupted by noise:
DiPIx = BiSx = mi
Notice that the above is not "m tilde" because we are referring to the m
identified when x has no noise.
We are thus in a position to say:
P'DiPix = P'ImI = x
Analogously:
P' DkPkX kmk = X
Plugging in equations (192) & (193) back into equation (190):
(190)
(191)
vector which is
(192)
(193)
+ 1 ) (P)D ipi - P'kDkPk>x
1 +rTIf )
(194)Sii- ia = AN
r T
Since r/x is a zero mean random vector:
E [A~i - Vk] = E ANk + ') iDii - P'/DkPk)1/X
r 1TI+rTf\k )
1+T)
This concludes the proof of the second part of the theorem.
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Pk1
1-+VT
(189)
P'DIPI - P'kDkPk) E (rT) (195)=A k E
16 Appendix for Part 2 of Thesis
16.1 Proof of qt =1
In this section, we prove that L will never invest in the risk free asset if K < F < m; one
could argue that putting some money in the risk free asset would allow him to borrow more
and thus possibly make him better off; however, this is not the case.
We drop all time indicators for brevity as this is a static problem. Denote by q the
proportion of L's net assets (his equity and the amount he borrows) which he invests in the
risky asset and by 1 - q that which he invests in the risk free asset. Our goal is to show
that if F < m, he will always invest a proportion of q = 1 in the risky asset. L's objective
function is:
C(q) = q(wL + b(q))m + (1 - q)(w' + b(q))F - b(q)X(q)
= q [wL(m - F) + b(q)(rn - F)] + b(q)(F - X(q)) + wLF (196)
L satisfying his VaR constraint means:
c P {q(wL + b(q))V L ( - q)(wL + b(q))F - b(q)X(q) < 0} 
K b(q)X(q) - (1 - q)(wL + b q))F
q(wL + b(q))
b(q) L qK + (1 - q)F
X - (qK + (1 - q)F)
b(q) (q)
X - f(q)
(197)
where we have defined f(q) as a shorthand for qK + (1 - q)F. Note that since we assumed
F > K, then f(q) < F. Furthermore, note that X(q) is given by:
F + f (q) + (F - f (q))2 + 'y
X(q) - 2 (198)
Deriving the above is exactly analogous to the derivation of Xt in equation (64). It is worth
noting that X(q) > F.
Proceeding, we expand (196) with the help of (197) as:4 5
C(q) = q [wL(m - F) + b(q)(m - F)] + b(q)(F - X(q))
4 5We drop the w'fF term as it is not dependent on q.
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wL (m - F)q + (F -
Ti xh(q) - f(q)
The goal is to examine whether C(q =1) > C(q < 1).
X(q) (q)Xq)X(q) 
- f (q)]
For brevity, we will use X and f instead of X(q) and f(q), keeping in mind that they
are functions of q. Taking the derivative with respect to q:
C'(q) - [((n - F)X + q(m - F)X' + f'(F - X) - X'f)(X - f)
- (q(rm - F)X + f(F - X))(X' - f')]
(200)
Manipualating the term in brackets gives:
[X'(q(n - F) - f) + X((m - F) - f') + f'F][X - f] - [X(q(m - F) - f) + fF][X' - f']
[q(m - F) - f][(X - f)X' - X(X' - f')] + F[f'(X - f) - f(X'
[q(m - F) - f + F][Xf' - X'f] + X(X - f)[(m - F) - f'] =
- f')] + X(X - f)[(m - F) - f'] =
[q(m - F) - kq - (1 - q)F + F][Xf' - X'f] + X(X - f)[(m - F) - k + F]
q(Tm - K)[Xf' - X'f] + (m - K)X(X - f)
(m - K)[q(X f' - X'f) + X 2 - Xf]
(m - K)[X(qf' + X - f) - qfX']
If (201) is positive, then C(q) is increasing in q, meaning that L will choose q
assumed that m > K. We now show that the term in the brackets is positive:
(201)
1. We have
qf'+X -. f =q(K -F)+X -qK-(1-q)F X -F'>0 (202)
where the inequality is strict if y > 0. Furthermore, we know that X'(q) < 0 since:
= 
1 f'(q) [
2
- (K - F
2
< 0
1+ F - f (q)
(F - f (q))2 + y J
CD
) + F - f (q)[(F - f (q))2 + yL CD
Thus, C'(q) > 0, meaning that L will always choose to allocate all of his borrowing to the
risky investment, as long as F < m.
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(199)
X'(q)
(203)
16.2 Proof that P(V±i < K) < c in non-VaR Constrained Mode
In Section 11.3.3, we saw that in the non-VaR constrained case, b""" < byaR and that the
probability of default is less than or equal to c; in this section, we show why. The key is that
bt Xt icesn
L is an increasing function of bt. From the coupling condition:
wt +bt
D b b
at - = 2CD(Xt -Ft) - Xt + Ft (204)2 CDWt
From here on, we drop the t subscripts for brevity. From the above, wbjx+ can be rewritten
as:
b2  + bF
2CDWU (205)
wL + b
The above is an increasing function of b since:
b2 +bF b 2- bwL + FwL
2
CDWU _ 
2
cDwU CDW
wL + b (wL + b) 2
Thus, if L's optimal unconstrained borrowing, by", does not violate the VaR constraint, then
bu"X "bc) b "RXbR) and baR <b VaR. Since the CDF function #(.) is a monotonically
increasing function, then the probability of default is less than or equal to c in thenon-VaR
constrained case.
16.3 The Simplified Model Approximation
As discussed in Section 12, in order to arrive at closed form expressions, we linearized the
solution of the full model presented in Section 11. The approximation is accurate when yt is
small. In this section, we present the approximation we made and analyze it.
16.3.1 An Empirical Justification
The assumption that yt << 1 in practice is actually quite valid. The total equity of all
levered financial intermediaries primarily includes that of hedge funds and other "alternative
investment" institutions as well as that of investment banks. The total equity of unlevered
players is by definition equal to their assets: unlevered players primarily consist of mutual
funds and pension funds. Table 8 shows estimates of the total world equity of the key levered
and unlevered players obtained at the end of 2009. 46 The data for all institutions except
banks is obtained from "TheCityUK" (see [2]), which compiles the data from various sources
including governmental agencies, supranationals (OECD, IMF, and BIS), and investment
managers. The data for banks is obtained from "The Banker" (see [1]).
4 6Note that for levered players such as hedge funds and private equity funds, the term "assets under
management" (AUM) is used instead of the term equity.
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Clearly, the classification is very crude as institutions within a given category may be
very heterogeneous. However, the aim is to use the data as a rough first order estimate of
the relative size of the levered sector to the unlevered sector.
The vast majority of hedge funds and private equity funds are indeed levered as leverage
is part of their business model. As for pension funds and mutual funds, they are typically not
leveraged: in many countries, laws are in place to prevent such institutions from levering up
due to the societal role that they play. Sovereign wealth funds are also typically unlevered
as their job is to manage their country's fiscal surplus. As for private wealth funds, the
$26 Trillion number referenced in Table 8 refers to the wealth of high net worth individuals
which was not invested through conventional investment management routes (pension funds,
mutual funds, etc.) or alternative investment management routes (hedge funds, private
equity funds, etc.). 4 7 The vast majority of such HNWI's outsource their investment decisions
to their private wealth manager and do not typically employ leverage.
The two categories which are hard to classify are banks and insurance companies. Clearly,
banks are levered institutions, yet the leverage amount and "behavior" of an investment bank
such as Goldman Sachs is markedly different from that of a regional "savings and loan"
bank. Furthermore, it is difficult to separate out the "investment banking" activities from
the retail banking activies of mega banks such as Citigroup, due to the size and complexity
of such modern "one stop shops". Given the high level of data aggregation for banks, it is
impossible to make a definive statement on whether they are leveraged or not in the context
of our model: a portion of the bank industry is definitely leveraged and acts to maximize its
ROE subject to a bankruptcy constraint.
As for insurance companies, their traditional role has been to invest the premiums they
receive into assets so as to be able to match their future liabilities (to policy holders). Thus,
with respect to our model setup, they would probably fit into the unlevered category as
they do not typically borrow in order to invest. However, they are tricky to classify as
pureley unleverd players within the context of our model, given their business model and all
regulations imposed on them.
If we assume that one third of the banks fit into our levered category, the ratio yt is ap-
proximately 5.9% (6.9% if insurance companies are excluded from the unlevered category).48
Even if we assume that all banks fit into our levered category, the ratio yt only increases
to approximately 9.6% (11.2% if insurance companies are excluded from the unlevered cat-
egory).
Furthermore, one must bear in mind that the Table 8 numbers are for 2009. As mentioned
in Section 3, there are numerous empirical studies which document the rapid increase in size
over the past 30 years of levered players such as broker/dealers and hedge funds. This fact
enhances our assumption of yt being significantly smaller than 1 over the past 30 years.
The discussion in this section highlights the lack of appropriate data and the difficulty
in estimating yt. Given its critical importance, an important regulatory objective is to be
47A high net worth individual (HNWI) is defined as someone who has more than $1 Million in investable
assets.
480ne third is the estimate of the size of US broker/dealers as a percentage of US commercial banks given
in [7].
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able to appropriately taxonomize various financial system players and obtain the appropriate
data.
Institution Type Total Worldwide AUM Levered or Unlevered?
in 2009 (US$ Trillions)
Pension Funds 28.0 Unlevered
Mutual Funds 22.9 Unlevered
Private Wealth 26 Unlevered
(ex conventional investment management)
Sovereign Wealth Funds 3.8 Unlevered
Private Equity Funds 2.5 Levered
Hedge Funds 1.7 Levered
Top 1000 Banks (Tier 1 Capital) 4.9 Unclear
Insurance Company Funds 13.6 Unclear
(not incorporated in Mutual Funds)
Table 8: This table presents the total worldwide assets under management
major levered and unlevered institution types.
(AUM) of the
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16.3.2 The Approximation
Recall that in order for the Taylor series approximation of Xt in (81) to be valid, we assumed
that:
1 2K
-KYt < Ei << 1(207)(F - K) 2 CD
We now discuss the effect that the approximation in Xt has on two key identities. Recall
that the resulting (Xt, bt) pair must satisfy equations (71) and (62): the former comes from
the VaR restriction being tight and the latter comes from the supply/demand equation for
L's risky debt. If we impose that L satisfies his VaR constraint and plug in the simplified
expression for Xt in (81):
Kb wXt
wL + bt
wL Kbt = -
Xt - K
wL Kbt = t
Ft+ F t 
Ft K2CD
FtK~yt
b =
Ft K Yt 
(Ft -K) 2
CD
nKt
bt wt yt Ft -
1t- + K yt
( F-K 2cD
be = 1+ K y t
2c(Ft-K)2
(208)
Thus, according to the VaR constraint in (208), the amount invested in the risky debt should
be a bit smaller than that presented in equation (83). However, note that the assumption in
(82) is sufficient in justifying that bt ~ wuyt(lI - 1) since the second term in the denominator
is "small". To see why:
1 2K 1 K Ei Ky1(F K2-yt < Ei 1 yt < - < Ei << 1 + ~C( 1 K209(F- CK)2 cD (Ft - K) 2 2cDY 4 «2CD(F K)2  (
Thus, the assumption in (82) allows us to assume that the identities in equations (71) and
(62) still hold. As the assumption in (82) becomes less accurate, then w'yt(lt - 1) will
increasingly overstate the amound that L borrows. If in a given trial, yt grows enough such
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that the assumption in (82) becomes invalid, then we expect the simplified model behavior
to deviate from the full model behavior.
An interesting aspect of the simplified model is that assuming that the assumption in
(82) holds means that:
K yt F - K
Xt - Ft = < ei < e << 1  (210)2cD Ft - K 4
where we have used that Ft - K < 1.49 We denote c1 Ft4 K by E2-
What the relationship in (210) means is that the differential between Xt and Ft will be
small; this is consistent with the fact that short term lending rates to leveraged financial
intermediaries have been very close to the risk free rate historically (see Figure 22 and the
discussion in Section 2). In our model, in order for U to invest a non-negligible portion of his
wealth into L's debt, he must have a high risk tolerance for it: mathematically, this means
that SD must be small so that 2cD is such that while K y 1, aD t K is not2cD Ft-K t tK
negligible.
Assuming that sD is small is consistent with the historical fact that only 2 money market
funds have "broken the buck" (i.e. lost money) over the past 40 years. Furthermore, it
is consistent with the behavioral argument presented in [42], where the authors argue that
in the years prior to the financial crisis, investors viewed short term financial intermediary
debt as virtually default free and thus had no information gathering incentive; this resulted
in them taking portfolio positions that resembled the market more than they thought or
desired. This observation is related to systemic risk within the context of our model: U's
excess exposure to the investment asset if L defaults increases as a Dincreases.
If U is proxied by the US mutual fund industry, 0 then a very rough estimate of a? over
time is presented in Figure 43. Since 1990, it has varied roughly between 20% and 40%, and
its ebbs and flows have coincided with economic expansions and contractions respectively.
The drop in the early 1990s coincides with a recession and the aftermath of the Savings and
Loan crisis. The increase in the late 1990s followed by the drop in the early 2000s mirrors
the tech fueled expansion, which was then followed by the recession of the early 2000s. It
then steadily grows during the credit boom years of 2003-2007 and then drops from 2008
onwards. Of course, when looking at Figure 43, one must keep in mind that the data is
annual and that the short term risk free rate varied over the period. Through Figure 43, we
are not trying to give a precise historical estimate of a? as we lack the data to do so and
clearly, there are many different types of financial intermediary debt with different horizons,
covenants, etc.; rather, our aim is to give a ballpark figure of a? and highlight that it is a
non-negligible part of U's portfolio.
49Since Ft < m, unless m is a wildly high number and/or K is close to 0, this is the case. For this not to
hold for all Ft < m, the "distance" between the mean and the cth percentile would have to be over 100% in
return terms. For realistic returns distributions at decision frequencies such as daily, weekly, and annually,
m - K will be less than one.
50We use this example because of data availability.
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US Mutual Funds % Allocation to Financial Intermediary Debt
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Figure 43: Estimated percentage allocation of US mutual fund assets into levered financial
intermediary debt.
16.4 Variance of Next Period Investmet
In this section, we examine how the variance of next period's investment depends on yt when
the risk free rate is constant. Given the expression for Pt+1 in (91) in the simplified model,
it is clear that the current relative size of yt plays a role in the dispersion of the investment
change in the next period. Conditional on no default at time t + 1, the variance is:
Vart = + t ((1 - 1)lyt - (1 - a")a")) (s') 2  (211)
where s' is the standard deviation of Vt+ 1 conditional on no default. Note that the term in
parentheses above is always non-negative since:
a'(1 - a")w' < aw Ft (212)
From (211), it is clear that the variance is an increasing function of yt, and that when yt > yc,
this variance is larger than (sI)2.
To isolate the effect of L's procyclical behavior, consider an identical economy at time
t where U does not adjust aD in response to L's relative size; mathematically, this would
mean at = at+1. In this alternative setup, the variance of the investment change would be
lower. Denote the next period investment under this alternative setup as Pa+. Then:
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t+ = Vt+1 + tat(F 
- Zt+1)
Pt Pt
w"
= Vt+1 - -ata"(F - Vt+1)
Pt
(213)
Thus, the variance is:
Vart 1 - atav (s')2  2 (214)
Pt Pt
The inequality follows from:
avatw" < avw," < Pt (215)
Thus, we have shown that the variance of next period's investment is an increasing function
of yt and will be above the fundamental variance if yt > y'. This "extra" variance, compared
to the alternative setup, is a result of the fact that aD will increase following a good outcome
and decrease following a bad outcome; the magnitude of these changes in aD depend on the
relative size of L to U. In the alternative setup, variance is below the fundemantal value
due to the fact that that a constant aD " attenuates" the reinvestment response following
both good and bad outcomes: a good outcome means that L grows more than U; if aD is
constant, then the amount that L borrows grows only as fast as U's wealth, meaning that
some of the overall investment value will be shifted to the risk free asset. Analogously, a
bad outcome means that L shrinks more than U; if aD is constant, then the amount that L
borrows decreases less than L's size, meaning that some funds are shifted from the risk free
asset to L's debt and thus the risky investment.
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